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SUMMARY
Advancement in deep learning (DL) based biometric identification and the prolifera-
tion of affordable sensors made biometrics pivotal players in authentication and surveil-
lance systems. For instance, major companies (e.g., MasterCard, AliPay) already adopted
facial/voice-based authentication as part of their security measures. Furthermore, govern-
ments and private sectors use biometric recognition for a broader impact, such as identify-
ing and catching “person of interest”, targeted advertisement or border protection. While
these technologies could have enormous impacts, existing biometric authentication and
surveillance systems are vulnerable to several kinds of attacks, and also jeopardize the
privacy of people’s sensitive data. Although biometric-based systems offer superior usabil-
ity and advantage for various use cases, they have to i) defend against different kinds of
impersonation attacks and ii) protect the privacy of biometric data against adversaries.
This dissertation aims to provide solutions to above challenges. First, I will present
vulnerabilities against impersonation attacks in an authentication setting. Our study shows
that many cloud-based audio/visual recognition systems (e.g., Amazon Rekognition) can be
defeated by the crudest impersonations. Then, I will present our live biometric verification
system, the Real Time Captcha (rtCaptcha), a practical approach that places a formidable
computational burden on the attacker by combining dynamic, live detection with a random-
ized Captcha challenge for stronger security. Second, I will present our privacy-preserving
remote biometric authentication system, Justitia, which makes DL-inferences of biomet-
ric data compatible with the standard privacy-preserving primitives, like fuzzy extractors.
Justitia lets a remote server to authenticate a client without revealing the biometric data in
cleartext in the process of enrollment and authentication. Finally, I will propose a fuzzy
(labeled-) private set intersection (FLPSI) protocol for privacy-preserving biometric search.
FLPSI is a secure computation protocol that allows a client to search a biometric data over




Advances in machine learning have led to new technologies for accurately analyzing bio-
metric data, e.g. facial and voice data. With the core accuracy challenge solved, while
deploying biometrics-based systems, we now face two main problems: i) impersonation
attacks and ii) privacy violations of biometric data. In the former, because of weak liveness
detection mechanisms, users face with the risk of losing their credentials, accounts and
sensitive data, that are protected by biometrics-based authentication systems, to an impos-
tor. In the latter, attackers can compromise large biometric databases since conventional
biometrics-based authentication and recognition systems store and process biometric data
in the cleartext at the enrollment and authentication/identification times. Even though these
technologies bring great usability and advantage to end-users, companies and law enforce-
ment, risks and flawed applications raise many questions and are hindering their usage. In
this proposal, I will introduce the risks, vulnerabilities and our solutions to them.
With the increasing popularity of facial/voice-based authentication systems, major com-
panies, e.g., MasterCard [1], Uber [2] and AliPay [3], already adopted these systems as part
of their security measures. In particular, users can now authenticate themselves to one of
Machine Learning as a Service (MLaaS)-based online services by using their mobile phone
to show themselves performing simple tasks like blinking or smiling in front of its built-
in camera. However, recent work on modeling a person’s face/voice (e.g. Face2Face [4],
DeepFake [5]) allows an adversary to create very authentic video/audio of any target victim
to impersonate that target. Furthermore, our study shows that many of the publicly available
MLaaS for facial/voice recognition (e.g. Microsoft Cognitive Services [6], Face++ [7] or
Amazon Rekognition [8]) are vulnerable to even the most primitive attacks that fool these
liveness checks and impersonate the target. All it takes to launch such attacks are a few pic-
1
tures and voice samples of a victim, which can all be obtained by either abusing the camera
and microphone of the victim’s phone, or through the victim’s social media account. Other
than forging an impostor biometric, adversaries may also authenticate themselves as the
target by using replay and presentation attacks [9, 10, 11], building or re-enacting a 3D
facial or video face [12, 13, 4, 14], or fooling the DL model through perturbed pixels [15].
To stop or mitigate these impersonation attempts, at least in the large scale, a biometric-
based authentication system has to use an effective liveness verification technique, instead
of playing the cat-and-mouse game between DL systems of the attack and defense sides.
This dissertation initially presents our Real Time Captcha (rtCaptcha) system, which
stops or slows down these attacks by turning the adversary’s task from creating authentic
video/audio of the target victim performing known authentication tasks (e.g., smile, blink)
to figuring out what is the authentication task, which is encoded as a Captcha [16]. Specif-
ically, when a user tries to authenticate using rtCaptcha, they will be presented a Captcha
and will be asked to take a “selfie” video while announcing the answer to the Captcha. As
such, the security guarantee of our system comes from the strength of Captcha, and not how
well we can distinguish real faces/voices from synthesized ones. Our evaluations show that,
thanks to the humans’ speed of solving Captchas, adversaries will have to solve Captchas
in less than two seconds in order to appear live/human and defeat rtCaptcha, which is not
possible for the best settings on the attack side.
Once the large scale compromising attacks have been solved in the authentication set-
ting, we can now focus on the second major problem of the biometrics-based systems:
privacy-protection of biometric data. Conventional deployment of biometric authentication
systems involves storing bio-templates in remote servers in cleartext. However, this raises
serious privacy concerns as the biometric databases occasionally compromised. For in-
stance, millions of fingerprint and facial biometric records have recently been stolen from
the European and Indian databases [17, 18]. Current solutions propose keeping these tem-
plates on the client’s device, outside the server’s reach. However, this binds the client to
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the initial device, which prevents recovery. A more attractive solution is to have the server
authenticate the client, thereby decoupling them from the device.
Unfortunately, existing biometric template protection schemes either suffer from the
practicality or accuracy. Existing privacy-preserving methods do not accommodate the
state-of-the-art DL methods, as they are tailored to hand-crafted feature space of specific
modalities in general.
In this dissertation, I secondly present our novel pipeline, Justitia [19], that makes DL-
inferences of face and voice biometrics compatible with the standard privacy-preserving
primitives, like fuzzy extractors (FE). To this end, we first form a bridge between Euclidean
(or cosine) space of DL and Hamming space of FE, while maintaining the accuracy and
privacy of underlying schemes. I also introduce efficient noise handling methods to keep
the FE scheme practically applicable.
We implement an end-to-end prototype to evaluate our design, then show how to im-
prove the security for sensitive authentications and usability for non-sensitive, day-to-day,
authentications. Other than authentication functionality, Justitia is also a usable tool to
prevent accessing sensitive credentials (like changing passwords), authorize social media
posts, or bind public/private key to an identity.
According to our analysis, Justitia achieves the same, 0.33% false rejection at zero false
acceptance, errors as the plaintext baseline does on the YouTube Faces benchmark. More-
over, combining face and voice achieves 1.32% false rejection at zero false acceptance.
According to our systematical security assessments conducted through prior approaches
and our novel method, Justitia achieves ˜25 bits and ˜33 bits of security guarantees for
face- and face&voice-based pipelines, respectively. Further, our novel security assessment
technique could be used as a black-box method in further biometrics research.
Some application scenarios may require querying a biometric data over a sensitive and
private database in a privacy-preserving manner, which means that server should not know
either of the query data and the search result. For instance, real-time identification of per-
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sons in footage collected by surveillance equipment is a current practice that uses plaintext-
based facial recognition systems. While real-time surveillance may be beneficial to public
safety, there are serious objections due to privacy concerns [20, 21, 22]. Tracking “per-
sons of interest” may be warranted, but tracking everybody else in the process (i.e., dragnet
surveillance) is often unacceptable. In this context, a privacy-preserving biometric search
plays a crucial role to leverage the achievements of DL systems without putting people’s
sensitive data into risks.
Even though Justitia achieves privacy protection for the client’s biometric data for a
single verification task, it does not scale for searching a biometric data over a large scale
database. That is, parties have to repeat Justitia pipeline for each database entry to im-
plement a privacy-preserving database search from Justitia. Instead, in this dissertation, I
finally present a practical solution for private querying of a real-life biometric scan (e.g.,
a person’s face) against a private biometric database. The querier learns only the label(s)
of a matching scan(s) (e.g. a person’s name), and the database server learns nothing. We
formally define Fuzzy Labeled Private Set Intersection (FLPSI), a primitive computing the
intersection of noisy input sets by considering closeness/similarity instead of equality. Our
FLPSI protocol’s communication is sublinear in database size and is concretely efficient.
We implement it and apply it to facial search by integrating with our fine-tuned toolchain
that maps face images into Hamming space.
We have extensively tested our system, achieving high performance with concretely
small network usage: for a 10K-row database, the query response time over WAN (resp.
fast LAN) is 146ms (resp. 47ms), transferring 12.1MB; offline precomputation (with no
communication) time is 0.94s. FLPSI scales well: for a 1M-row database, online time is
1.66s (WAN) and 1.46s (fast LAN) with 40.8MB of data transfer in online phase and 37.5s
in offline precomputation. This improves the state-of-the-art work by 9 − 25× (on WAN)
and 1.2−4× (on fast LAN). FLPSI achieves a false non-matching rate is 0.75% for at most
10 false matches over 1M-row DB, which is comparable to underlying plaintext matching.
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1.1 Contributions and Outline
This dissertation presents the following contributions to the literature.
Showing the insecurity of MLaaS. In Chapter 2, I first present how easy to fool ex-
isting cloud-based face/voice recognition services (e.g. Microsoft Cognitive Services [6],
Face++ [7] or Amazon Rekognition [8]) even through the most primitive attacks. Accord-
ing to our analysis, using such services as part of an authentication pipeline makes the
whole system vulnerable against simple impersonation attacks.
Preventing large scale compromising attacks. Even though researchers try to detect
impersonation attacks by using machine learning techniques, the shelf-life of such mech-
anisms is not long enough since the attackers have access to same amount and quality of
data and can always play and win this cat-and-mouse game. Instead, again in the same
Chapter 2, I introduce our novel mechanism, rtCaptcha, that detects liveness of the client
by binding her biometrics to response of a random challenge. This forces the attackers
to involve the standard cryptographic challenge-response mechanism, and brings them an
unavoidable computation burden that tell impostors and humans apart.
Privacy protection of biometrics in authentication setting. In Chapter 3, I present
our privacy-preserving remote biometric authentication system, Justitia. I initially show
how to address space incompatibility problem between deep learning, which handles the
fuzzy biometric data mostly through Euclidean or cosine similarity space, and crypto-
graphic primitives that achieves privacy preserving. While doing this I also show how
to avoid accuracy loss of underlying deep learning techniques without sacrificing from the
performance.
Measuring security of biometric authentication systems. One of the most challeng-
ing task in biometrics-based system is measuring the achieved security against smash-and-
grab attacks, which assume the adversary can get the whole database and tries to infer the
biometrics of any enrolled user in it. Despite the many attempts in the literature, there
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is no universally agreed mechanism to measure the entropy in a biometrics-based system.
In Chapter 3, I also present a novel black-box security assessment technique that assumes
a powerful threat model, where the adversary can leverage from the domain knowledge
and device a generative adversarial network-based model to create photo-realistic impostor
samples to match an enrollment in the database.
Privacy protection of biometrics in recognition setting. In Chapter 4, I present fuzzy
labeled private set intersection (FLPSI) protocol, which is designed for protecting privacy
of fuzzy data (such as biometric data) in a large scale database search. I initially show how
to map biometric inputs of a person into a t-out-of-T exact matching set elements without a
major accuracy loss. Then, I present how to build an LPSI protocol upon AES blockcipher,
garbled circuits, latice-based fully homomorphic encryption and secure secret sharing al-
gorithms to fundamentally solve the privacy problem of surveillance data in a semi-honest
two-party computation model. That is how a client (e.g., police officer, retail store etc.) can
search the biometrics of regular people over a server’s sensitive database without sacrificing
from the real-time performance and accuracy loss compared to the plaintext systems.
Formal security definition and proof of biometrics-based cryptographic protocols.
In the same chapter, I also present a novel simulation-based security definition technique
for the protocols that accept fuzzy inputs, and then formally prove the security of FLPSI
protocol. In secure multi-party computation (MPC), the preferred simulation-based secu-
rity definitions offer composable guarantees with a requirement of a precise specification
in ideal-world behavior, which is not known how to achieve for fuzzy functions. That is
why the current practice is using game-based definitions that are not composable, but allow
to bound instead of precisely specifying the adversary success. Our novel definitional ap-
proach allows the best of both worlds: a composable ideal-real world simulation, and yet
bound adversary success rather than exactly specifying it. This is a generic definition and
incorporates optional leakage, and thus can serve as a template in defining primitives in the
biometric space for the future research.
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CHAPTER 2
PREVENTING LARGE SCALE COMPROMISING ATTACKS
In this chapter, I will present rtCaptcha, a real time Captcha based liveness detection sys-
tem, to mitigate large scale impersonation attempts in face- and voice-based remote bio-
metric authentication settings.
2.1 Introduction
With automatic facial/voice recognition becoming more accurate1 and available2, online
services are increasingly allowing their users to authenticate using their face/voice. In
such authentication schemes, all one needs to do to authenticate is to perform simple tasks
like smile, blink or nod in front of his/her mobile phone, while the phone’s camera will
record the video of the user performing such a task and send it to the service provider. The
authentication is successful if the service provider determines that the received video is
indeed that of the expected user performing the required task.
While these new generation facial-recognition-based authentication systems offer su-
perior usability and are robust in benign settings, existing works already have shown that
they are quite vulnerable to several kinds of attacks. Depending on how the malicious
video/media is fed into the authentication system in order to impersonate a user, existing
attacks can be classified as presentation attacks and compromising attacks (see Fig. 2.1 for
an illustration).
As we can see in Fig. 2.1, presentation attacks physically “present” the impersonating
media (mostly static photos or masks) to the sensors used by the authentication system,
while compromising attacks involve tempering/fabricating the digital output of the sensors.
1Facebook [23] and Google [24] have respectively achieved recognition accuracies of 97.35% and 99.63%
on faces under different illumination, pose and facial expressions
2Through cloud services like Microsoft Cognitive Services or Amazon Rekognition
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Figure 2.1: Attack channels specified by ISO/IEC 3017-1 standard and possible spoof-
ing media types deployed via these channels. CHpa and CHca represent presentation and
compromising attack channels respectively.
An observation we can make here is that compromising attacks are potentially much
more scalable than presentation attacks, because compromising attacks can happen en-
tirely in the digital world, while presentation attacks are restricted to physically presenting
something to the target system. Recent advances in face modeling (e.g. Face2Face [4]) fur-
ther make it easier to automate compromising attacks. In particular, all an attacker needs
to generate authentic looking video of the target victim performing the task necessary for
authentication are pictures or videos of the victim. Such materials can be obtained either
through abusing the camera of the authentication device, or through accessing publicly
available data from the victim’s social media accounts– all very doable once the attacker
has a foothold on the authentication device (e.g. have their malicious app installed and
granted the right permissions). Once such “authentication video” is generated, the attacker
will need a way to feed it into the authentication system to launch a compromising attack.
This final step can be achieved in a number of ways, e.g. through compromising the au-
thentication device’s OS (and then modifying the output buffer of the camera) or through
reverse engineering the authentication protocol and directly talking to the server.
Based on the above observation that compromising attacks are much easier to launch
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in a large scale than presentation attacks, we will focus on the former in this paper. How-
ever, as we will note in Sect. 2.8, our solution is also expected to make state-of-the-art
presentation attacks more detectable.
Regarding existing work in defense against both presentation and compromising at-
tacks, we can argue that most defenses focus on making it harder for the adversary to
generate sufficiently good video of the victim performing the “authentication task.” An
obvious example is to perform better analysis of the received video to determine if it came
from a real human or was somehow synthesized. A less obvious example is liveness de-
tection, which is mainly used to defeat “replay” attacks that employ static pictures of the
victim; and this simply pushes the attackers to create animated 3D models, instead of con-
tinuing to use static pictures. What remains constant is that the “authentication task” is
predefined, fixed and known to the adversary, and this allows the adversary to develop new
technologies to create authentic videos of the victims performing the right task.
In this work, we propose a different, orthogonal approach; instead of making it harder
for the adversary to generate video of the victim performing the known task to fool our sys-
tem, we make it harder for the adversary to know what is the required task the user must
perform in order to successfully complete the authentication. In particular, at each authen-
tication attempt, instead of asking the user to perform simple actions such as blink or smile
in front of the camera on the authentication device, our server will send the user a Captcha
and have the authentication device take a video of the user answering that Captcha. For a
normal user, this will be easy, but for an automated attack, this will mean automatically
solving the Captcha before feeding the answer into the algorithm for generating fake video
of the user answering the Captcha. As in all Captcha schemes, we can assume that the
time it takes for a real user to solve the Captcha is significantly shorter than it is for the
adversary (even if some human intervention is involved, see Sect. 2.7 for our evaluation
of this claim), and only authenticate in case the correct response is received within some
threshold time.
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To summarize, the high level idea of our system is to turn the attacker’s task from
generating good quality video of the victim to one of breaking Captcha– a task that is well
understood and studied by the security community. A point worth noting is that while the
security of our system depends on the security of the Captcha scheme we used, we consider
the security of Captcha an orthogonal problem. We believe Captcha (i.e. being able to
tell if a user of an online service is a human) is so important, not only to us, but to the
whole online ecosystem, that the security of Captcha will continue to improve, and any
improvement in the security/robustness of Captcha can be easily adopted to our system.
We have implemented our high level idea in a prototype system called rtCaptcha. Our
user study shows that normal human response time to the Captcha presented at authenti-
cation time is less than 1 second even for the most complex scheme. We also conducted
experiments on the same challenges with existing Captcha solving services and state-of-the
art techniques which has 34.38% average recognizing accuracy and 6.22 seconds average
execution time [25]. In other words, there is a very large safety margin between the re-
sponse time of a human solving a Captcha and a machine trying to break one.
In summary, the contributions of this work are:
1. We perform an empirical spoofing analysis on current cloud based audio/visual recog-
nition and verification systems that use state-of-the art data-driven deep learning ar-
chitectures.
2. We propose a practical and usable liveness detection scheme by using security in-
frastructure of Captchas to defeat even the most scalable and automated attacks.
3. We perform analysis on existing automated and man-powered Captcha-breaking ser-
vices and state-of-the art Captcha-solving algorithms by using the most popular
Captcha schemes in the market.
4. We have implemented a prototype Android application and conducted a user study.
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5. Our evaluations show that audio response of a normal human being to a Captcha chal-
lenge is much shorter than automated attacks which have state-of-the art synthesizers
and Captcha-breaking methods.
In the rest of the paper, we will introduce our threat model in Sect. 2.2, present existing
attacks and defense mechanisms in Sect. 2.3, present our experiment on launching com-
promising attacks against existing, publicly available systems in Sect. 2.4, describe design
and details of rtCaptcha in Sect. 2.5, evaluate the human performance and existing Captcha
breaking tools on solving Captcha challenges along with usability and user acceptance of
rtCaptcha in Sect. 2.6, provide the security analysis of rtCaptcha against our threat model in
Sect. 2.7, discuss about limitations and future works in Sect. 2.8, and conclude in Sect. 2.9.
2.2 Threat Model
In this work, we focus on defending against powerful, automated compromising attacks.
We assume the following threat model:
• the authentication device is a mobile phone with a camera and a microphone,
• the authentication server is not compromised,
• the kernel of the authentication device can be compromised,
• there is no form of attestation mechanism on the authentication device, since software
attestation is theoretically security by obscurity and hardware attestation is not yet avail-
able for phones,
• the protocol between the client app running on the authentication device and the server
is known to the attacker, thus the attacker can run malicious version of the client app on
the authentication device that will completely control the camera and microphone input
to the authentication server,
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• the attacker can abuse the camera and microphone on the authentication device to collect
samples of the face and voice of the victim; the collected samples can then be used to
generate models of the victim’s voice and face, which can then be used to synthesize
videos and audios for impersonating the victim during a future authentication session,
• the attack needs to be completely automated, and it needs to happen on the victim’s
authentication device, otherwise we believe the attack cannot scale.
Out-of-scope: Based on above assumptions, we consider the following attacks out
of scope for this work. 1) Presentation attacks which involve showing 2/3D printed and
wearable masks, hard copy photos or device screens displaying the target’s face and other
rudimentary manipulations, (since this means the attack must happen on an authentication
device physically controlled by the attacker, thus violating the last assumption in the threat
model). 2) Facial mimicry manipulations through face reenactment [26, 4], where facial
expressions of an imposter solving the Captcha are captured and applied in real time to a
3D model of the victim to synthesize the victim’s face responding to our liveness detection
challenge3 (this requires a source actor to perform the act before the software can map it to
the target subject, which is not a practical and scalable attack scenario for automated tasks).
2.3 Related Work
In this section, we summarize existing liveness detection methods against both presentation
and compromising attacks.
2.3.1 Presentation Attacks and Defenses
The requirement of liveness detection systems against face spoofing attacks was first in-
troduced by researchers who showed that existing face authentication applications for both
desktop and mobile platforms are vulnerable to single image spoofing [9, 10]. As a defense
3In [4], this can be achieved with a 20ms latency.
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mechanism against this attack, researchers proposed challenge-response based liveness de-
tection mechanisms that involve user interaction such as smile, blink, lip or head move-
ment, etc. [27, 28]. However, frame switching or video-based attacks proved how easy it
was to bypass smile or blink detection since they have arbitrary facial frames creating a mo-
tion to fulfill desired challenges [11]. Both image and video-based attacks are deployed as
presentation attacks, but, they also are suitable for a compromising attack scenario. How-
ever, the latter attacks and corresponding defense mechanisms have been sophisticated for
either presentation or compromising attacks.
Against presentation attacks, researchers mainly focused on discriminating 3D struc-
ture, texture or reflectance of a human face from a planar surface. To this end, 3D shape
inferring features such as optical flow and focal length analysis, color and micro texture
analysis, or features extracting reflectance details (such as visual rhythm analysis) have
been proposed against presentation attacks [29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34]. On the other hand,
researchers proposed a wearable 3D mask for presentation attacks to defeat all of these
anti-spoofing methods. However, reflectance and texture analysis-based defense mecha-
nisms have also been proposed against 3D mask attacks [35, 36, 37, 38]. It is worth noting
that many different approaches and design choices have been proposed at the competitions
on the countermeasures to presentation attacks [39, 40, 41].
2.3.2 Compromising Attacks and Defenses
Recent advances in 3D face model creation (using a couple of images) have been employed
to launch compromising attacks [13]. In order to capture enough raw material for model
generation, the victim’s face/voice could be captured through a user interface (UI) redress-
ing attack caused by a malicious app that allows particular permissions (e.g. draw-on-top
on Android device [42]) without his/her notice. To generate a 3D face model from cap-
tured image/video, the most suitable approach in existing literature is to use pre-built 3D
Morphable Models (3DMMs) [43, 44, 45]. 3DMMs are the statistical 3D representations
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built on facial textures and shapes of many different subjects (e.g. 10,000 faces in [44]) by
incorporating with their facial expressions and physical attributes at the same time. Once
built, a 3DMM is ready for reconstruction according to facial attributes of a victim’s face.
The details of building a 3D face model could be found in [44], but the overall pipeline is
as follows. First, facial landmarks which express pose, shape and expression are extracted
from the victim’s face. Then, the 3DMM is reconstructed to match the landmarks from
both the 3D model and the face. Hence, pose, shape and expression of the face are trans-
ferred to the 3DMM. After reshaping the 3DMM, texture of the victim’s face is conveyed
to the 3D model. Since a 2D face photo/frame does not contain full representation of its
3D correspondence, a photo-realistic facial texture is generated from the visible face area
in the photo/frame for missing parts in the 3D representation [14]. Then, this 3D face is
transferred into a VR environment to fulfill requested challenge tasks (e.g., smile, blink,
rotate head, etc.).
On the defense against compromising attacks, even though some inertial sensor-assisted
methods increase the security of facial authentication systems [46], such a compromised
environment with given permissions can allow attackers to use additional sensor data to ma-
nipulate the motion of 3D face model in a VR environment. Another defense mechanism
against these attacks, especially against VR based ones, could be analyzing the authenti-
cation media by using forensic techniques to detect forged audio/video [47, 48]. However,
since 3D face models are created from scratch with high fidelity texture data, these methods
could not detect any forgery on spoofing media. On the other hand, new approaches (such
as discrepancy analysis on color filter array of camera sensor noise or multi-fractal and re-
gression analysis on discriminating natural and computer generated images) could be used
as countermeasures against 3D-face-model-based attacks [49, 50]. However, attackers can
extract genuine noise patterns or features from existing or captured images to embed them
into generated video in a compromised device, thus, these defense mechanisms also fail
against our threat model [51]. Hence, defense mechanisms against compromised attacks
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should not rely on additional device data as suggested in previous works.
User authentication through audio response to text challenges is first proposed by Gao
et al. [52]. However, their goal is mainly to distinguish between natural and synthesized
voice. Their results show that human responses can pass the system with 97% accuracy in
7.8 seconds average time while a very basic text-to-speech (TTS) tool (Microsoft SDK 5.14)
can pass the system with 4% success rate. In contrast to rtCaptcha, the work in [52] use
plain-text challenges and thus allows the attacker to easily learn what is the task involved in
the liveness detection challenge, and thus can be easily defeated by more sophisticated real-
time synthesis of the victim’s voice (e.g. [53, 54]). Shirali et al. [55] proposed a scheme
that involves audio Captchas. In their system, challenges are sent to users in audio formats
and users give audio responses back to the system. They use audio features such as Mel-
Frequency Cepstral Spectrum (MFCC) to correlate challenge and response audios at the
decision side. They achieved 80% of authentication accuracy on average. However, since
breaking audio Captchas are as easy as breaking plain-text challenge by using a speech-
to-text application, this work also does not provide good defense against compromising
attacks. To the best of our knowledge, rtCaptcha is the first approach that binds a text-
based Captcha challenge response with user’s biometric data in the realm of audio/visual
liveness detection.
2.4 Evaluating the Security of Existing Systems
In this section, we study how vulnerable the most popular facial and voice-authentication
systems are to the compromising attacks which motivate our work in rtCaptcha. In par-
ticular, we tested all studied systems against compromising attacks of various levels of
sophistication in terms of how they create the impersonating video/audio of the victims,
using open source spoofing datasets.
4www.microsoft.com/en-us/download/details.aspx?id=10121
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Number of Verified Faces Over 10 / Overall
Confidence Rate (%)
TP TN 3Dsf 3Dfg 3Dct8 2Dcar 2Dske 2Dfem
Microsoft 10 / 78 10 / 65 10 / 70 10 / 75 10 / 70 10 / 82 10 / 84 10 / 86
Kairos 10 / 80 8 / 58 10 / 75 10 / 78 10 / 73 10 / 91 10 / 83 10 / 80
Face++ 10 / 87 10 / 83 10 / 86 10 / 71 10 / 72 9 / 77 7 / 80 7 / 75
Amazon 10 / 97 10 / 82 10 / 89 8 / 77 9 / 67 7 / 84 6 / 84 9 / 89
2.4.1 Facial Authentication Systems
We tested most popular cloud-based facial recognition services that are provided or funded
by major companies such as Microsoft [6], Amazon [8], AliPay (Face++) [7] and Kairos [56].
Database: We tested each studied system against videos showing real/fake faces. We
used subjects from the open source CASIA Face Anti-Spoofing Database [57]. In partic-
ular, we took the genuine videos from the CASIA Face Anti-Spoofing Database and: 1)
used them as positive samples to test each studied system, and 2) used them as samples
for generating synthesized videos, and used them as negative samples against each tested
system. For our experiment, we used the first 10 subjects from the CASIA database.
Synthesizing methods: We tested each studied system against videos synthesized us-
ing methods with various levels of sophistication. Fig. 2.2 presents a complete set of syn-
thesized video for a user in the database (5th subject in training set). We can summarize
the synthesizing techniques employed starting from the most complex to the simplest as
followed:
1. 3D Face Model: This is the state-of-the art method for generating fake face video for
the purpose of compromising attacks [13]. For our experiments, we generated 3D face
models from genuine videos of each subject in our dataset by using three different
tools: i) Surrey Face Model (labeled as 3Dsf in Fig. 2.2), a multi-resolution 3DMM
and accompanying open-source tool [45]; ii) FaceGen5 (3Dfg), and iii) demo version of
5https://facegen.com
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Figure 2.2: A full media set including genuine and fake versions of it for a subject in our
face authentication database.
CrazyTalk86 (3Dct8) commercial tools used for 3D printing or rendering 3D animation
and game characters. Although the demo tool puts a brand mark on 3D models, they
don’t seem to have any effect on the effectiveness of the attack.
2. Cartoonized and Sketch Photos: To detect whether the face authentication systems
check the texture information or not, we convert randomly grabbed frames from the
genuine videos to cartoonized and sketch forms7. We express these manipulations with
2Dcar and 2Dske, respectively.
3. Fake Eyes/Mouth Photo: Finally, we replaced eyes and mouth regions of the stationary
photos with fake ones which are cropped from an animation character. We conduct this
attack method to prove that facial authentication and verification systems only focus on
the location of facial attributes. To create appropriate fake eyes and mouth, we first
extract the facial landmarks to get their regions. Afterwards, we reshape our fake eyes




represented by 2Dfem in the evaluation results.
Methodology: We experimented with each studied service as followed: we enrolled
each subject with his genuine face sample. After the enrollment, we established the base-
line performance of each service by presenting one genuine face from the enrolled user
(thus measuring its true positive, TP) and one genuine face from a different user (thus
measuring its true negative, TN). To test the robustness of each service against attacks, we
presented each service with all of our synthesized videos. To make the experiment more
realistic, we generated the synthesized videos using samples different from those used for
registration. The success rate of each synthesis technique and its overall similarity rates
(which is the tested service’s measure of how close the presented video is to the one from
registration) are in Table 2.1. Since most of the services accept 50% of similarity rate for
correct verification, we also consider this threshold in our experiments.
Findings: First of all, under benign conditions, we find the analyzed services have an
overall baseline true positive (TP) of 100% and an overall baseline true negative (TN) of
95%, with 85.5% and 75.7% overall confidence rates, respectively. Our results also show
that Amazon Rekognition service performs best among all tested service, since its con-
fidence rates on both TP and TN are highest. Unfortunately, we also find that all of the
analyzed services are vulnerable against almost all of the tested synthesis techniques. Re-
sults show that 92.5% of the spoofed faces are detected as genuine copies with an average
similarity rate of 79%. More specifically, Cartoonized and Sketch photo attacks showed
that the texture information is not considered in the authentication process at these sys-
tems. When we made detailed analysis to understand the reason for a lower matching rate
in the Sketch photo attack, we conclude that it is because the tested services cannot de-
tect facial region on those samples. The success of Cartoonized and Sketch photo attacks
highlights that attackers can succeed without putting much effort in building a high fidelity
facial texture; it would add to the latency in generating the synthesized video to answer
the liveness detection challenge presented. Moreover, results of fake eyes/mouth spoofing
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Figure 2.3: Smiling probabilities of genuine and fake samples with 78.52% similarity rate.
amusingly proved that all of these systems are only using the landmark locations as the
facial feature set on their face authentication protocol. 3D facial model spoofing results
also support these outcomes since we used non-sophisticated tools to create 3D models and
facial textures. Even though the demo software puts some brand marks over the generated
face, we still get very high similarity rates with these 3D models. Hence, faces created by
one of the latest 3D facial model generation software (e.g. [12, 14]) are very unlikely to be
detected as fake by these services. As a result, we can make an inference that even if a fa-
cial authentication scheme uses a challenge-response based liveness detection mechanism
(such as smile/blink detection) accompanying one of these services, it will be very easy to
spoof such a scheme even by conducting a rough switching frame manipulation (e.g. when
asked to blink, go from a frame with open eyes to one with closed eyes for a short time)
or using a demo application to create 3D face model and manipulate the model to answer
the challenge. For instance, Fig. 2.3 shows how easy it is to get a high smiling probabil-
ity from Microsoft Cognitive Service even with a rough manipulation on a genuine face
while preserving similarity rate around 78.52%. Assuming a security mechanism that uses
smile-detection as a liveness clue and MS Face API to authenticate user face (as Uber does
for driver authentication), then a crude attack as in the figure can defeat this mechanism
without using any sophisticated tool or algorithm.
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2.4.2 Voice Authentication Systems
In this section, we show that automatic speaker verification (ASV) systems also have sim-
ilar vulnerabilities to compromising attacks as do their facial recognition counterparts. To
make a clear demonstration, we systematically conducted attacks with synthesized voices
from the MS Speaker Identification (SI) service by using open-sourced synthesized speech
data sets.
Database: In our experiments, we used two different datasets, from ASV Spoofing
Challenge [58] (Vasv) and DNN based speaker adaptation work by Wu et al. [54] (Vdnn).
The first dataset, Vasv, contains both genuine and synthesized voice samples for a total
of 106 male and female users. ASV Spoofing Challenge is organized for Interspeech
2015 Conference to determine best technique detecting spoofing methods against auto-
matic speaker verification systems. Hence, organizers published Vasv dataset containing
synthesized versions of genuine data which are generated by 7 voice conversion (VC) and
3 speech synthesizing (SS) techniques. We denoted these samples from V1asv to V
10
asv. Some
of the synthesized data have published before the submissions evaluated, which are called
known attacks, and some of them are used only for evaluation which are called unknown
attacks. Overall spoofing detection accuracy of the submissions is around 97% for known
attacks and 91% for unknown attacks. It is worth noting that almost all submitted counter-
measure methods perform worst on the last SS based samples (V10asv).
The second dataset, Vdnn, contains both genuine and synthesized samples for one fe-
male and one male speaker, where the synthesized speech samples were generated by using
7 different settings of their DNN framework. These samples are denoted as V1−7dnn . Objec-
tive and subjective experiments prove that all DNN techniques in the paper have better
adaptation performance than the hidden Markov model baseline in terms of naturalness
and speaker similarity. Hence, we use this dataset as the state-of-the art spoofing attacks.
Methodology: We first enrolled 10 users using their genuine samples from the two
datasets, (2 users from Vdnn and 8 randomly selected users from Vasv), each with a total
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Figure 2.4: Success rate of speaker spoofing attacks to Microsoft SI service.
of 30 seconds of speech samples. We then tested the targeted service against 10 genuine
samples from the enrolled user, as well as 7 (for Vdnn) or 10 (for Vasv) synthesized samples
generated for the enrolled user by each tested technique, and evaluated if each tested sample
was successfully identified as the enrolled user.
Findings: In Fig. 2.4, we present the genuine identification results for the genuine
samples (Org), synthesized samples generated by 10 different methods in the Vasv dataset
(V1asv to V
10
asv) and 7 different DNN methods in the Vdnn dataset from left to right. V
1−7
dnn
average result is given for 7 DNN based synthesizers in the Vdnn dataset. First of all, we
note that 97% of the genuine samples were identified correctly. Hence, it shows that the
cloud service is working accurately for the recognition tasks. On the other hand, samples
synthesized by various tested SS and VC methods have an average success rate of 64.6%.
More specifically, even with the worst performing VC tool, there are still 28.75% of the
synthesized samples identified to be from the real enrolled user. Additionally, samples
from open sourced TTS synthesizers (10th method of Vasv) can have a 90% chance of
being considered legitimate. Finally, if an adversary generate synthesized voice of a victim
by using a DNN based approach, the SI service identify the forged speakers as a genuine
one 100% of time (this is true for all methods/settings in Vdnn). The results also prove
that the parameter space to synthesize is much more bigger than those which are used
by verification methods. That is why, even the simplest VC approach can tune the voice
characteristics of the victim to the level of a verification system’s requirements.
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Figure 2.5: Process flow diagram of rtCaptcha. Tr, Th and Fvf refer to user response time,
human response time threshold and face & voice feature vector, respectively.
2.5 Our Approach
The workflow of rtCaptcha is summarized in Fig. 2.5. The workflow starts when an authen-
tication device (i.e. mobile phone) needs to start an authentication/registration session; to
proceed, it will establish a secure connection with our authentication server. Upon receiv-
ing requests over the secure channel, our server will generate and send a Captcha challenge
to the authentication device and measure the time until the authentication device responds.
The session will time out if no response is received after a predefined period.
On the authentication device, once it receives the Captcha challenge, it will display the
challenge to the user and start recording the user’s audio response. The client app running
on the authentication device will also take a number of snapshots of the user at random time
while he/she is responding to the challenge, using the front camera on the phone. We use
the phone’s voice recognition system to determine when the user has finished responding to
the Captcha challenge; the captured voice and face samples will then be sent to the server
using the established secure channel. To avoid unnecessarily utilizing the more expensive
voice/facial recognition service, our server will perform initial sanity check of the response
by transcribing the audio response received using a standard speech-to-text (STT) algo-
rithm to determine if the response corresponds to the Captcha solution to the challenge we
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sent. We will also determine how much time it takes for the user to start responding to the
challenge by measuring when did the first speech activity happen in the received response.
If the user took too long to start responding, we will consider the liveness test a failure and
reject the authentication/registration request. If the received response passes the prelimi-
nary checks, we’ll perform the more expensive analysis to determine if the validity of the
received voice and face samples (the exact process will depend on whether the request is
for authentication or registration, and we will detail the process for each case below).
Registration: Our analysis for registration is very simple and mostly involves sanity
check of the received face and voice sample to make sure they came from a real human
being to further avoid bot registration and avoid wasting resources to establish accounts
for non-existent/non-human users. If necessary, we can also match the received samples
against that of all existing users to detect attempts to register multiple accounts for the same
person. If the face and voice samples pass all our tests, we will proceed to create the new
user account and tie the received face and voice sample to that user and use them for future
authentication sessions.
Authentication: For authentication requests, if the user is trying to authenticate as user
X, we will compare the received facial and voice samples against the samples received at
the establishment of account X. If the samples are verified as coming from user X, we can
confirm the liveness and authenticity of the request; liveness is confirmed since the Captcha
challenge is correctly answered, authenticity is confirmed through the matching face and
voice sample. Thus, we will report to the user that the authentication is successful and
let him/her log in as user X. Upon successful authentication of a user, we can also add
the received face and voice sample for this authentication attempt to the user’s record to
improve his/her face and voice profile for future authentication.
Using this framework, we can prevent the adversary from launching automatic, large-
scale user impersonation using compromised phones. In the following, we will provide
implementation details of the rtCaptcha system.
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2.5.1 Captcha Challenge
For our implementation of rtCaptcha, we’ve employed a number of commonly used Captcha
generation tools so we can experiment with and fine tune the difficulty level of our liveness
detection. In the following we will give a brief description of the Captcha schemes we’ve
experimented with.
In the literature, text-based Captchas are classified into three different categories ac-
cording to font styles and positional relationships between adjacent characters. The three
categories are, namely, character isolated (CI) schemes, hollow character schemes, and
crowding characters together (CCT) schemes [25]. Some Captcha providers also use vari-
able character sizes and rotations or different kinds of distortions and background noises
to make their Captcha harder to break. For our experiments, we obtained Captcha samples
used by Gao et al. [25] (which conducted generic Captcha breaking attacks on them). We
also have modified the Cool PHP Captcha8 framework to create variable size Captchas of
short phrases or numbers to include random lines on background. Table 2.2 summarizes
different Captcha schemes we have experimented with in our user study and evaluations.
Table 2.2: The most popular Captcha schemes
Sample Scheme Websites
reCAPTCHA (CCT scheme)
linkedin, facebook, google, youtube,
twitter, blogspot, wordpress
Ebay (CCT scheme) ebay.com
Amazon (CCT scheme) amazon.com
Yandex (Hollow scheme) yandex.com
Yahoo! (Hollow scheme) yahoo.com
Microsoft (CI scheme) live.com, bing.com
Regarding the hardness of these Captcha schemes, Brodic et al. [59] shows that an
average Internet user can solve text and numeric Captchas in hollow and CCT (reCaptcha)
8Cool PHP Captcha is used in the reCaptcha scheme, and is available at https://github.com/josecl/cool-p
hp-captcha
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schemes at around 20 seconds on average (3 secs. min.). They also show that Captcha
solving time is correlated with education and age. However, previous findings focus on the
scenario where the user has to type in the answer to the Captcha, while in our case, they
only have to speak out the answer, which should be faster and easier than typing. Thus, we
have performed our own user study to determine how long it will take users to complete
the liveness challenge in our settings. Our findings are reported in Sect. 2.6.
2.5.2 Transcribing Captcha Responses
As a first step in our validation of the face and voice samples received for the liveness
test under rtCaptcha, we transcribe the voice sample using a speech-to-text (STT) algo-
rithm to see if it’s a correct answer to the Captcha we sent. In our framework, we used
a Hidden Markov Model (HMM)-based approach with a pre-trained dictionary. We used
the open-sourced CMU Pocketsphinx library, Carnegie Mellon University’s Sphinx speech
recognition system [60], in our user study app since it provides a lightweight library work-
ing on mobile devices. CMU Sphinx is the state-of-the art solution among HMM based
approaches. There also are many sophisticated alternatives for this step. For example,
recently Baidu’s open source framework Deep Speech 2 exceeds the accuracy of human
beings on several benchmarks [61]. They trained a deep neural network (DNN) system
with 11,940 hours of English speech samples. Cloud-based cognitive services such as Mi-
crosoft Bing Speech API9 or IBM Watson Speech to Text10 also could be used as STT
algorithm for this step. However, network latency caused by audio sample transmission
could be a drawback in our framework.
2.5.3 Audio Response Validation
Given a verified audio response of the Captcha challenge, the next verification process tests




Figure 2.6: Time window for adversarial actions.
will show that giving audible response is much faster. Furthermore, the attacker’s time
window for breaking Captcha challenges and synthesizing a victim’s face and challenge
announcing voice is smaller than even the duration of audible response. As depicted in
the top of the Fig. 2.6, adversarial action time is limited with the beginning of the speech
activity.
Speech activity detection, also referred to as voice activity detection (VAD), is a ubiqui-
tous method that has been studied and discussed in different contexts such as audio coding,
content analysis and information retrieval, speech transmission, automatic segmentation
and speech recognition, especially in the noisy environments [62, 63]. In our framework,
we used a hybrid model that follows a data-driven approach by exploiting different speech-
related characteristics such as spectral shape, spectro-temporal modulations, periodicity
structure and long-term spectral variability profiles [64]. After getting different streams
representing each of these profiles, the information from the streams is applied to the input
layer of a Multilayer Perceptron classifier. The overall equal error rate of this approach is
around 2% when a classifier is built with 30 hours data and tested on 300 hours data. Since
our audio responses will be a few seconds, the error rate will be a few milliseconds. On the
bottom of Fig. 2.6, we presented speech activity detection on the spectrogram of a sample
Captcha response audio from our experiments.
26
Once user response time has been extracted, if it is within an expected human response
time and not-longer than the breaking time of the corresponding Captcha scheme, we verify
the challenge response as a genuine attempt. The reference response time window could be
adapted for each user and Captcha scheme with his/her response times from the successful
attempts since Captcha reading behavior could vary for each person and scheme.
2.5.4 Facial and Voice Verification
After getting a correct Captcha response within a real human response time, we verify the
user’s facial and voice data by using data from the registration phase. If the attempt is
a new user registration, we again make facial and speaker recognition to check that the
new user is not a duplicate one. Facial and speaker recognition and verification literature
could be investigated under two different categories; first one is feature or descriptor-based
(old fashioned) and the second one is a data-driven DNN-based (modern) approach. In our
experiments, we used cognitive services of Face++ and Microsoft to verify a user’s face
and voice, respectively.
2.6 Evaluation
In this section, we present the results of our evaluation on rtCaptcha to show that it provides
a strong, yet usable, liveness detection to protect facial/voice-based authentication systems
against compromising attacks. In particular, we have performed a user study to measure:
1) the time difference between a real user solving the Captcha presented by rtCaptcha
versus the time it takes for an algorithm to break it, 2) the usability and user acceptance of
rtCaptcha.
Note that our user study has been approved by the Institutional Reviews Board of Geor-
gia Institute of Technology.
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Table 2.3: Response times and challenge recognition accuracy of our approach
(Humanaud), men-powered Captcha solving service (Attacktyp), OCR based (Attackocr)
and state-of-the art Captcha breaking algorithms (Attackbest) [25].
Time (secs) / Recognition accuracy (%)
Task Captcha scheme Humanaud Attacktyp Attackocr Attackbest
1 Plaintext 0.77 / 91.9 N/A N/A N/A
2 reCaptchanum 0.90 / 87.1 22.11 / 96.7 2.98 / 0 10.27 / 77.2
2 Ebaynum 0.73 / 94.1 12.33 / 100 2.79 / 0 05.98 / 58.8
2 Yandexnum 0.89 / 87.7 15.05 / 96.7 3.30 / 0 15.50 / 02.2
3 reCaptchaphrase 1.02 / 88.0 20.88 / 91.5 3.03 / 0 N/A
2.6.1 User Study Procedure and Data Collection
We implemented an Android app to experiment with five different challenge response-
based liveness detections, where the user either has to read numbers or text presented on
the screen, or perform an action in front of the screen. All text-based challenges will have
the user read a number of phrases comprised of two to three simple words, and numeric
challenges of 6-digit numbers.
It is worth noting that users pronounced all of the numeric or phrase challenges (in plain
text or Captcha forms) out loud in our experiments.
To be more specific, our five tested liveness detection based upon the following chal-
lenges: 1) two text phrase and one numeric challenges as plaintext; 2) three numeric chal-
lenges as Captcha images with reCaptcha, Ebay and Yandex schemes; 3) three text phrase
challenges in an animated Captcha images with reCaptcha scheme. In this task, we display
challenge words individually by animating (e.g., sliding from left to right) them sequen-
tially with small time delays. The idea behind this approach is to prevent the attacker
from extracting the challenge from one single frame, and instead force him/her to extract
the Captcha as moving targets. On the other hand, we believe understanding an animated
Captcha should be not too much more difficult than solving one at a fixed location for a hu-
man being. For this part of our experiment, we used Captcha samples collected by Gao et
al. [25] for Ebay and Yandex schemes. To obtain reCaptcha samples that are either purely
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Figure 2.7: Screen shots of our prototype. From left to right; tasks 2, 3 and 4, resp.
numerical or purely text (which are not included in the dataset from [25]), we generated
them using Cool PHP Captcha tool which creates custom word Captchas in reCaptcha
scheme; 4) challenge to blink, and 5) challenge to smile.
To improve the usability of our liveness detection, for challenges 1 to 3, our app will
only present one challenge at a time, and we used CMU Pocketsphinx library for real-time
speech recognition on mobile devices to know when the user has finished attempting the
current challenge (by noticing the stop of utterance), show them whether they’re successful
before moving on to the next challenge phrase or number. Similarly, for challenges 4
and 5, we used Google’s Mobile Vision API to obtain smiling and blinking probability to
determine when the user has answered our challenge. Fig. 2.7 shows sample screen shots
from our Android app while conducting Captcha challenges and blink detection.
We recruited 31 volunteers for our experiments and had them use our Android app,
which has installed on a LG Nexus 4 device we own. At the beginning of our experiment
with each participant, we explained the purpose of our experiment and showed them an
introductory video about how to use the Android app to complete the tasks. Then we
asked each participant to answer 3 rounds of challenges for each of the 5 different kinds of
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challenges listed above (i.e., 15 challenges in total). For each challenge, we set a timeout
of 10 seconds and considered it a failure and moved on to the next if the participant did
not answer the challenge in that time. For the first three types of challenges, we captured
the user’s audio responses and some facial frames while answering the challenges (like
we did in rtCaptcha), as well as how long it took to answer the challenge and whether the
answer was correct. We also compared the facial and voice data from different challenges to
determine if it’s the face and voice of the same user. For the fourth and fifth challenge types,
we only measured and saved blink and smile detection time along with their probability
without capturing any video/audio data.
2.6.2 Findings
Before delving into the details of the results from the aforementioned experiment, it is
worth noting that participants correctly announced the Captcha challenges with an 89.2%
overall accuracy and 0.93 seconds overall response time. The accuracy is much higher and
the response time is excessively smaller than state-of-the art Captcha breaking algorithms
(detailed in further sections). Moreover, 100% of participants’ faces and voices are veri-
fied correctly with 93.8% (by Face++) and High (by Microsoft) overall confidence values,
respectively.
Figure 2.8: Distribution of challenge response times for each tasks.
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Fig. 2.8 presents the response time distributions of the participants. While response
(and detection) time to any type of challenge that involves the user reading something are
below two seconds, the minimum time to give a smile or blink response is higher than the
largest measured response time to any of the Captcha challenges (task 2 and 3). The slow
detection time for blink and smile may be due to the limitation of our implementation, but
we believe they generally require every frame to be analyzed and thus can be more difficult
than detecting the utterance of the answer to a text or numerical Captcha challenge. In other
words, our experimental results show that Captcha based liveness detection challenges are
not going to increase the end-to-end time to authenticate a user over existing smile or blink
based challenges.
Figure 2.9: Distribution of overall completion times for each tasks.
Finally, Fig. 2.9 shows the overall time to answer all 15 challenges, and we see that
there’s no significant difference between participants.
In Table 2.3, the left most columns (Humanaud) give the average response times and
recognition accuracies of our participants for each Captcha scheme in challenge type 1 to
3. Also, Fig. 2.10 presents distribution of them for each challenge in tasks 1 to 3. Our re-
sults show that participants’ response times remain mostly constant over the different types
of Captcha schemes tested, and are not affected by the difficulty level of the Captcha. Simi-
larly, recognition accuracies from plain-text and Ebay Captcha challenges to reCaptcha and
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Figure 2.10: Distribution of response times for each challenges in each tasks. (1-1 and 1-2:
Plaintext Phrases, 1-3: Plaintext numbers, 2-1: reCaptcha numbers, 2-2: Ebay numbers
2-3: Yandex numbers, 3-1, 3-2 and 3-3: Animated reCaptcha phrases)
Table 2.4: Authentication accuracies by number of trials (%)
Number of trial Task-1 Task-2 Task-3 Task-4 Task-5
1 90.3 87.1 90.3 80.7 90.3
2/3 100 100 96.8 100 100
Yandex Captchas vary only slightly. Moreover, while numeric Captchas have consistently
better accuracies than English phrase-based Captchas, the difference is below 5%.
Fig. 2.10 also shows that there is a slight warm-up effect at the beginning of each tasks;
the response times for the first challenge of each task is longer than that for the others.
Moreover, when we change the challenge type (e.g. from phrase to numeric at task 1) or
the Captcha scheme (e.g. from Ebay to Yandex at task 2), we also observe a slight warm-up
effect. On the other hand, since we did not change challenge type or Captcha scheme on
task 3, response times decreased in each trial at this task. In any case, even if we have
a warm-up effect, the maximum response time to the Captcha challenge is 3.74 seconds,
which is still below the execution time of current Captcha-breaking algorithms.
Finally, when a user fails to correctly answer any kind of liveness detection challenge,
he/she will be asked to try again. So, in Table 2.4, we measure how many times our
participant had to re-try before a successful authentication could be completed under the
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different types of challenges. Our results show that in almost all cases, participants needed
to try at most two times to successfully respond to any challenge. The only exception
happened for one participant under the animated Captcha challenge. When we manually
inspected his response, we realized that the problem was caused by the speech recognition
algorithm.
2.6.3 Usability Evaluation
We measured the usability and user acceptance rate by asking subjective questions at the
end of our user study. Each participant faced two to four questions depending on their
answers. We asked the following questions with the stated multiple choices:
1. Have you ever interacted with any kind of facial authentication systems? (Y/N)
2. If yes, what was the challenge it asked? (Blink/Smile/Other)
3. Would you consider using Real Time Captcha in the future? (Y/N)
4. If no, why? a) I don’t like Captchas, b) I don’t like voice recognition systems, c) I prefer
using password protection.
Overall, 87.1% of the participants never have used any kind of facial authentication
system and 81.5% of them lean toward an authentication system that offers the proposed
liveness detection scheme. The rest do not want to use our framework because of the voice
recognition component or Captcha scheme. Finally, 12.9% of the participants have used
smile or blink detection-based facial authentication systems, and they stated that they prefer
rtCaptcha. Even though an 84% favorable response from our participants shows promise,
we consider it only a preliminary result. As future work, we plan to perform another user
study to establish the usability of our system in the general population. This is because: 1)
our current user study has a small number of participants, and 2) the participants are from
limited diversity of age and background (e.g., mostly university students).
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2.7 Security Analysis
In this section, we will first present our analysis to determine how likely it is for an at-
tacker to successfully evade rtCaptcha and impersonate the user. As mentioned in the threat
model, we assume the attacker can compromise the victim phone’s kernel, and can have
his/her malicious version of the client app used for authenticating with rtCaptcha. Further-
more, the attacker can also use the victim’s phone camera and microphone to collect face
and voice samples of the victim, and use available techniques to build accurate models for
the victim’s face and sound. Thus, when rtCaptcha presents the attacker with a Captcha,
his/her main obstacle in achieving successful authentication is to solve the Captcha before
the authentication session times out. Once the Captcha is solved, the created facial/voice
model of the victim can be used to create video/audio of the victim saying the answer to the
Captcha. This fabricated answer can be sent to our authentication server either by injecting
it into the system as outputs from the camera and the microphone (through a compromised
kernel) or directly into a malicious version of the client app.
Since our system measures the time between when the Captcha is first presented to the
time when the user starts to speak, one possible attack against our system is for the attacker
to produce an arbitrary “filler” sound (e.g., “errrr”) while trying to automatically solve the
challenge and then inject the synthesized video. This attack can lead to one of the following
scenarios: 1) the “errrr” part is detected by the speech-to-text library, and results in the
attacker giving the wrong response, or 2) the “errrr” part is ignored by the speech to text (in
this case, we can modify our system to ignore the beginning of an utterance, but instead the
beginning of speech recognized by the speech-to-text). Another potential attack against use
of the start of speech is for the attacker to focus their effort in identifying/solving the first
part of the Captcha. However, we will argue that a main challenge in solving Captcha is to
break up the different characters and digits, and thus this attack may not buy the attacker
much time.
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Table 2.5: Best decoding accuracy and time of generic attacks
Captcha Gao et al.[25] Bursztein et al.[65]
Scheme Acc. (%) Time (sec.) Acc. (%) Time(sec.)
reCAPTCHA(Old) 7.8 8.06 21.74 7.16
reCAPTCHA 77.2 10.27 19.22 4.59
Yahoo! 5 28.56 3.67 7.95
Baidu 44.2 2.81 54.38 1.9
Wikipedia 23.8 3.74 28.29 N/A
QQ 56 4.95 N/A N/A
Microsoft 16.2 12.59 N/A N/A
Amazon 25.8 13.18 N/A N/A
Taobao 23.4 4.64 N/A N/A
Sina 9.4 4.83 N/A N/A
Ebay 58.8 5.98 47.92 2.31
Yandex 2.2 15.5 N/A N/A
One key to considering the attacker’s chance of success is the threshold for session
time out; let’s call it Thlegit. To put it another way, the strength of rtCaptcha depends on
the difference between a Thlegit threshold that’s long enough for legitimate human users
to have good success rate at authentication, versus a Thlegit threshold that allows for accu-
rately breaking Captcha using a Captcha-breaking algorithm. Thus, in the following, we
will refer back to our experiments in Sect. 2.6.
2.7.1 Setting Thlegit = 5sec
Participants in our user study responded to 98.57% of the challenges in less than 3 seconds.
Furthermore, our results in Sect. 2.6 also show the studied users have an overall accuracy
of 87.1% for all tested Captcha schemes, and there seems to be no correlation between
their response time and their success rate. In other words, we will not see any significant
improvement in the user’s rate of successfully answering the Captcha even if we set Thlegit
significantly higher. Thus, for the rest of our discussion, we’ll assume Thlegit to be 5
seconds.
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2.7.2 Automated Attacks under Thlegit = 5sec
Now let’s consider what is the attacker’s chance of breaking our Captcha and successfully
generating the video/audio of a victim answering the Captcha with a session time out of 5
seconds. We will base our discussion on different kinds of Captcha breaking methods with
different levels of sophistication.
The most primitive Captcha breaking method we have tested is Optical Character Recog-
nition (OCR) based. In particular, we tested the Captcha used in our study against one
of the OCR-based Captcha solving websites11. As presented in the Attackocr columns of
Table 2.3, the tested site could not solve any of our Captcha challenges. Later on, we in-
vestigated if it can successfully decode anything but plain-text lookalike Captcha images
without background noise or distortions.
We’ve also experimented with state-of-the-art Captcha breaking schemes from Gao et
al. [25] and Bursztein et al. [65], which are based on character segmentation and Reinforce-
ment learning (RL) respectively. Table 2.5 summarizes their best decoding accuracy and
solving times for various schemes on commodity laptops. We consider the work in [25]
to be state-of-the-art because it proposes the most generic solution and is the only pub-
lished work that defeats the Yandex scheme. In Table 2.3 we referred to their system as
Attackbest. While the results in Table 2.5 show that some Captcha schemes can be broken
in approximately 3 seconds, the overall recognition accuracies can be very low (while the
corresponding accuracies for harder schemes in our user study remain above 85%). Thus,
we believe that setting Thlegit at 5 seconds gives us a very good safety margin against com-
promising attacks that could employ even the most advanced Captcha-breaking scheme.
2.7.3 Semi-Automated Attacks
Although in our threat model we stated that any attack that requires human intervention is
not going to scale and thus is out of scope, we still will consider the possibility of breaking
11http://www.captchatronix.com
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Table 2.6: Reported average decoding accuracy and time of typing based human responses
to Captcha challenges
Service Acc. (%) Time (sec.) Service Acc. (%) Time (sec.)
anti-captcha 99.0 7 2captcha 96.6 10
captchaboss 99.9 8 imagetyperz 99.0 12
deathbycaptcha 95.8 10 9kw.eu N/A 30
rtCaptcha using cloud-based, manual Captcha solving services, since this is a commonly
used attack method against other Captcha schemes. In particular, attackers may use the
authentication device as a proxy and ship Captcha solving tasks to the real human work-
ers. There are many man-powered Captcha-solving services that report high recognition
rates, as presented in Table 2.6. We obtained recognition times and accuracies, as adver-
tised on the official website of each service in Table 2.6. While the advertised times are
much higher than our 5 seconds Thlegit threshold, we also used 2captcha.com to break the
Captcha dataset we used in the user study to obtain real numbers for a fair comparison.
The average response times and decoding accuracies of this service under each scheme
are presented in Table 2.3 under the Attacktyp columns, while the distribution of response
times are presented in Fig. 2.11. The average solving time is 19.17 seconds (with 10.75
seconds at minimum) with 96.2% overall solving rate. As such, once again, an attacker
trying to launch compromising attacks based on these services will not be able to beat the
5 second threshold, and that is true even if we do not consider other time overheads caused
by synthesizer, which has Ttts=1.1 seconds (TTS delay time) at best [53], etc.
2.7.4 Other Security Benefits
While the main strength of rtCaptcha lies in presenting the attacker with a challenge that
is difficult to answer automatically, and thus nullifying the advantage they have in being
able to generate authentic-looking/sounding video/voice of the victim and inject it into the
authentication process at will, rtCaptcha also comes with a surprising benefit over other
liveness detection challenges like blinking and smiling. That is, it is very difficult to cap-
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Figure 2.11: Distribution of response times of 2captcha service for our Captcha database.
ture the user giving out the answer to the right Captcha ”just by accident.” In particular,
liveness challenges that are based on blinking and smiling are very vulnerable to attacks
like UI redressing attacks [42], or more advanced attacks like those described in [66]. Un-
der both scenarios, the attacker can drive the legitimate authentication app to a state where
it’s presenting the user with its liveness detection (either by using Intent, which is harder
to control for more than one UI, or using the accessibility service), while covering up the
phone’s display with an overlay (so the user doesn’t know he/she is being attacked). With
liveness challenge based on blinking or smiling, this attack is likely to be successful be-
cause people naturally blink and smile occasionally, and thus they will provide the answer
to the underlying challenge and help the attacker to authenticate them unknowingly. With
rtCaptcha, such an overlay-based attack is unlikely to be successful because it is very un-
likely the victim will spell out the answer to the right Captcha by accident while the overlay
is obscuring the screen and the underlying app is waiting for a response.
2.8 Discussion and Future Works
Reaching a big diversity in our user study was our limitation as in the previous studies [46].
Since we mainly recruited people around the university, these users were usually more
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familiar with the underlying technology with rtCaptcha. Hence, human performance may
vary among other populations, especially among those who rarely use mobile devices or
are unfamiliar with Captchas, as stated by Brodic et al. [59].
One of the main security infrastructures in our framework relies on speech recognition
since we capture audio response to the Captcha challenges. Hence, the STT algorithm must
be robust enough to minimize the false negatives for legitimate user responses. The col-
lected data in our user study involves ambient office, restaurant and outside environments
with A/C sound, hums and buzzes, crowd and light traffic sounds. However, our data still
have limited background noise variations to test the robustness of used STT method in our
experiments. Having said that, we can always use other powerful STT approaches such as
Deep Speech 2 by Baidu [61] or cloud-based solutions (instead of CMU Pocketsphinx li-
brary) for noisy environments. Moreover, recent advances in lip reading (e.g. LipNet [67])
provide around 95.2% of sentence-level speech recognition accuracy by only using visual
content. Combining such an approach with STT would probably give very accurate results
to legitimate challenge responses. Moreover, using lip reading-based speech recognition
also will increase the usability of the system in a silent environment.
Our future work includes implementing a lip reading method on the Captcha response
recognition. Furthermore, future research is required to analyze more data collected from
different populations and environments with varying noise types and levels. It also could
be required to analyze varying illumination and pose to measure face recognition and veri-
fication performance in a real life scenario. However, most of these limitations are related
with all audio/visual authentication systems.
Even though we consider presentation attacks out of scope for this work, we believe that
by requiring the user to actually say something in order to authenticate, we will create extra
challenges for even state-of-the-art presentation attacks. In particular, no matter whether
the presentation attack employs static pictures or wearable masks, the attacker will have
difficulty in using those materials to present genuine muscle movement. This is obviously
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true for static pictures, but even for wearable masks, where it is doubtful that one can move
lips (without exposing the lips of the person wearing the mask underneath) well enough to
appear to be saying the answer to our Captcha challenge. Thus, on top of incorporating lip
reading into our system, in the future we also plan to evaluate how this will stop attacks
from wearable masks (which should be the state-of-the-art for presentation attacks).
Finally, one can argue that the recently announced Face ID12 by Apple already provides
a robust security mechanism against our threat model, and also, wearable masks. However,
our approach still can be applicable through the existing smart phones (estimated around
2.3 billion by the end of 201713) without the requirement of any additional hardware (e.g.,
depth camera, infrared sensors, etc.).
2.9 Conclusions
Our work outlines several aspects of an audio/visual authentication system and presents
a novel and practical approach, called rtCaptcha to straighten the flaws of existing live-
ness detection systems. First, our exhaustive analysis on major cloud-based cognitive ser-
vices (which have a market size of $15 billion14) clearly reveals that an applicable and
spoof-resistant liveness detection approach is an urgent need. On the other hand, Captcha-
based human authentication has been used successfully on the web for more than a decade.
Therefore, rtCaptcha is a suitable fit for this urgent and growing need. Additionally, our
user study and comparative threat analysis with its results proves that our scheme consti-
tutes a strong basis against even the most scalable attacks involving the latest audio/visual






PRIVACY PROTECTION IN REMOTE BIOMETRIC AUTHENTICATION
In this chapter, I will present Justitia, a privacy-preserving remote biometric authentica-
tion system, that introduces how to use fuzzy biometric inputs as part of cryptographic
primitives without loss of accuracy of the underlying off-the-shelf deep learning models. I
will then present a novel security assessment technique that considers powerful adversar-
ial models, and could be used as a black-box approach to measure the security of future
biometrics-based authentication systems.
3.1 Introduction
Recent advances in deep learning (DL) have finally made the task of face/voice-based bio-
metric verification accurate enough for authentication in terms of usability and security:
too high false rejection rate (FRR) makes a system unusable, too high false acceptance rate
(FAR) makes it insecure. With the core accuracy challenge solved, we now face another
problem: privacy. Conventional biometric verification requires enrollment data of a client
C to be stored in a remote server S, unprotected, for later comparison at authentication
time. This data storage raises privacy concerns because if an adversary (or S itself) is able
to gain access, it can cause harm via impersonation or by enabling unwarranted surveil-
lance. Usability of biometric verification is appealing, but collecting biometric information
of people in the process is too high of a price to pay [68, 18].
The current solution to privacy, deployed by popular systems like Apple FaceID [69]
(or TouchID [70]), is to lock the enrollment template in the client’s device under hardware
protection (e.g., Trusted Platform Module) [71]. This is cumbersome for protecting online
accounts because it permanently binds authentication to the device, meaning the user has
to enroll each device separately and cannot authenticate without one.
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In this chapter, we study how to achieve privacy preserving face- and voice-based veri-
fication using samples that are cryptographically protected, while maintaining the achieved
accuracy of the off-the-shelf DL systems and providing the practicality. In particular, we
aim to provide a way for C to encrypt and decrypt a secret (registered with S) using its own
biometric material such that C can authenticate to S by proving he has the secret, but the
biometric data of C is never leaked to S in the processes of enrollment and authentication.
If we are successful in achieving our goal, we can eliminate the privacy risk of face- and
voice-based authentication.
In a typical password-based authentication, S hashes the registered passwords to pro-
tect them against data-breaches. However, due to the presence of some noise (e.g., dif-
ferent lighting, ambient sounds, imprecise scans, etc.), S cannot hash the biometrics, then
compare with the hashes of those captured at the authentication time for an exact match.
In response, researchers propose different forms of fuzzy cryptography, also used in this
work, to protect biometrics in a manner similar to hashing [72].
In this context, Dodis et al. [73] introduce the notion of fuzzy extractors (FE), which is
the first and broad formal cryptographic primitive in its kind, but earlier works produced
some of the first constructions (e.g., fuzzy commitment and fuzzy vault) [74, 75]. The main
idea of FE is to employ error correction schemes to recover an enrollment-established secret
from non-sensitive helper data using C’s biometric sample obtained at authentication time.
Hence, if C can recover the secret successfully, he can use it to prove his identity to S,
without revealing his biometric data to S (see Sect. 3.3). Note that, the secret is encrypted
by C with multiple keys derived from his biometric data, and all encryptions are kept as part
of the helper data. That is how FE i) protects privacy by having S handles only the helper
data, and ii) provides security for our scheme by guaranteeing that only the biometric data
”close enough” to the one used to encrypt the secret can decrypt it (see Sect. 3.4).
However, existing bio-template protection schemes, including FE, have two major
drawbacks in practice for our focus. First, as many of them employ i) hand-crafted fea-
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ture extraction methods for a specific biometric modality (e.g., fingerprint or iris) or ii)
custom-built distance metrics, they are not applicable to the DL-generated embeddings of
face and voice biometrics. Second, as [76] points out, despite almost 20 years of research,
many of them (e.g., winners in [77] and [78]) could not meet the accuracy requirements
(FAR ≤ 0.002% and FRR ≤ 10%) of industrial systems for practical use [79]. Fur-
thermore, they achieve low security guarantees against impersonation attacks. Though the
protocol from [72] improves the security of FE-based systems (relative to the database
size), it requires C to send his bio-template to S and put strong trust assumptions on S,
which are also against our focus.
3.1.1 Our Contributions
To our knowledge, there is no privacy-preserving scheme, for DL-based face and voice
biometrics, meeting the requirements of such a remote authentication system in the fo-
cus of this work. In this paper, we build a novel pipeline, Justitia, on top of reusable
fuzzy-extractors (SSF-FE1) from [80], and state-of-the art DL systems for face and voice
biometrics.
Challenges & our solutions
We solve two major challenges: “space mapping” to solve compatibility problem between
DL and SSF-FE, and “noise handling” to solve the SSF-FE’s efficiency problem.
Space mapping The fundamental problem in providing privacy protection on top of DL-
based biometric matching is that of a “round hole, square peg” situation. On the one hand,
DL models work in grid-like spaces (e.g., Euclidean or cosine) in order to leverage station-
arity and compositionality like properties of the data through local statistics [81]. On the
other hand, SSF-FE, for protecting biometric data, works in Hamming space via bit-wise
operations.
1Named after the last names of the author of [80], and used interchangeably with FE.
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To this end, one of the core technical contributions of this work is bridging these spaces
while still attesting to both the security of the cryptography, protecting the biometric data,
and the accuracy of the underlying DL system.
Noise handling SSF-FE can handle the noise in biometrics, but the size of the required
helper data of FE (to guarantee secret recovery) increases exponentially with the amount of
noise we want to tolerate. As a result, each of eliminated noisy bit, from the biometric rep-
resentations in Hamming space, will exponentially decrease i) the data transmitted between
C and S (and storage space in S), and consequently, ii) the response time of SSF-FE.
Hence, the resolution of above “round hole, square peg” problem also helps in applying
further noise reduction (NR) techniques in Hamming space (see Sect. 3.2.4). Additionally,
the client app can enforce C to scan only high-fidelity biometric samples, which cause less
amount of noisy bits, by applying input quality filters (QF) at enrollment and authentication
times (see Sect. 3.2.1). Note that, this also maintains the accuracy of underlying DL system
Remote authentication protocol
Now, C can prove that he has the secret, as followed. C sends the hash of the secret (e.g.,
computed via a pseudo-random function) to S at enrollment time. Similarly, C sends the
hash of the recovered secret to S at authentication time. Then, S compares both hashes
to verify if C has the secret,without learning nothing about the biometrics of C. Note that,
this also makes Justitia compatible with the password-based schemes as S handles only the
hashes of the secret.
Improving security
We show how to improve the security of our design, by i) combining face and voice bio-
metrics in a way that does not suffer from the accuracy, and ii) using Justitia as a second
factor as it is compatible with the password-based authentication. For instance, C can send
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the hash of the concatenation of his secret and password to S, to improve the security for
sensitive authentications. Note that, this also brings additive protection against targeted
biometric attacks. Moreover, in our design, combining face and voice could be handled
seamlessly, by having the client app captures a short video of C while he is pronouncing a
short phrase (e.g., 2-3 seconds) in front of the camera.
Improving usability
Scanning biometrics (especially in a noisy environment) for every single authentication re-
quest presents usability problems. We can prevent this by not using the biometric-based
authentication for every authentication attempts. Instead, we can tie the client’s identity
to the mobile device used for biometric-based authentication. From then on, day-to-day
authentications for non-sensitive operations can be performed using standard one-click
device-based authentication, i.e., in Fast IDentity Online (FIDO) approach [82].
Implementation
We implement an end-to-end prototype from scratch, to measure the accuracy, perfor-
mance and usability of our design for face- and combined-biometrics-based remote au-
thentications. We use standard cryptographic primitives and state-of-the-art DL models
(i.e., FaceNet [24] and DeepSpeaker [83]) in our implementation. We also implement
above one-click authentication protocol to simulate the day-to-day usage in our user study.
Evaluation results
To measure accuracy of our end-to-end design, we compare directly against error rates
of a non-private (plaintext) pipeline. Justitia achieves the same low error rates (0.33%
FRR, 0% FAR) as the plaintext system does on a subset of the YouTube Faces (YTF)
benchmark. Note that, we also evaluate our system’s FAR under an impersonation attack
scenario, by assuming a powerful adversary, as 0% FAR might be the result of not having
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enough negative samples in YTF dataset. Moreover, through the proposed face&voice-
based pipeline, Justitia achieves (1.32% FRR, 0% FAR) compared to (1.14% FRR, 0%
FAR) errors of plaintext system. Finally, Justitia achieves similar response times, on new
device enrollment/renewal, compared to the prior plaintext systems.
Threat model & security analysis
We evaluate the security of our design in the semi-honest S model, where S follows the
pipeline while trying to obtain an encrypted secret of an enrolled person in the database.
Hence, we consider only large-scale attacks, as such the adversary compromising the
database has the same advantage with S. Note that, no greedy/gradient descent search
is possible as the data is kept under encryption in S.
We first discuss the privacy and security guarantees, achieved by underlying standard
crypto primitives, of our design (see Sect. 3.4). Then, we support them through system-
atic security evaluations by i) using existing approaches and ii) proposing a novel method
considering more powerful attacks than existing work.
Previous work either conducts empirical attack simulations [84] or statistical estimation
techniques [85, 86]. While the latter may fall short in modeling a broader attack space due
to the limited data, the former assumes a weak adversary, which does not narrow down the
attack space as it only generates random inputs. They measure from 25 (by [86]) to (more
than) 40 bits of security on Justitia.
In this work, we consider an adversary that can leverage from the domain knowledge,
while probing random inputs (as impostors) to our pipeline. In particular, we measure
the probability of impersonating one of the enrolled users from YTF dataset while brute-
forcing through (impostor) faces from photorealistically synthesized subjects. Empirically,
we only observe 2 falsely accepted faces out of 60 million brute force attempts, which
matches with the statistically-backed estimate from [86]: 1 impersonation per 24.6 million




Other than fuzzy cryptography, biometric authentication (along with the related and alter-
native approaches [87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92]) has long been studied for different application
scenarios and modalities, by many works and industrial systems. These are based on multi-
party computation, Homomorphic encryption and hardware tokens, which do not accom-
modate the focus of this work, as they require S holding plaintext database, C handling
key-management or possessing the token all the time.
Multi-party computation
There are techniques protecting queries against a biometric database in a secure multi-party
computation (MPC) environment [93, 94, 95, 96, 97]. However, they solve a fundamentally
different and easier problem, one where the server has access to the plaintext face.
Homomorphic encryption
HE allows computing arbitrary functions, including biometric authentication, under en-
cryption [98, 99]. Though advances in HE performance [100] are encouraging, the funda-
mental issue is key management and trust [101]. Indeed, while it is easy to compute under
encryption the yes/no output of authentication decrypting the result requires the decryp-
tion key. We want to avoid client-side storage of the keys. Furthermore, storing the key
at the server defeats the purpose of the HE, as it decrypts all data (e.g., input biometrics).
Protocols from [102, 103] solve this problem by using two servers to isolate the biometric
data and the key. Note that, this introduces additional strong trust assumptions, which we
avoid in our work.
47
Token-based authentication
Schemes from [104, 105, 106] employ a second factor, e.g., a hardware token, to apply a
reproducible distortion of the biometric data. The distorted data is stored by the server, and
the user maintains the secret. At authentication time, the user generates another distorted
biometric reading using the secret, which will be matched against the stored data. Note
that the second factor must not be entrusted to the server (hence must be maintained by
the user), since some of the distortion is reversible. Loss of this secret token presents a
recovery problem.
3.1.3 Out-of-Scope Assumptions
We require the client app having access a single global DL model that is not tailored to
any particular C. Hence, we do not consider such membership inference [107] or model
inversion [108] attacks to be a privacy threat in the context of securing authentication.
We do not consider any targeted impersonation attack, either by directly feeding stolen
biometric into the client app, or by any perturbation on the input of the DL model. Potential
defenses to such attacks include better liveness detection (LD) [16, 109], strengthening the
DL model against perturbations [110, 111], and coupling with passwords as mentioned
above, which are also not in our focus.
3.1.4 Summary of Our Contributions
1. We propose a novel pipeline, Justitia, accommodating privacy-protection on DL-
generated embeddings of face/voice biometrics, by solving the space mapping problem
between underlying deep learning and cryptographic methods.
2. We introduce efficient noise handling techniques to maintain the accuracy of the respec-
tive plaintext systems.
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Figure 3.1: A remote authentication protocol based on Justitia. Gen and Rep algorithms
of SSF-FE are shown for one mask and bio-bit vectors (B,B′), with five bits (b1, . . . , b5),
from enrollment and authentication, resp. Hamming distance dist(B,B′) is 2 bits. The
real implementation uses multiple masks and longer bit vectors to produce multiple secure
lockers. Only the masks and lockers are stored on S . Hash H is equal to H ′ as the secrets
R and R′ are the same in this example.
and accompany to passwords as a second factor to increase the security.
4. We improve usability by accommodating standard one-click device-based authentica-
tion for non-sensitive operations.
5. We systematically evaluate our security through four different approaches from prior
art. We also propose a novel black-box security assessment method, which could be
used for measuring the security of future face-based authentication systems.
6. We build and evaluate a prototype on standard benchmarks.
7. We conduct a user study to measure usability of our prototype for sensitive authentica-
tion scenarios and day-to-day usage.
8. We achieve comparable user acceptance to known two-factor authentication (2FA) sys-
tems.
3.2 Building Blocks
In this section, we discuss the ideas behind Justitia pipeline, which is depicted in Fig. 3.1.
As mentioned before, we consider liveness detection out-of-scope for this work. Hence, we
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assume all inputs are validated through an off-the-shelf, privacy preserving, LD process.
Our protocols are instantiated upon Justitia in Sect. 3.3.
3.2.1 Input Quality Filtering
Compared to other modalities like fingerprints or iris, the use of face/voice for authenti-
cation presents unique opportunities and challenges. On the one hand, since almost all
mobile devices and laptops come with both microphone and camera, capturing face/voice
samples are much more readily deployable. On the other hand, the accuracy can vary sig-
nificantly based on how these samples are captured in the first place. For example, it should
be obvious that voice based authentication will not work well in a noisy environment. Sim-
ilarly, face based authentication will not work well with faces captured in i) high (or low)
lit environment or background, ii) low resolution, high (or low) contrast or brightness, iii)
occluded or blurry conditions, and iv) with too much pitch, yaw or roll angles.
Overall, to guarantee the bio-bit vectors have high signal-noise ratio, C locally checks
the quality of the input biometric samples, and provide the user feedback on what to do
to improve the sample quality if the input is deemed too poor quality, while capturing
samples with the client app. We design the following filters to utilize sensors available on
most mobile devices and avoid relying on advanced sensors (e.g., infrared camera, depth
sensor etc.). In particular, the client app will:
1. detect the face orientation and retain those within certain facial angle thresholds through
pitch, yaw and roll axis,
2. make a color space conversion from RGB to YUV, where Y refers to brightness and UV
refers to color components, then retain faces within a certain brightness thresholds,
3. compute a statistical quality assessment score over a pre-trained model representing
known distortions [112], then retain faces having a score within certain thresholds.
Note that, applying our pipeline is requested rarely in improved-usability scenario (see
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Sect. 3.3.3). Besides, similar to existing authentication systems, we may allow C to au-
thenticate, e.g., once a week, as long as they are accessing the controlled resource using
the same device. Thus, the chance that C will have to conduct QF check at a noisy en-
vironment is significantly reduced. Moreover, in Sect. 3.7.1, we also make a preliminary
analysis to show the impact of QF checks on the usability, by measuring the average time
of our participants capturing qualifying facial samples.
Note that, face and voice quality assessment have been studied for different application
scenarios [113, 114, 115, 116, 117]. Note that, we can leverage from these methods to
improve the Step 3. However, our technique avoids non-qualifying samples even before
requiring to apply these models. In Sect. 3.6.3, we show that the proposed approach can
significantly reduce the error rates (e.g., FRR/FAR decrease from 2.01/2.02% to 0.33/0%).
3.2.2 Deep Learning (DL)
In this step, C locally converts raw biometric readings, retained in QF layer, into d-
dimensional feature vector representations (e.g., embedding vectors), by using the state-
of-the-art DL systems (e.g., FaceNet [24] and DeepSpeaker [83]), with the guarantee that
two such vectors will only be close in Euclidean distance (or cosine similarity) iff they are
of the same person.
3.2.3 Signal Extraction (SE)
Though the Euclidean space of DL accurately captures the statistical properties of the raw
input data, unfortunately, even the two consequent biometric scans of a person will not
result the same embeddings due to the continuous nature of the Euclidean space. Hence, in
order to accommodate SSF-FE, C locally translates d-dimensional embeddings into L-bit
binary codes, by using Super-Bit Locality Sensitive Hash (SBLSH) [118].
SBLSH is built on top of Sign-Random-Projection LSH (SRP-LSH) [119] , which turns













































Figure 3.2: NR. Majority voting keeps bits, that are above a predetermined threshold τrb.
Bi is the ith bio. scan’s bit vector.
tication phases) are close in angular distance, it is likely that their SRP-LSH will be the
same. In particular, for given embedding vector x and a uniformly-sampled vector v (both
in d-dimension), SRP-LSH is defined as hv(x) = sgn(vTx), where sgn(.) is a sign func-
tion (i.e. 1 if the input is greater than or equal to 0, otherwise 0). Then, to turn x into L-bit
binary codes, SBLSH independently samples {v1, ..., vL} vectors, and for each i ∈ [L],
calls hvi(x). Note that, these vectors are public to every clients.
3.2.4 Noise Reduction (NR)
Inspired by [80, 120], C can collect multiple biometric samples at enrollment and authen-
tication attempts in order to perform noise removal. This can be done very seamlessly for
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face/voice samples because for face, C can record a very short video of his face in front of
the camera. Since people normally will not be able to hold completely still while recording
this video, we can treat each individual frame in the video as a different sample. Similarly,
C can collect sufficient voice samples (utterances) from a short audio recording (e.g., 2-3
second-long sentence [121, 122]).
In this step, C takes L-bit binary codes, generated in the SE step through multiple (e.g.,
Nbr =10) biometric readings, and majority vote over each bit. If a certain amount of them
agree (e.g., at least τrb =80 percent), C keeps the bit. Otherwise, it is canceled. If too
many bits are canceled (e.g., more than half of the bits), we assume that the captured set of
samples is too noisy, and C will restart from the sample capturing process. After eliminating
noisy bits through multiple samples, the NR layer gives the residual, representative, bio-bit
vector B to Gen algorithm of SSF-FE in enrollment phase. Similarly, B′ is generated and
given to Rep algorithm of SSF-FE in authentication phase. The steps are visualized in
Fig. 3.2.
3.2.5 Fuzzy Extractor from Random Oracle
A (m, `, t, ε)-FE scheme is defined for input space M, distance function dist, and a pair
of algorithms (Gen,Rep) (“generate” and “reproduce”). Gen, on input B ∈ M from
the input space with entropy m outputs an extracted string R ∈ {0, 1}` and a helper string
P ∈ {0, 1}∗. The FE correctness property ensures reconstruction ofR from close biometric
such that if dist(B,B′) ≤ t and (R,P ) ← Gen(B), then Rep(B′, P ) = R. Finally, the
crucial privacy property guarantees that the string R is close (expressed in terms of ε) to
uniform, even if the helper data P is public.
In our design, we use a specific FE under Hamming space extension, the reusable FE
(SSF-FE) from [80]. Since it is based on the Random Oracle (RO) model, its security is
based on the well accepted/understood hardness of reversing hash/encryption functions.
In contrast, other systems only guarantee the mathematical complexity of breaking their
53
security and related works have demonstrated some known cases of feasible attacks [123,
124, 125].
Our pipeline uses digital lockers [126] while constructing SSF-FE. Fig. 3.1 illustrates at
a high level how a digital locker works. The goal is to allow input bio-bit vectors (B,B′),
which are close in Hamming distance (e.g., 2 bits in the example), to be used to generate
the same keys keyi = key′i for encrypting/decrypting a secret R. The encrypted secret R
is called “locker” as it can be “locked” and “unlocked” by the two bit vectors. It achieves
this goal (generating the same key) by masking (i.e. turning to a constant zero) the error
bits (e.g., (b1, b4) in the example). An astute reader will note that even if we can guarantee
the Hamming distance between B and B′ to be at most 2, the mask in the example may
not always be able to eliminate all errors. Thus, multiple sets of (maski, lockeri), where
i ∈ [N ], are needed to achieve high probability (i.e., 1− ε = 1− 10−4 in our construction)
in regenerating the right keys and unlocking the secret R from at least one of the lockers.
Note that, N increases exponentially with t, where N is the number of (mask, locker) pairs
needed to guarantee successfully unlocking the R, and t is the amount of noise we want
to tolerate (i.e. the maximum Hamming distance between B and B′, used for locking and
unlocking R, resp.)
3.3 Instantiating protocols
In this section, we explain how we construct our enrollment and authentication protocols,
which are built on top of Justitia pipeline, for a remote authentication scenario. We also
discuss improving the i) security and ii) usability of such a remote authentication system,
by incorporating our design with i) passwords in a 2FA scheme and ii) standard challenge-
response schemes, respectively.
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3.3.1 Enrollment and Authentication
Fig. 3.3 and Fig. 3.4, present our constructions of enrollment and authentication protocols,
respectively. Note that, the sets of biometric readings (BR,BR′), captured by the client
app, are from the domain D. We set the optimal parameters of our design in Sect.3.6.2.
Constructing digital lockers
We construct digital lockers on top of Hash-based Message Authentication Codes (HMAC),
namely HMAC-SHA256, such that the encryption function in the Gen method of SSF-FE
(e.g., Enc in Fig. 3.1) is implemented as lockeri = HMAC(noncei, keyi) ⊕ (0λ || R),
and decryption in the Rep (e.g., Dec in Fig. 3.1) is implemented as 0λ || R =
HMAC(noncei, key′i)⊕ lockeri.
Recovering the secret on the client-side
As noticed above, C concatenates 0λ, where λ is a security parameter, before encrypting
the secret R into a locker at the enrollment time so that it can verify a correct decryption of
R′ = R at the authentication time.
Authenticating C on the server-side
As presented in Fig. 3.3 and Fig. 3.4, in our pipeline, only C handles the secret R (and
recovered R′) as it executes Gen and Rep algorithms of SSF-FE, respectively. On the
other hand, S handles only the helper data Pi = (maski, noncei, lockeri), where i ∈ [N ],
and the hashes (H and H ′) of the secrets. That is, given a publicly known pseudo-random
hash function h, C computes and sends H = h(R) to S at enrollment time. Then, at
authentication time, if C sends H ′ = h(R′) s.t. H ′ = H , S remotely authenticates C,
without seeing C’s biometrics.
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Inputs: C captures a set of biometric readings BR = {BR1, . . . , BRNbr}, where BRi ∈
D, by using the client app.
1. [Quality Filter] C retains only the biometric readings from BR passing through a
set of quality filters.
2. [DL-SE-NR] C computes B = f(BR), using publicly defined Justitia functions
f = NR ◦ SE ◦DL : D → {0, 1}L.
3. [SSF-FE Gen] C samples a random secret R, and ∀i ∈ [N ]:
(a) samples a random maski = {0, 1}L, which includes ` 1-bit,
(b) computes keyi = maski ∧B,
(c) samples a random noncei = {0, 1}L, and computes lockeri =
HMAC(noncei, keyi)⊕ (0λ || R), λ is a security parameter.
4. C computes the hashH = h(R), where h is a publicly defined pseudo-random hash
function.
5. C sends set {Pi = (maski, noncei, lockeri)}i∈[N ], and H to S.
Figure 3.3: Enrollment Protocol using Justitia.
3.3.2 Improving Security
Using face & voice together
Building the identity of an individual by combining his/her multiple biometric traits is a
common practice to increase the security of authentication systems [127, 128, 129, 130,
131, 132, 133]. In our case, we achieve this combination of face and voice seamlessly by
having the client app capture a short video of C while he is pronouncing short phrases
in front of the camera. We combine these modalities as in the following conjunction
rule [129]. If S verifies the hash of secret, recovered by the C’s face, then it tries to verify
the one recovered by C’s voice. Since, this rule, on the other hand, naturally increases the
FRR (relative to errors in both modalities), we take extra steps to handle this while com-
bining them. In particular, the client app allows C to authenticate himself through multiple
attempts (e.g., up to 3 times) if he is rejected, while he prefers using both face and voice in
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Inputs: S sends the helper data {Pi = (maski, noncei, lockeri)}i∈[N ] to C. C captures
BR′ = {BR′1, . . . , BR′Nbr}, where BR
′
i ∈ D.
1. [Quality Filter] Repeat the Step 1 of Fig. 3.3 for BR′.
2. [DL-SE-NR] C computes B′ = f(BR′) as in Step 2 of Fig. 3.3.
3. [SSF-FE Rep] For each i ∈ [N ], C:
(a) computes key′i = maski ∧B′,
(b) computes pi = HMAC(noncei, key′i)⊕ lockeri.
(c) if pi[1 : λ] = 0λ, then return R = pi[λ+ 1 : λ+ `].
4. C obtains R′ = R if Step 3c return R, otherwise it gets R′ = ⊥.
5. C computes the hash H ′ = h(R′), and sends H ′ to S.
6. [S auth.] If H = H ′, S authenticates C, otherwise it rejects C.
Figure 3.4: Remote Authentication Protocol using Justitia.
our design.
Strengthening password-based authentication
For sensitive authentications, clients may prefer using multiple factors, like biometrics and
passwords in a typical 2FA scheme. This improves security in two ways. That is, passwords
protect users against targeted biometric attacks, and biometrics protect passwords against
typical attacks applied to a stolen password database [134, 135].
In our design, for instance, C can first hash his secret after concatenating with a pass-
word (e.g., H = h(R || password)), and send it to S at both enrollment and authentication
times. That is how we increase the security guarantee of our design relatively with the
chosen password. To deploy this, we should only modify the client app without touching
the server-side. Note that, passwords could be included into protocols from Fig. 3.3 and




Scanning biometrics (especially in a noisy environment) for every single authentication
request presents usability problems. We can avoid a lot of these issues by not using the
biometric-based authentication in Fig. 3.4 for every authentication attempts. Instead, at the
enrollment time, we can tie the user’s identity to the mobile device used for the enrollment.
From then on, day-to-day authentications for non-sensitive operations can be performed
using standard one-click device-based authentication (i.e. the person with the registered
device can authenticated as the user). In this set up, we will only need to perform the
biometric-based authentication in Fig. 3.4 when the user need to register a new device (i.e.
he will authenticate using his biometric on the new device, and requesting to register this
new device; if the authentication is successful, his identity will be tied to the new device).
We implement this usability improvement by using OpenID connect [136] (i.e. the FIDO
approach), and evaluate its user acceptance in Sect. 3.7.2.
3.4 Security Discussion of Justitia
In this section, we present a high level argument for the security of our design, which
comprise of the enrollment and authentication protocols presented in Fig. 3.3 and Fig. 3.4,
under the assumption that S is honest but curious, i.e. S follows the steps of the enroll-
ment and recovery pipelines, but tries to learn additional information about C through the
stored data in its database. This setting is also applicable in modelling an attacker who
compromised the database, since he will have access to what’s available to S.
In the following, we will present a high level explanation of how underlying crypto
primitives, including SSF-FE and hashes from PRF, protect the privacy of C’s biometric
data, as well as how they guarantee the security of our authentication scheme. Recall that,
no greedy/gradient descent search is possible since S only holds the encryption or hash of
the secret, thus attackers can only brute force. In Sect. 3.9, we present the achieved security
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in practice through diverse analysis. We refer interested readers to [80, 126] for the formal
security proofs of the security and privacy of SSF-FE.
3.4.1 Privacy
The privacy goal of the proposed protocols is to protect the input bio-bit vectorsB from the
adversary. As noticed in the protocols, for each C, S only holds the helper data for SSF-FE
(i.e., Pi = (maski, noncei, lockeri)) and H , the hash of the secret. As such, it is safe to
make both of them public in terms of privacy, because: i) H has nothing related with B,
ii) the masks are entirely random and are not derived from any bit from B, iii) the lockers
are encryptions of the secret with different keys, which are the masked B. The encryption
algorithm guarantees that nothing about either the keys or the locked secret will be revealed
unless the adversary guesses the right key, and each key is ` = 128 bits.
3.4.2 Security
Our security goal is to prevent the adversary (who does not have the correct input bio-
bit vector) from extracting the secret of any C. To do this, he has to i) reverse the hash
H = h(R), whose security relies on reversing the hash function h from a PRF family, or ii)
decrypt at least a SSF-FE locker. While the encryption algorithm should provide standard
defense against any leakage through the ciphertext, the protection of a locker is only as
strong as the key. In particular, even if we have sufficient unmasked bits in the key, the
ciphertext thus generated is still vulnerable to brute force attacks if the input bio-bit vector
is very low in entropy. In Sect. 3.9, we provide our analysis of how much security we can
achieve in practice.
3.4.3 Unlinkability (Reusability)
According to ISO/IEC-24745 standard [137], one of the requirements of biometric authen-
tication systems is unlinkability of biometric templates across different databases [138].
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Our design meets this through the reusability of SSF-FE, as such it is guaranteed in the
same manner with the privacy of SSF-FE. In particular, since it is the C who chooses
which secrets and masks to use across different servers. Additionally, none of the
(mask, nonce, locker) pairs from the servers, leak any information about the raw biomet-
ric data since each locker is the encryption of a secret under a hash function modeled as
RO. Hence, colluding servers cannot combine a pair of helper data or hashed secrets of C to
obtain extra information about the C’s raw biometric data. We refer the reader to [139, 140]
for a detailed analysis of why reusability is hard to achieve in existing secure sketches/FE
schemes that are not based on the RO assumption.
3.5 Implementation Details
3.5.1 Prototype Implementation
We implement a prototype system where C is an Android app and communicates with S
through the REST API. For the DL layer, we use a pre-trained model of FaceNet 2 to ex-
tract facial-embeddings. This model is pre-trained on the MSCeleb1M dataset, including
8 million faces from around 100 thousand identities [141]. To infer voice embeddings,
we train our own model using an open-source implementation 3 of DeepSpeaker, as in-
troduced in [83]. We use VoxCeleb dataset, including 100 thousand of English utterances
from 1,251 identities, to train our model [122]. For reproducibility, we open-source our
implementation4, and clearly present and explain all the parameters in Sect. 3.6.2.
3.5.2 Environment
For evaluating our prototype, C runs on four different Android mobile phones (LG Nexus
5, Xiaomi Redmi Note 5 Pro, One Plus 6 and Huawei Mate 10 Pro) and S operates on a





Table 3.1: Usage and number of people of each dataset.
Used in Face Voice
DL train MSCELEB1M (100K) VoxCeleb (1.2K)
Fine tuning Custom (20) LibriSpeech (90)
Evaluation YTF (1.6K) LibriSpeech (831)
Security analys. StyleGAN (60M)
64 GB RAM. C and S have 30 megabit/s connection with 10 ms latency, and both operate
on single thread. For evaluating the prototype system, people enroll and authenticate by
using different mobile devices to simulate a lost-device scenario.
3.6 Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the accuracy and performance of our design. We start by intro-
ducing used datasets and parameter fine tuning process. Then, we compare the accuracy
and performance of our privacy-preserving protocols to the respective plaintext protocols.
We also measure the impact of combining face and voice (for more security), as introduced
in Sect. 3.3.2, on the accuracy and performance. On top of presenting results from whole
system evaluation, to evaluate the usefulness of our QF method, we also present the results
obtained without enabling it in Sect. 3.6.3.
3.6.1 Datasets
Table 3.1 presents the details (number of total people and usage purpose) of datasets used in
this paper. In the following, we briefly explain the details of our fine-tuning and evaluation
datasets.
Face
To make sure we are fine-tuning Justitia for realistic deployment, we collect a custom
dataset of 360 facial images from 20 local subjects using the filtering and feedback mech-
anism through our prototype app to obtain good quality inputs.5
5This data collection activity is approved by the IRB of our organization.
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In our large-scale evaluation, we use the YouTube Faces (YTF) academic benchmark
dataset [142]. It contains noisy collections of unconstrained faces in video format belong-
ing to 1,595 public figures. For our experiments, we extract up to 100 random frames for
each identity, which is the standard protocol used to evaluate the underlying baseline DL
model [24]. Note that, a subset of YTF, including faces from 312 people, pass the filters
from QF layer. Hence, we measure the accuracy of our end-to-end prototype, as well as its
respective plaintext baseline, using this subset for fairness (see Sect. 3.6.3). We refer this
subset as “filtered YTF” in the rest.
Voice
We use the standard LibriSpeech (LS) dataset [143] in our voice-based pipeline. LS in-
cludes 1,000 hours of English speech recorded by 921 people in a studio environment.
Since our voice samples do not contain any ambient noises, we did not apply any filter on
them. We randomly pick 10% of all subjects for fine-tuning the parameters and use the
remaining 90% of them in evaluation.
3.6.2 Parameters
In the following, we introduce the parameters for our prototype and our parameter selec-
tion process. In 3.2, we introduce all parameters and their fixed values for both face- and
face&voice-based pipelines. Note that, once we fix our parameters, we use them with-
out changing across different experiments and analysis, whose results are presented in
Tables 3.3, 3.4 and 3.7.
Evaluation metrics
We fine tune and evaluate our prototype for the following two evaluation metrics: “perfor-
mance” and “authentication errors”.
Performance refers to the end-to-end execution times of enrollment and authentication
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Table 3.2: List of parameters and their fixed values.
Par. Description Value
QF
pitch, yaw, roll angles [-15, 15]
mean val. of brightness comp. Y [90, 120]
quality score from [112] [0-47.7]
L length of bio-bit vectors (B,B′) 400 bits
` extracted bits from B for a keyi 128 bits
t Hamming dist. thresh., dist(B,B′) ≤ t 7 bits
ε max. SSF-FE Rep error probability 10−4
N number of helpers/person for (L, `, t, ε) 12000
R C’s secret, enc. in each lockeri for i ∈ [N ] {0, 1}`
λ security parameter for 0λ || R 128 bits
H hash H = h(R) s.t. h is a PRF {0, 1}`
Nbr number of facial biometric readings 10
τrb consistency threshold ratio 80%
phases through our prototype system. Note that, C’s face scanning time is discussed as part
of the usability of our system. Also, recall that this is a one-time cost that C pays if he use
one-click authentication for day-to-day authentication, as discussed in Sect. 3.3.3.
Authentication errors refer to the standard metrics of false acceptance and false rejec-
tion rates (FAR and FRR respectively). We denote pairs (i,j) of biometric data from the
same identity as Psame and different as Pdiff . To compute FAR and FRR for each pair (i,j)
in Psame, we enroll using sample i and authenticate with j, then denote the number of pairs
that fail to authenticate as FR. Similarly, for each pair (i,j) in Pdiff , we enroll using sample
i and authenticate with j, then denote the number of pairs that succeed to authenticate as
FA. In this case, FRR= FR|Psame| , and FAR=
FA
|Pdiff |
. Our target is to have both FAR and FRR
meeting industrial standard/requirement of FAR<0.001% and FRR<10% [79, 144].
Parameters of privacy-preserving layer
As discussed in Sect. 3.2.5, since the required helper data size exponentially increases with
t, the amount of error we allow between bio-bit vectors (B,B′) of the same person, we
first limit it to be below 10 bits. Then, to guarantee the recovery of the secret R for the
t-bit error tolerance, we fix SSF-FE’s reproducibility error to ε = 10−4. Finally, we set the
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security parameter λ and the length ` of the subsampled keys from (B,B′), the secret R
and its hash H = h(R) to 128 bits, to avoid an adversary brute-forcing the key-space of
lockers.
Parameter choices for targeted errors
In the following, we summarize our parameter searching method to find the ones achieving
the targeted error rates. After conducting above constraints on the fine-tuning datasets, we
fix our parameters to the values presented in 3.2.
QF parameters According to our analysis conducted on our custom dataset, a facial
input in high fidelity should have 1) a facial angle ranging between –15 and +15 degrees in
pitch, yaw and roll, relative to the camera, 2) an average brightness value between 90 and
120 and 3) a statistical quality score below 47.7 [112].
Fine-tuning procedure Even though we fix or limit the search space of (`, t, ε, R,H, λ)
parameters, fine-tuning them all together presents its own challenges because this is still a
big search space to explore. For instance, trying all parameter combinations for our pipeline
will take too long (e.g., 120 hours for single query). That is why we aim to decrease t
as it plays a crucial role on overall performance, and tune other parameters step-by-step
achieving minimum error rates, as followed.
• We set the number of extracted samples to Nbr = 10 since we target a short (e.g., 2-5
seconds) biometric capturing session.
• Then, we initially optimize L, the length of bio-bit vectors (B,B′), extracted through
DL-SE-NR layers. We set our objective to decrease the Hamming distance between
B and B′ for the same person while maintaining the same accuracy with the plaintext
baseline system. Since L must be larger than `, we set the search space of it from 256 to
512 bits, also as recommended by [145].
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• After fixing L, we exhaustively search for t that achieves the best accuracy. We also
consider the threshold τrb for reliable bits along with these parameters. Instead of brute
forcing, we follow a more probabilistic approach to find its optimal value. That is, we
have to guarantee that enough bits are retained at the end of NR layer such that SSF-FE
can derive N distinct masks and keys (each having ` subsampled bits) from B and B′.
Overall, we fix our parameters to the values presented in 3.2. With these parameters, we
achieve for the fine tuning datasets 1) zero errors for face and 2) zero FAR at the same FRR
(8.89%) for voice compared to respective plaintext pipelines on the fine-tuning datasets.
For the Hamming distance threshold of t = 7 bits, SSF-FE Gen is responding in 0.62
sec. while SSF-FE Gen takes 0.075 sec. for the same and 0.7 sec. for different identities.
Finally, we observe that more than 200 reliable bits from both face and voice-based binary
hashes could be retained after filtering them over NR layer. This infers that SSF-FE can
extract enough distinct masks to guarantee reproducing the secret R with the given ε-error
probability.
3.6.3 Achieved Errors with Fixed Parameters
After fixing the parameters, as discussed in the previous section, we evaluate our protocols’
error rates on the evaluation datasets of face and voice, and compare the achieved results
to the error rates of respective plaintext baseline. Table 3.3 shows the results for face- and
face&voice-based pipelines. It also shows the error rates, achieved when allowing C to
try multiple authentication attempts. Recall that we achieve these results through Justitia
pipeline by enabling all of its layers, but we individually discuss the impact of QF layer on
the error rates after presenting our main results.
Results of face-based protocol
Results show that Justitia achieves targeted error rates, determined by industrial systems
(see Sect. 3.6.2), for face-based protocol even without a requirement of multiple authenti-
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Table 3.3: Accuracy comparison. Results show FRR/FAR (%) errors on YTF (face) and
YTF & LS (face & voice) datasets for multiple auth. trials.
Face Face&Voice
1sttrial 2nd 3rd 1sttrial 2nd 3rd
Plaintext 0.33/0 0/0 0/0 8.42/0 1.14/0 0/0
Justitia 0.33/0 0/0 0/0 9.26/0 1.32/0 0/0
cation attempts. According to our analysis, all results for both the fine-tuning datasets and
the evaluation datasets are comparable, thus the fine-tuning process can be done once and
the same parameters can be used for different deployment scenarios.
Results of face&voice-based protocol
We now evaluate the impact of utilizing multiple biometrics, whose results also presented
in Table 3.3. We randomly assign each identity from the LS dataset to an identity from the
filtered YTF dataset. Even though Justitia slightly increases its FRR while using ensembled
verification model, our highest priority is to have a 0% FAR since any false acceptance will
be an instance of successful impersonation attack. In the following section, we will present
further evaluation on the false rejection cases to show that all users can recover from a false
rejection by retrying the authentication process.
Using multiple trials
Here, we evaluate how users of our prototype can recover from false rejections (i.e. can they
successfully authenticate after a false rejection, and if so, with how many authentication
attempts?). As discussed in Sect. 3.3.2, using multiple authentication trials is especially
required due to the high FRR of underlying voice-verification DL. Table 3.3 shows error
rates, achieved through all biometric modalities, for each number of trials. We find that
1) errors of our system are independent of the users since falsely rejected subjects change
across different trials, thus retrying the authentication process will allow all legitimate users
to successfully authenticate, and 2) every extra trial reduces the overall errors dramatically.
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Figure 3.5: Filtered samples in QF due to being occluded, low resolution, low lit and blurry,
from YouTube Faces dataset.
For instance, Justitia can achieve zero errors on face- and (1.32% FRR, 0% FAR) errors on
face&voice-based protocols if we request one more authentication attempt.
Using QF layer
Using a QF layer on the client app is one of the ways to ensure high fidelity inputs to our
pipeline, and thus to have similar accuracy as achieved on the fine-tuning process. As men-
tioned, only high quality faces of 312 subjects are retained for the enrollment/authentication
tasks after applying QF to the noisy YTF dataset. Fig. 3.5 shows some of the filtered sam-
ples, eliminated due to being occluded, low resolution, blurry and low lit. Overall, if we
remove the QF layer, our FRR/FAR for the YTF dataset will increase from 0.33/0% re-
ported in Sect. 3.6.3 to 2.01/2.02%.
Comparison to plaintext baseline
In Table 3.3, we also compare achieved errors of Justitia with the respective plaintext base-
line for each scenario. In plaintext pipelines, we measure how close two embeddings are to
determine if they belong to the same person. Moreover, we also let the plaintext pipelines
leverage from multiple samples, over a typical majority voting scheme [146], for the sake
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of fair comparison. We realize this is not the exact same majority voting approach from our
NR layer, but it is the best we can do for the Euclidean or cosine spaces. Other than the NR
layer, we use the same settings for both schemes. For the chosen authentication attempts,
Justitia achieves no further error for face-based pipeline and only an added 0.18% of FRR
error for face&voice-based pipeline compared to the plaintext systems.
3.6.4 Performance of Prototype System
Now, we discuss the response time of each step in our design and networking overhead
between C and S at enrollment and authentication times for face- and face&voice-based
protocols. Here, we do not discuss the people’s biometric sample scanning times, as it
is evaluated in the following user study section. Table 3.4 presents our results. Results
show that face&voice-based protocol increases the overall computation as it executes for
two modalities and the client app tries multiple authentication attempts for some users,
according to this protocol. Recall that, this is a one-time cost if C prefers to use day-to-day
authentication, as discussed in Sect. 3.3.3. We compare overall response times of Justitia
and prior plaintext-based protocols, which capture different biometric modalities, in the
next section.
3.7 User Study on the prototype system
In this section, we first describe our user study, then we discuss the usability of our de-
sign in different scenarios, and compare it with plaintext protocols. Finally, we present a
preliminary user acceptance study 6.
3.7.1 Usability
We analyze the usability of our design for both sensitive and non-sensitive authentication
cases. We also discuss how combining face and voice biometrics impacts the biometric
6Usability examines whether our design is convenient or easy to use for desired purpose. User acceptance
questions whether people would prefer using the proposed system (in which conditions).
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Figure 3.6: One-time enr./auth. process (left). One-click authentication message for day-
to-day usage (right).
capturing process. Our user study involves 20 volunteers recruited from our organization,
with the approval of the Institutional Review Board (IRB) of our organization.
Procedure
In this study, each person i) scans only his/her face and ii) scans his face while pronouncing
short English phrases three times (to be used if multiple authentications will be required)
both at enrollment and authentication times. Users change mobile devices and environment
(e.g., background lighting) across enrollment and authentication phases to simulate a lost-
device (or renewal) scenario.
Improved-usability scenario As introduced in Sect. 3.3.3, each user also iii) tries one-
click authentication to log in a demo website, which simulates day-to-day usage for non-
sensitive authentications. Participants try this through the above enrollment and authenti-
cation devices to make sure that biometric scanning is one-time process at this scenario. In
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Table 3.4: One-time cost of enrollment/renewal. Avg. response times (sec.) of each step in
the pipeline. Network also shows transferred data.
Pha. Cap. QF DL SE NR FE Network Total
fa
ce Enr. 2.3 0.6 0.1 0.1 0.3
0.62 0.5 sec. 4.52







11 1.2 0.4 0.5 1.2
1.49 1 sec. 16.79
Aut. 0.19 (3.6 MB) 15.49
Fig. 3.6, we show sample screen shots from one-time enrollment/authentication and day-
to-day authentication processes.
Results
Table 3.4 presents the average time it takes for the subjects in the user study to capture their
i) face and ii) face&voice biometrics. Note that, some guidance messages are displayed
if captured faces do not accommodate QF rules, which could increase the execution time
of this process. As discussed in Sect. 3.6.4, capturing both biometrics takes longer times
since the client device collects biometric samples required for multiple authentications in
advance.
Results show that, participants can enroll or authenticate himself to S with a new (or
renewed) device around 4 and 16 seconds in the first and second scenarios, respectively.
Response time increases 12 seconds in the second scenario, as C has to record voice re-
sponses at least two times. However, this will be the case even in a plaintext-based pipeline
since the voice-based deep learning baseline has a high FRR rate for single trial, as pre-
sented in Table 3.3.
Note that, these are the cost for enrollment (or device renewal) and sensitive authentica-
tions. On the other hand, as mentioned before, if C prefers using one-click authentication,
they become a one-time cost before initializing a typical challenge-response authentication
scheme, introduced in Sect. 3.3.3. Then, the cost of day-to-day authentications will be the
same with responding an authentication message (e.g., in Fig. 3.6), which is less than a
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Table 3.5: Comparing response times of Justitia to prior plaintext-based protocols for dif-
ferent modalities.
Protocol Modality Pipeline Response Time
Justitia Face Private 4-4.5 sec.
Justitia Face&voice Private 15.5-16.8 sec.
FaceFlashing [109] Face Plaintext 6-29 sec.
rtCaptcha [16] Face&voice Plaintext 12-20 sec.
second.
Response time comparison with plaintext systems
To evaluate the impact of our privacy preserving pipeline on performance, we compare
our system’s response times for different modalities to the respective plaintext-based prior
art. We first compare Justitia with FaceFlashing from [109], which captures only face
biometrics. Then, we compare Justitia with rtCaptcha from [16], which captures both face
and voice together. Notice that, both works send the captured biometric data in plaintext to
S. Table 3.5 presents the comparison results. FaceFlashing’s response times increase from
6 to 29 seconds, as it increases the captured number of frames for better accuracy. Similarly,
rtCaptcha has at least 12 seconds of response time, as it requires capturing voice samples
for multiple trials. Results show that the privacy preserving steps in Justitia do not bring
additional delay, as the bottleneck is the biometric capturing process in such authentication
systems.
3.7.2 A Preliminary Study for User Acceptance
Measuring user acceptance of biometric systems, especially using a new modality like face,
is a challenging task and deserves an in depth analysis. Hence, in this work, we could only
present a preliminary study for our design. We refer readers to [147] for a detailed analysis
reflecting the opinions of experts and non-experts on biometric authentication systems. In
the following, we present the details and results of our user study to measure the user
acceptance of the Justitia system.
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To measure the user acceptance of Justitia relative to existing two factor authentica-
tion schemes, we conducted a large scale survey through Amazon Mechanical Turk. In
particular, we recruited over 200 subjects from a broad range of genders, levels of edu-
cation (from high school diploma to doctoral degree), races (Caucasian, Asian, Hispanic,
and Black/African American) and ages (18 to 60). Each participant is shown a two minute
video explaining what Justitia does and how it is used, including a demo of us performing
the enrollment/authentication along with the one-click authentication through our client
app over different mobile devices. After watching the video, the subjects are asked to fill
out a survey containing questions designed to measure the user acceptance of Justitia and
existing two factor systems. We conclude the survey with miscellaneous questions regard-
ing their attitude towards two-factor, biometrics and passwords.
Our questions come from the widely used System Usability Scale (SUS) metric [148].
SUS presents ten opinion statements to which the subjects report how strongly they agree
with each on a five-point scale ranging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”. We
compute an overall SUS score ranging from 0 to 100 based on all the answers. A higher
score indicates a more usable system. Based on the data collected from Mechanical Turk,
we computed an average SUS score of 63 for Justitia and 66 for two factor authentication.
We argue that the user acceptance of Justitia is comparable to two-factor and believe our
slightly lower score is due in part to the subjects having significantly more exposure to the
functionality and benefits of two-factor compared to our two minute demo video of Justitia.
Given this, we consider the response to our initial prototype to be promising and believe
we can improve our score with a better implementation and by giving subjects hands on
experience.
We also make several observations from the responses to the miscellaneous questions.
First, we notice a per-subject inverse correlation between acceptance of password managers
and acceptance of our system. Second, there is a per-subject inverse correlation between
trust of existing biometric systems (e.g., Touch ID) over passwords for security and ac-
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:fully offers the benefit; : almost offers the benefit; no-circle: does not offer the benefit
:better than passwords; : worse than passwords; no-background: no change
ceptance of Justitia. One possible interpretation of these results is that users who believe
existing systems (be it password manager or biometric systems) are secure enough will
consider Justitia to be unnecessarily complicate. We believe this shows that the security
risks of existing schemes are not well understood by average users.
3.8 Comparison with Other Systems
In this section, we evaluate Justitia against the usability, deployability and security metrics
proposed by Bonneau et al. [149] to demonstrate the benefits of our privacy preserving
biometric authentication. Additionally, we have evaluated Apple’s FaceID for comparison.
Table 3.6 presents the summary of comparative evaluation of Justitia, FaceID, OpenID,
Google 2-Step Authentication (2-Step) and plaintext form of a biometric (Iris) through the
criteria set defined by Bonneau et al.[149]. It should be noted that if Google 2-Step is used
as single sign-on service, it does not offer security benefits of No-Trusted-Third-Party and
Unlinkable. For consistency, we borrow the original work’s terminology of “fully offers”,
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“almost offers”, “does not offer”.
For all the usability benefits identified in [149], Justitia fully offers all but one, namely
nothing-to-carry. For users who insist on having nothing-to-carry, we note that Justitia can
accommodate this at the cost of being physically-effortless. Specifically, one can always
authenticate using their biometrics on whatever client they happen to be using via recovery.
Compared to FaceID, Justitia offers the additional benefit of easy-recovery-from-loss. This
is thank to our privacy preserving pipeline, which addresses the privacy concerns limiting
FaceID to local authentication. Compared to OpenID, which the related work identifies
as a strong candidate to replace passwords, Justitia fully offers the benefits memorywise-
effortless and physically-effortless by entirely eliminating passwords and easy-to-learn by
guiding users through enrollment and recovery with step-by-step instructions. According
to the related work, OpenID almost offers these benefits, but falls short because it still uses
passwords. Compared to passwords in general, Justitia is better in 6 out of the 8 usability
metrics and equivalent in the remaining two. Finally, the superior accuracy and privacy
makes Justitia more usable than traditional biometric systems (e.g. iris).
For deployability, Justitia cannot offer the mature benefit since it is a prototype. Oth-
erwise, it offers the same benefits as OpenID, mainly because it is a compliant OpenID
authentication service. Furthermore, we argue that since the publication of [149], OpenID
has gained further support from organizations like FIDO, Google and Facebook, thereby
making server compatibility less of an issue. Overall, Justitia is the strongest in deployabil-
ity among the candidates considered in Table 3.6. To the contrary, Apple’s FaceID suffers
greatly in this category because it is a closed ecosystem, local authentication system.
Finally, for security, Justitia in its current form does not offer the benefit of resilient-to-
targeted-attack. In the next subsection, we discuss future work towards addressing this lim-
itation. Also, Justitia is almost resilient-to-theft, but not fully because if the user’s phone is
stolen and has no lock screen, the thief can approve authentication attempts up to the point
that the user recovers with another phone. Justitia fully offers all the other security benefits.
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Table 3.7: Comparison of our security assessment technique to previous approaches.
Kullback-Leibler (KL) is a pseudo-distance. First five rows are for face- and last row is
for face&voice-based pipeline.
Approach Space (data type) Method Security
Ours RGB (photoreal. faces) empiric ˜25 bits
ZAK20rgb[84] RGB (random) empiric >37 bits
ZAK20emb[84] Euclidean (random) empiric >40 bits
AYL06 [85] KL (embeddings) statistic ˜40 bits
D09 [86] Hamming (face bit-vec) statistic ˜25 bits
D09 [86] Hamming (face&voice) statistic ˜33 bits
On the other hand, FaceID almost offers the benefit of resilient-to-targeted-impersonation
due to its platform security (i.e. one cannot directly feeding digital data to the iOS system
without first jailbreaking it) and sophisticated sensors that supposedly detect face masks.
However, there are concerns that in-person adversaries can cause victims to inadvertently
unlock their phones.7 FaceID makes this harder by checking the user’s gaze, but looking
at a phone is not explicit consent. Therefore, we claim FaceID almost offers requiring-
explicit-consent. FaceID fully offers all the other security benefits.
In conclusion, comparing to all the other candidates in Table 3.6, both Justitia and
FaceID offer superior security. Also, compared to password, Justitia and FaceID are supe-
rior in 6 out of 11 security criteria and inferior in 1.
3.9 Security Analysis
As pointed out in Sect. 3.4.2, our security goal is to prevent the adversary from obtaining
any locked secret from the database. Recall that, even though the key space of the lockers
is 128 bits, they are still vulnerable to brute force attacks if the keys are derived from the
bio-bit vectors with very low entropy.
In this section, we evaluate the practical security of our design through systematic




Figure 3.7: Possible attack channels, and existing (and our) security estimates through input
data on each channel. LD refers to liveness detection and is out-of-scope of this work.
We also discuss the potential impact of combining face and voice on the overall security.
Table 3.7 summarizes the input space (e.g., RGB, Euclidean or Hamming), assessment
method (e.g., empirical or statistical), and compares the measured security (in bits, as in-
troduced in [150]) of our approach to previous security assessment techniques, elaborated
in the following. As noted before, we consider both the targeted impersonation attacks and
potential defense mechanisms (e.g. liveness detection, password/pin/token protection etc.)
to them as future work.
3.9.1 Categorizing the Approaches
Note that, considering the measurement data, we categorize the security assessment tech-
niques (including ours) into two groups: “empirical” and “statistical”. The former assumes
an attacker probing large number of inputs, while the latter suggests fitting the limited data
into a distribution model (e.g., Gaussian or binomial) to build a reflection of the real world
distributions [85].
Attack channels
As depicted in Fig. 3.7, these methods could apply a simulating or make an estimation over
the space of different attack channels of our design.
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3.9.2 Our improvements
As presented in the following, there is no universally accepted definition or metric for
security assessment of biometric authentication systems. Hence, instead of formally pin-
pointing the entropy of facial-biometrics, we address the limitations of the prior work (both
empirical and statistical ones). We assume that the adversary can leverage from the domain
knowledge while probing random inputs (as impostors) to our pipeline. This narrows down
the attack space considered in [84]. Additionally, instead of conducting an analysis through
intermediate steps, we simulate a black-box attack. Therefore, it already accounts for error
correction and entropy loss caused by all building blocks in the pipeline. Hence, this could
be applied to different face-based authentication systems in the future.
3.9.3 Previous Security Assessment Approaches
Now, we review the former techniques in two categories. Note that, they attack a Justitia
database with people from filtered YTF dataset.
Empirical assessments
Zhao et al. [84] propose two approaches (ZAK20rgb, ZAK20emb) analyzing the security of
biometric authentication systems (including face- and voice-based systems), by simulating
attacks through uniformly sampled data from the space of the respective input channel.
According to their simulation for facial authentication systems, an attacker can generate
uniformly sampled i) raw RGB inputs and ii) embedding vectors in their message spaces.
We generate and feed these inputs to the corresponding channels of our design to obtain a
secret belong to any of the enrolled user.
Empirical assessment results Both ZAK20rgb and ZAK20emb attacks could not be suc-
cessful even after i) 150 billion (> 237) and ii) 1.6 trillion (> 240) distinct input trials,
77
respectively. We terminate these simulations because of the limited time and another ap-
proach estimating a lower bound than these.
Statistical assessments
These approaches try to estimate the security of a biometric authentication system, by fit-
ting the limited data into a distribution model that creates a reflection of the corresponding
input space. In previous work, Adler et al. [85] (AYL06) uses a Gaussian model, and John
Daugman [86] (D09) uses a binomial model for distribution modeling.
AYL06 estimate In this approach, the security could be interpreted as the mean of
Kullback-Leibler (KL) distances of all people in a population, where KL is the relative en-
tropy [151] between the inter- (p) and intra-person (q) biometric feature distributions. We
use the embedding vectors of enrolled faces from filtered YTF to estimate p and q. Note
that, intra-persons refer to face pairs from different people. Roughly speaking, AYL06 esti-
mate KL distance of each person, by modeling p and q as Gaussian distributions. We refer
readers to [85] for more details on formal definitions.
D09 estimate According to this approach, we use only intra-person distribution (among
filtered YTF dataset) of subsampled keys keyi and key′i from the bio-bit vectors B and
B′, respectively, for the target and imposter pairs. In this case, D09 suggests building a
binomial model through the Hamming distances between all combinations of these genuine
and impostor key pairs to realistically reflect the tails of a real world distribution, which
determines the security of our system. Before delving into details of this approach in the
following, we refer readers to [86] for more details.
Recall that, ` is the optimal value to subsample keys keyi and key′i. For k different sets
of ` random bits, we extract the corresponding `-bit keys from all samples in both target
and impostor. Call the resulting set of keys Key(`, target) and Key(`, impostor) and the
i-th and j-th keys in both sets Key(`, target, i) and Key(`, impostor, j), respectively. For
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all values of (`, i, j) denoting different identities, compute the Hamming distance between
Key(`, target, i) and Key(`, impostor, j).
D09 [86] states that if we can model the Hamming distance between genuine and im-
postor keys as a binomial distribution with a mean µ and degrees of freedom N , each
attempt of cracking one locker with an impostor sample can be seen as N Bernoulli trials,
with the probability of having the fractional Hamming distance between the two keys being
x = n/N as: 8
f(x) =
N !
n! (N − n)!
µn (1− µ)(N−n) (3.1)
If the SSF-FE generates k lockers for each user, the chance of an attacker using a
random sample from impostor to decrypt the secret (i.e. unlocking one or more of the k
lockers) of a user in target is: Fk(x) = 1− [1− f(x)]k.
Since the impostor key must be an exact match (x=n=0) to crack the locker, the prob-
ability of the attacker using one sample from the impostor dataset to unlock one locker
generated by the target dataset is: f(0) = (1−µ)N . And, the cumulative chance to unlock






Since impersonating enrolled users with all the other subjects from the filtered YTF
dataset presents the attacker an advantage by the same distribution of target faces, we ex-
tract the binomial distribution through the (target, impostor) pairs from (filtered YTF,
filtered YTF). Fig. 3.8 compares the empirical and ideal binomial distributions for these
(target, impostor) pairs. The figure also shows the mean (µ), standard deviation (σ) and
degrees of freedom (N ) for the best fit binomial distribution along with the average statis-
tical distance (∆P ) between the empirical (PDF ) and ideal (f(x)) distributions. Overall,
8Thus, n out of the N Bernoulli trials is a match.
79
Figure 3.8: Empirical HD distributions and PDF curves (black-dashed) of 10M (target,
impostor) instances and their theoretical Binomial models f(x) (blue-solid and red dotted-
dash).
after applying the parameters from 3.2, this approach measures the success rate of an at-
tacker on face-based pipeline as F−1k (0)=1 in 24.6 million (˜2
25). Similarly, it measures
the security of face&voice-based pipeline as 1 in 8 billion (˜233).
Statistical assessment results After applying the values derived from our data into the
parameters of both approaches, AYL06 and D09, resp., compute the success rate of an at-
tacker as around 1 in 240 and 1 in 225. Note that, considering the applied space conversion
and noise elimination operations, the gap between two estimates is not surprising. More-
over, as stated in Adler et al. [85], Gaussian models are used to give an upper bound to
entropy value. In the following, we show how D09 estimation agrees with our black-box
attack.
3.9.4 Proposed Security Assessment Approach
In the following, after introducing our impostor dataset, we discuss the details of our
methodology and present the achieved security.
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Generating impostor faces
We use the NVidia’s face generator StyleGAN [152] to create unique and photorealistic
faces from 60 million subjects. This simulates a powerful adversary which narrows down
the random input space, considered in ZAK20rgb, by eliminating those do not actually look
like a face. We use an existing model and weights 9 trained on 70,000 high-quality images
with configuration that results the lowest reported Fréchet inception distance [153], which
infers generated faces will have closer image quality or more similar statistics with the
real faces. We refer readers to [152] for more details regarding the diversity, quality, and
stability of the generated faces.
Methodology
We measure the “security” of our system as the chance of false acceptance when a random
face sample is used to impersonate an enrolled user in our database. This is different from
the FAR reported in Sect. 3.6.3, which used a limited number of illegitimate samples as
impostors.
Results
Pitted against faces from StyleGAN-generated 60 million identities, Justitia only allows
2 successful impersonations, agreeing with the statistical D09 estimate: around, 1 imper-
sonation per 225 attempts. Fig. 3.9 shows the matching (target, impostor) samples from
(filtered YTF, StyleGAN) pairs. Note that it is possible to generate synthetic faces with
some targeted auxiliary information (e.g., gender, race, age etc.) to even increase the attack
power. This observation does not undermine our conclusions.
9https://github.com/NVlabs/stylegan
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Figure 3.9: 2 in 60M impersonations from StyleGAN, with matching YTF enrollment.
3.9.5 Security of Face&Voice-based Pipeline
If C combine his face and voice in a way that suggested in Sect. 3.3.2, attacker’s success
rate decreases to 1 impersonation per 8 billion (˜233) attempts. To estimate this, we use
D09 as it agrees with our empirical analysis and we could not synthesize millions of voices.
3.10 Conclusion
We introduce Justitia, a privacy-preserving pipeline that authenticates C to a remote S
without revealing his/her biometric data to S. The first challenge is mapping between
accurate identification component, deep learning, and privacy preserving components, like
fuzzy extractors. The second one is preserving the practicality of crypto components, which
is solved by our efficient and convenient noise handling approaches.
Experiments show that our design incurs zero error for face- and only a 0.18% of FRR
for face&voice-based pipelines over the plaintext baseline systems to achieve privacy. We
show how to increase the security and usability for sensitive and non-sensitive authentica-
tions, respectively. According to our systematical security assessments conducted through
prior approaches and our novel black-box method, Justitia achieves ˜25 bits and ˜33 bits
of security guarantees for face- and face&voice-based pipelines, respectively.
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CHAPTER 4
PRIVACY PROTECTION IN BIOMETRIC SURVEILLANCE
In this chapter, I will present fuzzy labeled private set intersection (FLPSI) protocol, which
is designed for protecting privacy of fuzzy data (such as biometric data) in a large scale
database search.
4.1 Introduction
Recent advances in deep learning (DL)-based biometric identification have made possible
real-time identification of persons in footage collected by surveillance equipment. The
trend toward real-time surveillance in public and private places (e.g., streets, city halls,
airports, retail stores, pharmacies, gas stations etc.) has immense benefits for public safety
or customer convenience. However, adoption of these technologies come at a significant
privacy cost, which raises serious objections.
To our knowledge, existing biometrics surveillance systems have the following major
challenges. First, vendors store and process the collected biometric data on their server
in plaintext for the ease of deployment and practicality. Second, people cannot opt-out of
these systems, since video footage (or any captured faces) are directly uploaded to a remote
server.
Identifying “persons of interest” may be warranted [154], but tracking everybody else
in the process may open the doors to illegitimate surveillance and certain human right
abuses [155]. In response, privacy stakeholders are pressing for a moratorium on perma-
nent adoption of these systems, and in fact they have already succeeded in banning facial
surveillance in several countries and U.S. states [20, 21, 22].
In this paper, we propose a middle ground solution, privacy-preserving biometric
search. Here the server S holding a large biometric database with corresponding labels
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(e.g., identities) should learn nothing about the query or the result, while the querier (client
C) should learn nothing about the database besides the label(s) of the query’s match(es).
A similar problem of exact private match is extensively studied in a variety of scenarios
(e.g., contact list discovery and online dating services), and can be achieved via (labeled)
private set intersection (LPSI), a standard primitive [156, 157, 158, 159]. Even though the
state-of-the-art CHLR18 [159] achieves a practical efficiency with communication costs
sublinear to DB size, LPSI cannot directly be applied to our problem because it targets
exact matches, while biometrics are noisy (e.g., due to lighting, imprecise scans, etc.).
We introduce FLPSI: a fuzzy LPSI protocol for fast privacy-preserving biometric search.
We address a number of technical challenges in protocol/definition design and formal
proofs.
To our knowledge, none of the prior work related to fuzzy matching achieves practical
efficiency for real-time surveillance, mainly because of communication growing (at least)
linearly with database size (see Sect. 4.2 and Sect. 4.11.5 for the related work). For exam-
ple, two protocols of the state-of-the-art (SANNS [99]) require 1.7-5.4 GB communication
and 15.1-41.7 sec. online response times over WAN per query over a million-row database.
We follow a much more scalable approach that reduces our fuzzy matching prob-
lem to an easier exact-matching subproblems that could be solved with communication
cost sublinear in DB size, by leveraging optimizations of the state-of-the-art (L)PSI tech-
niques [158, 159]. The crux of our solution is twofold. First, we translate the closeness
(e.g., in Euclidean space) of two biometrics into a t-out-of-T set-based matching without
sacrificing accuracy. That is, we encode a given biometric input into a set of T items,
s.t. the two sets will likely have at least t exactly common items iff the biometrics are of
the same person. Second, we build an efficient threshold set-matching protocol from fully
homomorphic encryption (FHE), garbled circuits (GC) and t-out-of-T secret sharing, and
solve several challenges in definitional approach.
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4.1.1 Summary of Our Contributions
• We describe and formally define the functionality and security of Fuzzy Labeled Private
Set Intersection (FLPSI). We build a FLPSI protocol using the AES blockcipher, homo-
morphic encryption, garbled circuits and t-out-of-T secret sharing. We prove the security
in the semi-honest model.
• We show how to interpret closeness (e.g., in Euclidean space) between biometric inputs
as t-out-of-T exact set-item matchings without sacrificing the accuracy.
• We give simulation-based FLPSI security definition (prior definitions of fuzzy primitives
are game-based).
• We introduce a number of optimizations, in addition to the prior (L)PSI techniques we
use.
• We extensively evaluate our protocol in different settings. We achieve 1.66s online run-
ning time over WAN with 40.8MB transfer per query over a million-row database.
• We systematically compare our design with prior art, and outperform all of them in their
best settings, often by several orders of magnitude both in run time and communication.
For example, on the largest dataset (of 10M records), we speed up by a factor of 3-33×
and decrease the overall data communication by a factor of up to 48-452× compared to
the two protocols of the state-of-the-art, SANNS [99].
• We highlight sublinear and concretely very small network use of our solution. In contrast
with most other related work, our solution will scale on very small-bandwidth networks.
4.2 Related Work
As noted above, (L)PSI protocols [156, 157, 158, 159] and other exact-match protocols are
inapplicable in our setting.
Freedman et al. [160] informally introduced the problem of private fuzzy search as an
application of their private matching protocol. They proposed a basic construction, and left
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improving its efficiency as future work. We now discuss state of the art techniques in fuzzy
search.
4.2.1 Threshold Matching.
The works [161, 162, 163] are based on threshold t-out-of-T matching outlined in [160].
These constructions incur (at least) linear in DB size and concretely inefficient communi-
cation and computation. We compare them in detail in Sect. 4.11.5 and Fig. 4.12 and show
that they do not scale to a million-row DB.
A related line of work uses threshold over Euclidean or Hamming distance or cosine
similarity between players’ vectors [164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170]. While these works
are generally faster than [161, 162, 163], our solution is still orders of magnitude more
efficient. We provide detailed performance comparison in Sect. 4.11.5 and Fig. 4.11.
Our solution, also based on threshold t-out-of-T matching, must overcome the technical
difficulties of i) high variability (and hence high distance) of feature vectors of the same
person, and ii) large size of extracted feature vectors (hence high costs). We resolve both
by carefully integrating fine-tuned random private subsampling of the feature vectors prior
to computing threshold match (see Sect. 4.5).
4.2.2 Nearest Neighbor Search (NNS).
A related line of work, albeit solving a different problem from the privacy perspective, is
secure NNS. Indeed, NNS may (and is expected to) return match(es) for a person who is not
present in DB; hence NNS does not meet our security requirements. However, we compare
to NNS solutions as well, as they are close enough in spirit to our application scenario,
and they are faster than prior work on private fuzzy search discussed above. Note, we do
not consider outsourcing-based NNS [171, 172, 173, 174, 175] as they require a third party
who learns the query ([176] requires two non-colluding servers). State-of-the-art optimized





































Figure 4.1: Overview of FLPSI. For clarity, subsampling is depicted without AES encryp-
tion and 2PC.
as they transfer 1.7-5.4 GB to run a 10-NNS over a database of a million entries (6.1-57.7
GB over a database of 10 million entries). Hence, SANNS is not practical enough for
real-time tasks at scale. We give a detailed comparison to SANNS in Sect. 4.11.5.
Finally, we mention, but do not discuss in detail, work on fuzzy searchable encryp-
tion [177, 178], as they address a different setting where the querier owns the data stored
on an untrusted server (i.e. non-private DB).
4.3 Overview and Technical Details
Here we review existing non-private (plaintext) fuzzy matching algorithms and building
privacy protection into them.
4.3.1 Plaintext Fuzzy Matching
Existing facial surveillance systems, informally, work as follows. A client C captures facial
images of people from a surveillance video footage, then transmits the biometric data to a
server S with transport encryption, and S receives the data in plaintext. Then, the server
uses a DL system to turn raw biometric readings into embedding vectors with a (probabilis-
tic) guarantee that two such vectors will be close in Euclidean distance iff they are from
the same person. If the server finds such a close biometric entry in its database, it returns
the label (e.g, identity) of the entry to the client. Otherwise, it returns “no match” result to
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the client. In our evaluation, we used FaceNet [24], which is the state-of-the-art DL system
achieving at most 0.67% for 10 false matches per query over 1M-row DB. See Fig. 4.7.
Privacy concerns. Clearly, since the data is typically processed in plaintext by the
server, it achieves maximal privacy, while the client achieves none. Next, we discuss
achieving maximal client privacy as well.
4.3.2 Private Fuzzy Matching
Our goal is to build a protocol that reveals labels of query matches only to C, while main-
taining confidentiality of C’s query and S’s database. To achieve this, C and S can locally
compute DL embeddings from their biometric data, then apply standard MPC tools to com-
pute Euclidean (or cosine similarity) distance between the C’s query and each of the S’s
database items [165, 169, 167, 164, 166]. However, this does not scale (cf Fig. 4.11). Our
much more scalable approach is based on a t-out-of-T matching scheme, described in detail
next. Fig. 4.1 shows a high-level overview of our FLPSI protocol.
Binary encoding. To accommodate t-out-of-T matching, we first address the incompat-
ibility between DL embeddings (operating in Euclidean space) and the crypto components
(operating in Hamming space) of our protocol. (Operating in Hamming space, e.g., com-
puting closeness is much cheaper in MPC). To do this, parties additionally apply a space
mapping function, which is based on locality-sensitive hashes [179, 145, 118, 119], to con-
vert the embedding vectors into bio-bit vectors (xi and y) with the desired property (they
are Hamming-close if they originate from the biometrics of the same person). This is also
used as a dimension reduction process in scalable image search applications [180, 181,
182]. We note that there are different DL-based algorithms that generate binary represen-
tations directly from the raw data [183, 184, 185]. We omit exploring the best algorithm,
and refer to [186] for a comprehensive survey. We present our space mapping technique
from [19] in Sect. 3.2.3. We will refer to the set of functions converting biometric data into
bio-bit vectors, as “Encode(.)”.
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C and S proceed as follows after encoding their biometric data into bio-bit vectors y
(held by C) and xi ∈ X (held by S).
Subsampling: generate T random subsamples of y and each xi bio-bit vectors (in the
same way, e.g., x21 = x2 ∧ mask1), s.t. at least t of them will be the same iff y and a
xi belong to the same person (if bio-bit vectors are Hamming-close, this can be achieved
whp);
Secret sharing: generate t-out-of-T secret shares of the label li (e.g., identity) of each
xi ∈ X (each share is associated with a subsample of xi), such that any t shares can
reconstruct li;
STLPSI: interactively execute a private t-out-of-T matching protocol (Set Threshold
LPSI, or STLPSI) on the C’s subsample set and the S’s sets of (subsample, secret share)
pairs1: the label li of an xi ∈ X is revealed to C iff at least t of the subsamples of y and xi
are equal (which means C obtains shares of matching subsamples of xi).
Our private matching achieves false positive and negative rates equal to the state-of-
the-art plaintext algorithms.
4.3.3 Our Solutions to Technical Challenges
Now we discuss the most interesting technical challenges.
Subsample confidentiality As described above, C learns the subsamples (and respec-
tive subsampling masks), which may help C learn something additional about database.
For example, in case of a false-positive match, the semi-honest C will now learn with con-
fidence positions in bio-bit vector, thereby learning the original biometric, which may not
be included in the result set. his next query so as to improve his chance of “hitting” a face
in database (a false match).
We can resolve this by operating over encrypted subsamples only. For this, S chooses
the random subsampling/projection masks and an AES encryption key kS . Then S via MPC
1Note that the secret shares are now treated as labels in the STLPSI.
89
allows C to compute the AES-encryptions of masked projections on the C’s query bio-bit
vector y, while keeping the projection masks and kS secret from C. The server efficiently
computes AES-encryptions of masked projections on its large database non-interactively
in O(|X |). Note that S has to refresh these masks and keys for each execution.
Concealing partial matches in single execution. (L)PSI protocols (e.g., [156, 157,
158, 159]) do not directly implement the above STLPSI functionality since they, by design,
reveal partial (below-threshold t) matches. We resolve this by building effient STLPSI from
t-out-of-T secret sharing and FHE, based on prior (L)PSI works (e.g., CHLR18 [159]).
Concealing partial matches in repeated executions. This subtle issue arises when
generated shares are not refreshed between queries, and C may collect threshold t shares
across queries. We resolve this by carefully resetting secret shares, subsampling masks and
keys in each execution.
Novel definitional approach. In MPC, the preferred simulation-based security def-
initions offer clean and composable guarantees. At the same time, they require precise
specification of ideal-world behavior, which we (as a community) do not know how to
achieve for biometric functions. Because of this, biometric authentication definitions are
usually game-based and not composable, but which allow to bound, rather than precisely
specify adversary success.
One of our contributions is a novel definitional approach (see Sect. 4.7.1), which allows
the best of both worlds: our definition is indeed simulation-based, and yet we bound ad-
versary success rather than exactly specifying it. Our definition is generic and incorporates
optional leakage, which is often needed for efficient sublinear protocols. We believe this
definitional approach can serve as a template in defining primitives in the biometric space.
4.3.4 Trust Assumptions and Threat Model
• C and S locally apply binary encoding to their biometric data. We assume they own
the same DL model that is trained on a public dataset and not tailored to any particu-
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lar user from either party. Hence, we consider membership inference [107] or model
inversion [108] attacks to be out of our scope.
• Considering our motivating application, we do not discuss here how the query biometric
is obtained; we note that face detection in video footage is an easy and solved prob-
lem [187].
• We prove our 2PC (one C and one S) in the semi-honest model (parties follow the pro-
tocol specification). In particular, parties do not corrupt their inputs (e.g., via a pixel
perturbing attack [15]). This models natural scenarios in practice, as well as serves as
a stepping stone to stronger models, such as handling malicious adversaries. Of course,
many practical applications require protection against active cheating. Indeed, the bio-
metric information served by S may be highly sensitive, and hence a possibility of data
exfiltration by a malicious C would preclude offering the search service to a broader
audience. We leave malicious security as important future work.
Resilience Against Certain Malicious Behaviour. While our protocol is in the SH
model, we informally discuss several natural malicious attacks, their impact and mitigation.
Firstly, S can exclude its DB entries from search results simply by sending encryptions
of random values. This can be also achieved by appropriate input substitution, and therefore
is not an attack in a standalone execution setting. In general, efficiently ensuring that a
malicious S is unable to omit entries in its DB is a hard technical problem.
Further, C can try to learn DB by querying random bit-vectors or brute-forcing arbitrary
biometric inputs. Brute-forcing is a well-understood attack, which is mitigated by rate-
limiting. Querying bit-vectors is not helping C, since the bit-vector search space is larger
than the space of faces.
4.4 Definition of FLPSI
In this section, we define a general syntax for a fuzzy labeled PSI. We start with the notion
of closeness (fuzzy matching), adopted from [178].
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Definition 4.4.1. Closeness Domain. We say that Λ = (D,Cl) is a closeness domain if
D is a set, and Cl is the (partial) closeness function that takes any x, y ∈ D and outputs a
member of {close, far}, so that Cl is symmetric (i.e., Cl(x, y) = Cl(y, x)).
There are no requirements on the output of close for pairs that are “near” (i.e. points
that neither close nor far).
Definition 4.4.2. Fuzzy Labeled PSI (FLPSI). FLPSI protocol is defined for a closeness
domain (D,Cl) and a label space LS by the interactive algorithm (C, S), where the client
C inputs a query q ∈ D, and the server S inputs a database Db = {(d1, l1).., (dN , lN)},
where items di ∈ D and labels li ∈ LS. At the end, C outputs a set R, and S outputs ⊥.
FLPSI must satisfy the following correctness and security properties:
Correctness. We use ε-correctness instead of a perfect correctness, as it is common for
biometrics-matching systems to have errors, e.g., false matches (ε1) and non-matches (ε2).
Then, it requires that, for q and Db, we have an output set R consisting only of pairs (q, li)
such that for each i ∈ [N ]2;
if Cl(q, di) = far, then Pr[(q, li) /∈ R] ≥ 1− ε1;
if Cl(q, di) = close, then Pr[(q, li) ∈ R] ≥ 1− ε2, where (di, li) ∈ Db.
In our construction the domain D refers to facial biometrics in a surveillance sce-
nario. Hence, Cl(q, di) = far refers to each of q, di coming from different people, while
Cl(q, di) = close refers to both of them belonging to the same person. The label space
LS refers to people’s identities or other info. Hence, the client learns the information cor-
responding to the person in its query, if the photo(s) of this person is in the database.
Security of FLPSI is formally defined in Sect. 4.7.1 in the simulation paradigm by
specifying the ideal functionality. We stress that we separately require ΠFLPSI to satisfy the
above correctness requirement. We present this low-level technical definition discussion
together with the proofs in Sect. 4.7.1, and focus on the protocol description next.
2[N ] is a shorthand for {1, 2, . . . , N}.
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4.5 Building Blocks of FLPSI
In this section, we discuss the ideas behind our protocol and its building blocks (presented
formally in Sect. 4.6).
4.5.1 Binary Encoding
Our construction starts with a binary encoding step, where the client and server locally turn
each of their raw biometric inputs (e.g., facial photos) q, di ∈ D, for i ∈ [N ], into bio-bit
vectors y = Encode(q) and xi = Encode(di), respectively, so that if there is a q, di pair of
the same person, then y, xi are likely close wrt Hamming distance.
4.5.2 Subsampling and 2PC
Now the client and server could apply random projections for each bit vector y and xi,
respectively. This outputs a set of subsampled bit vectors, Y = {y1, . . . , yT} and Xi =
{xi1, ..., xiT}, with the property that if y and xi are close, then some subsamples of them
will likely be the same [73, 188, 19].
S hides the subsampling projections from C to avoid it reconstructing the inputs in the
database (see Sect. 4.3.3). To do this, S chooses a 128-bit AES blockcipher key kS and
generates the projection masks {mask1, . . . ,maskT}. Note that S can locally compute its
subsample set Xi for each of its bio-bit vector xi s.t. xij = AESkS (xi ∧ maskj), where
j ∈ [T ].
Next both parties execute a 2PC protocol (CAES,SAES). This protocol privately com-
putes each yj ∈ Y s.t. yj = AESkS (y ∧maskj) for C, s.t. it can learn matched encrypted
subsamples without learning the projection masks and kS .
We implement this 2PC protocol as Yao’s Garbled Circuits (GC)3 using the EMP
3Note, we could have used a generic oblivious PRF (OPRF) to implement encrypted subsampling; how-
ever, known efficient OPRF are public-key based, even when both key and input are known to the evaluator.
This would result in a more expensive solution, since (expensive public-key) OPRF must be applied by S to
each DB entry for each query. In contrast, while we pay slightly more to evaluate AES inside MPC on the
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toolkit [189]. We use subsamples and encrypted subsamples interchangeably, by referring
Y , throughout the paper.
4.5.3 Secret Sharing
Our construction will use STLPSI (introduced in the next section) along with a t-out-of-T
secret sharing scheme, whose syntax, correctness and security we now define.
Definition 4.5.1. t-out-of-T Secret Sharing. A t-out-of-T secret sharing scheme is de-
fined by algorithms (KS,KR) for sharing and reconstructing a secret. The domain of
secrets is {0, 1}K, where K is some parameter. KS takes a secret s and outputs a set
{ss1, ..., ssT} of shares. KR takes as input a set of shares {ss1, ..., ssd} and returns an
integer s ∈ {0, 1}K if d ≥ t, or ⊥ if d < t.
Correctness. For correctness we demand that for any s ∈ {0, 1}K, any set SS ∈
[KS(s)], and SSi ⊆ SS, where |SSi| ≥ t, it holds that KR(SSi) = s with probability 1.
Privacy. For privacy we demand that for any s ∈ {0, 1}K and set SS ∈ [KS(s)] it holds
that any subset SSi ⊆ SS of size |SSi| < t does not give any information about s, i.e., its
probability distribution is independent of s.
In our protocol, S generates t-out-of-T secret shares for the label li ∈ LS associated
with the ith entry in its database. Note that S attaches an agreed-upon token 0λ, where λ
is a security parameter, to each label li before secret sharing it. Then, C can verify if any
set of t shares (obtained via a single STLPSI execution) correctly reconstruct a valid label.
Overall, for a given label li ∈ LS, S generates {ssi1, ..., ssiT} $← KS(0λ || li).
4.5.4 Set Threshold LPSI (STLPSI)
Though prior steps prepare the inputs to accommodate a t-out-of-T matching, existing
private t-out-of-T matching schemes are not practical for a real-time surveillance (see
C’s query, we pay much less to encrypt DB entries.
94
Sect. 4.11.5). We require small communication (e.g., under 128 MB), to support server
with a large (1M rows) database and a WAN or less channel to the client.
A closely related LPSI primitive does achieve above performance [159], but cannot be
plugged in directly as a building block to FLPSI, since it does not implement t-out-of-T
matching (LPSI reveals below-threshold t matching to the client). It is, however, possible
to combine with an appropriate carefully designed secret sharing scheme to achieve this
feature as well.
For modularity and because STLPSI is a useful primitive, we formalize it and imple-
ment it based on prior techniques, mostly drawn from CHLR18. We integrate a number of
optimizations specific to our setting, such as different bucketing, removing now redundant
preprocessing steps and the use of cuckoo hashing in CHLR18. We prove security of the
resulting protocol (Theorem 4.5.1).
Formal Definition of STLPSI
In this section, we formally define a general syntax and correctness for a private t-out-of-T
matching protocol.
Definition 4.5.2. Set Threshold Labeled Private Set Intersection (STLPSI). STLPSI
protocol is defined by the input space MS, label space SSa, threshold values t, T ∈ N
and the interactive algorithm (C,S). C inputs a query set Y = {y1, . . . , yT} ⊂ MS,
and S inputs database sets X = {X1, . . . ,XN}, where Xi = {xi1, ..., xiT} ⊂ MS, and
SS = {SS1, . . . , SSN}, where SSi = {ssi1, ..., ssiT} ⊂ SS. At the end, C outputs a set
R, while S outputs ⊥.
aSince the labels are secret shares in STLPSI, we use SS for the label space to avoid confusion with the
label space LS of the main protocol.
Correctness. We require that R = {r1, . . . , rN} s.t. for each i ∈ [N ], let r′i =
{(xij, ssij) : xij = yj ∈ Y , ssij ∈ SSi}j∈[T ], then we have that ri = (r′i, li) iff |r′i| ≥ t,
otherwise ri = ∅. That is, through the set R, C learns such tuples (xij, ssij) and the label li
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Functionality FSTLPSI
Given inputs Y ⊂ MS of C, and X = {X1, . . . ,XN} and SS = {SS1, . . . , SSN} of
S, where Xi ⊂ MS and SSi ⊂ SS, the functionality sends the output result set R (cf
Def. 4.5.2) to the client, and nothing to the server.
Figure 4.2: The Ideal Functionality FSTLPSI
associated with them iff it gets at least t exactly matching items between sets Y and Xi.
Now we define the security of STLPSI. Let Π be an STLPSI protocol, defined according
to Def. 4.5.2. The ideal functionality FSTLPSI is defined in Fig. 4.2. Next we recall the
standard definition of securely realizing ideal functionality in the semi-honest model [190],
formulated as Def. 4.5.3 for the 2PC case.
Definition 4.5.3. Securely Realizing Ideal Functionality. We say that a real-world
protocol Π securely realizes an ideal-world functionality F in the presence of static
semi-honest adversaries if there exists a simulator Sim such that, for every corrupt
party Pi, i ∈ {1, 2} and all valid inputs x1, x2, the distributions RealΠ(κ, Pi;x1, x2) and
IdealF ,Sim(κ, Pi;x1, x2) are computationally indistinguishable (in κ). Real and Ideal en-
sembles are defined as follows:
RealΠ(κ, Pi;x1, x2): run Π with security parameter κ, where each party Pi runs honestly
using private input xi. Let Vi denote the final view of party Pi, and let y1, y2 be the final
outputs of the two parties. Output {Vi, (y1, y2)}.
IdealF,Sim(κ, Pi;x1, x2): Let (y1, y2)← F(x1, x2). Output
{Sim(Pi, (xi, yi)), (y1, y2)}.
Now we can put these together to define security of STLPSI.
Definition 4.5.4. STLPSI Security. We say that a protocol ΠSTLPSI = (C, S), defined
w.r.t. input space MS and label space SS, is a secure STLPSI protocol (in the semi-honest




For clarity, we first explain how a private t-out-of-T matching works on two sets, Y from
the client and Xi ∈ X from the server (each with T items) in a strawman design. Then, we
introduce our optimizations for an efficient construction.
Strawman design. First, C and S agree on an FHE scheme, where C generates (public,
secret) keys (pk, sk) and sends pk to S. C also homomorphically encrypts each set item
yj ∈ Y into a ciphertext JyjK and sends to S. Then, S computes JzijK = r×(JyjK−xij)+ssij
under encryption4, where r ∈R P and is refreshed for each computation, and ssij is the
secret share (of label li) associated with xij . S sends the ciphertext JzijK to C. Recall
that secret shares are uniformly sampled items in SS (equal to MS). Notice, zij = sij iff
yj = xij , Otherwise, zij is random on SS. Now, it is guaranteed that C can reconstruct the
label li iff it gets at least t shares of li (see Def. 4.5.1). Otherwise, C learns nothing and
cannot distinguish possible below-threshold t matches.
Optimizations. Applying above evaluation for each DB item does not scale to large
DBs (e.g., of a million sets). We adopt the following optimizations from the (L)PSI liter-
ature for compressing DB items and reducing the circuit depth in FHE evaluations [160,
191, 192, 193, 194, 158, 157, 159]. With the exception of bucketing, we closely follow
CHLR18 [159] in applying the following optimizations:
Polynomial interpolation is used instead of the above strawman to generate JzijK.
To do this, S interpolates an N -degree polynomial Pj , by using (〈item〉, 〈secret share〉)
pairs (xij, ssij) s.t. Pj(xij) = ssij . Since Pj(y) = αNyN + ... + α1y + α0, where the
αi could be pre-computed by S in the offline phase, Pj is homomorphically evaluated in
O(logN) multiplicative depth given JyK. Further, a single JzijK now encodes a secret share
corresponding to any of the matching xij .
Bucketing. Prior exact matching works use different methods (e.g., cuckoo hashing,
4Following [159], we slightly abuse notation to emphasize FHE operations with known values. Formally,
we are computing JzijK = Jr × (yj − xij) + ssijK.
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bloom filters) to bucketize the DB items, so that the query item needs to be compared only
with DB items in the same bucket. In our protocol, since each of T set items are gener-
ated through different LSH projections, each projection is interpreted as a bucket (with N
items). Note that bucketing is a standard PSI technique [195], also used in CHLR18. It
improves asymptotic performance, but concretely is costly, as buckets must be padded with
dummy element for security. Crucially, this additional bucketing is not needed in our ap-
plication. As noted above, projections already define the buckets within which the search
is performed, and they need not be padded.
We combine bucketing with windowing, described next.
Windowing. Interpolating polynomials over buckets doesn’t scale to large N values
(e.g., a million). If C sends the encryptions of y20 , y21 , y22 , ..., y2logN , S can homomor-
phically compute all necessary powers of y in O(log logN) multiplicative depth. This
technique decreases C ←S communication cost by a factor of N , while increasing the C
→S cost by a factor of logN , which has a small impact on overall communication since C
only holds a set of T items.
Splitting. To speed-up homomorphic evaluations, S splits each bucket into a partitions,
s.t. it interpolates a N
a
-degree polynomial per partition. This reduces the multiplicative
depth to O(log log N
a
), and the number of y powers (C sends to S) to log N
a
, but increases
the C ←S communication by a factor of a as S sends results for all partitions to C.
Batching. This is a well-known technique in FHE to enable Single Instruction Multiple
Data (SIMD) on ciphertexts. For more details and example applications, we refer [196,
197, 193, 198, 158]. In this work, we specifically use SIMD batching from FHE library
SEAL [100]. To accommodate it, S groups coefficients, associated with the same powers
of y1, y2, . . . , yT from different buckets, into vectors of length m. Since m is parameterized
as m  T , S also concatenates coefficients from m
T
partitions. This means batching m
T
sets into a single vector, that decreases each partition size to NT
ma
. Finally, C concatenates
its set m
T
times and batches into a plaintext polynomial, then it computes all windowing
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powers of it and sends encryptions of them to S. Overall, batching decreases i) the FHE
multiplicative depth to O(log log NT
ma
); ii) the number of y powers (C sends to S) to log NT
ma
;
and iii) C ←S communication by a factor of m
T
.
Noise flooding. S re-randomizes the returned ciphertexts by adding fresh encryptions
of zero with large noise [199]. This results in increased FHE parameters. See Sect. 4.11.2.
Modulus switching. This is a technique that FHE scheme allows to reduce the com-
plexity of a ciphertext at some degrees [192]. In our design, S performs SEAL’s modulus
switching on encrypted results before sending them to C.
After receiving the evaluation results, the client decrypts each of them to m
T
sets (each





combinations of each set and obtains a label li iff at least t query subsamples match with
the ones from ith database set.
Full Protocol and Security Proof of STLPSI
Our STLPSI protocol and its security theorem are formally presented in Fig. 4.3 and The-
orem 4.5.1, respectively. The intuition for the protocol security is presented above. In this
section, we formally prove the security of our protocol ΠSTLPSI w.r.t. Def. 4.5.4.
Theorem 4.5.1. In the presence of a semantically secure fully homomorphic encryption
and t-out-of-T secret sharing schemes, the ΠSTLPSI protocol of Fig. 4.3 is a secure (in the
semi-honest model) STLPSI protocol with no leakage if each of the server’s input sets of
labels SSi ∈ SS for i ∈ [N ] are:
• randomly sampled (and unknown to C) t-out-of-T Shamir’s secret shares of 0λ || li,
where λ is a security parameter and li ∈ LS is the label associated with ith database
record;
• the domain of secret shares SS is equal to the domain FP of the underlying fully homo-
morphic encryption scheme.
We specifically describe ideal world simulators SimC and SimS emulating the views
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Inputs: C inputs set Y = {y1, . . . , yT} ⊂MS; S inputs X = {X1, . . . ,XN}, where Xi =
{xi1, ..., xiT} ⊂ MS, and SS = {SS1, . . . , SSN}, where SSi = {ssi1, . . . , ssiT} ⊂ SS
is the secret shares of 0λ || li s.t. λ is a param., li ∈ LS.
1. [FHE parameters] Parties agree on FHE parameters (m,mp,mct,P) for an IND-
CPA secure FHE scheme, and on threshold (t), split (B = NT
ma
) and windowing (w ∈
{21, 22, . . . , 2logB}) parameters. Then, C generates (public, secret) FHE keys (pk, sk),
then sends pk to S.
2. [Pre-process X and SS] S bucketizes X into a table and splits each bucket (column)
into a partitions, then interpolates a B-degree polynomial Pk for each partition, s.t.
Pk(xij) = ssij , where ssij is the secret share associated with xij . Then, S batches
coefficients at corresponding row (of lenghtm) of the table into a plaintext polynomial
p`k, where ` ∈ B, k ∈ a.
3. [Compute encrypted query from Y] C concatenates its input set m
T
times and batches
into a plaintext polynomial. Then, it homomorphically encrypts (by using pk) each
windowing power (w) of this plaintext polynomial into the ciphertexts JywK, then sends
them to S.
4. [Homomorphic intersection] S, under encryption, i) expands the received JywK to
{Jy0K, Jy1K, . . . , JyBK}; ii) evaluates JzkK =
B∑̀
=0
Jy`K.p`k for each k ∈ a, and sends all
ciphertexts JzkK to C after applying noise flooding and modulus switching on them.
5. [Decrypt and get result] C decrypts (by using sk) ciphertexts JzkK to obtain result
vector zk (of length m) for each partition k ∈ a. Now, each item of zk will be the
evaluation of Pk(yj) = ssij iff there is any xij = yj in partition k of corresponding
bucket, otherwise the item will be a random element in FP.





combination of consecutive T
items of zk, and gets a reconstruction result si. We have r′i = {(xij, ssij) : xij = yj ∈
Y , ssij ∈ SSi}j∈[T ]. Then si = 0λ || li and ri = (r′i, li) iff |r′i| ≥ t, otherwise si is a
random element from FP (see Def. 4.5.1) and ri = ∅. 0λ validates a label li in DB.
Output: C outputs a result setR = {r1, ..., rN}, where each ri 6= ∅ is recovered in Step 6.
S outputs ⊥.
Figure 4.3: STLPSI protocol ΠSTLPSI
VIEWC and VIEWS of C and S in the real execution for both protocols. Recall, the
player’s view includes its input, output, randomness, and the messages it received. The
(challenging part of the) task of the simulators is to emulate the received messages in a
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consistent manner. Recall, a simulator Sim takes as input the simulated player’s input,
output and leakage (if there is any). In the following, we formally present the required
simulators and the proofs of the indistinguishability of the simulated and real views.
It is immediate that ΠSTLPSI correctly computes the set intersection and the associated
labels if the underlying Shamir’s secret reconstruction succeeds, i.e. when there are at least
t intersecting items between a query and database set (cf. Def. 4.5.1). Now, we formally
prove the Theorem 4.5.1.
Proof. For the ease of exposition, we assume that the simulator/protocol is parameterized
by (t, T, λ,m,mp,mct,P, a, B), which are fixed and public (see Sect. 4.11.2), and that t-
out-of-T secret sharing scheme (Sect. 4.5.3) is used.
SIMULATING THE CLIENT. Recall, SimC takes the client’s query set Y = {y1, . . . , yT} and
the output of the real execution (labels of the matching database sets Xi and corresponding
(item, share) pairs, if at least t of them matched). To construct SimC , we first describe the
real view that needs to be simulated.
Real view of C. In Steps 1-3 and 5-6, C receives no messages, and thus SimC does
nothing to simulate them.
In Step 6, C attempts to reconstruct a label li (and succeeds if there is a matching one.
As required by the security of STLPSI, the client should not learn any below-threshold t
matches. STLPSI achieves this since the server takes a set of secret shares (for each label)
as inputs, and again, Shamir’s secret sharing scheme guarantees the indistinguishability of
each individual share (or any below-threshold t combinations of them) from a random item
in the share domain SS, which is the same with the agreed FHE scheme’s domain FP.
Also note that we assume the server randomly re-generates different set of secret shares
for each label before each execution of STLPSI protocol. This prevents a serious leakage,
an adversary combining (possible) below-threshold t shares, which are obtained across
distinct executions, to sum up enough shares reconstructing a label.
In Step 3, C computes and sends logB homomorphic ciphertexts to S. In Step 4, C
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receives back a homomorphic ciphertexts, each of which is an encryption of a degree-m
FHE plaintext polynomial. Crucially, the ciphertexts sent to C by S are rerandomized with
high noise (noise flooding), to hide the history of ciphertext construction.
Constructing the client’s simulator. We need to simulate the output of Step 4, homo-
morphic evaluations of intersection functions. Hence, SimC is defined as follows.
Recall the SimC has the output of the real execution. Hence, if the output is empty
(there is no match), SimC generates a vectors, where each of them includes m random
items from the agreed FHE scheme’s domain FP. And, if the output has a matching label
li, SimC inserts its associated shares into the corresponding vector indices (which are also
obtained from the output) instead of random items from FP. Then, SimC batches each of
these a vectors into a FHE plaintext polynomial and homomorphically encrypts it into a
ciphertext. The ciphertext is then noise-flooded with the same noise distribution as used in
the protocol. This ensures that the noise distribution in the simulated ciphertext is indistin-
guishable from that of the real execution. SimC then applies modulus switching with the
same parameters as in the real execution. The resulting a ciphertexts serve as a simulation
of the client’s view. By the IND-CPA security assumption on the agreed FHE scheme, this
view is indistinguishable from the client’s view VIEWC in the real execution of ΠSTLPSI.
SIMULATING THE SERVER. Simulating the server is straightforward. In Step 4, S receives
logB ciphertexts, where each of them is an encryption of a degree-m FHE plaintext poly-
nomial. SimS generates new encryptions of zero in place of the encryptions in this step.
By the IND-CPA security of the agreed FHE scheme, this view is indistinguishable from
the server’s view VIEWS in the real execution of ΠSTLPSI.
This completes the proof.
4.6 FLPSI Protocol
In Sect. 4.3.2 we present the technical intuition of our ΠFLPSI protocol. Fig. 4.4 formalizes
that discussion and presents ΠFLPSI for the closeness domain (D,Cl) and label space LS.
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The protocol uses the building blocks AES blockcipher, t-out-of-T secret sharing scheme
(KS,KR), 2PC protocol (CAES,SAES), and STLPSI protocol (CSTLPSI ,SSTLPSI).
In the protocol, Encode is an algorithm that generates L-bit bit vector for an input from
D; kS is 128-bit AES blockcipher key; T is number of subsamples; t is matching threshold;
λ is a security parameter; and ∧ is “logical and” operation, used in subsampling function,
i.e., AESkS (y ∧maskj).
The outputs of both the server’s subsampling in Step 3 and (CAES,SAES) (Step 5), and
the input items of CSTLPSI and SSTLPSI should be in the same domain MS. Moreover, the
output of secret sharing KS (Step 4) and the input labels of SSTLPSI should be from the
same domain SS.
4.6.1 Instantiating FLPSI Protocol
We now discuss specific instantiations of ΠFLPSI building blocks, tailored for our use case.
Discussion of low-level protocol and subprotocol parameters is presented in Sect. 4.11.2.
In the binary encoding step, C and S locally i) encode their raw biometrics (q and di,
resp.) into embedding vectors, by using the state-of-the-art DL model (e.g., FaceNet [24]);
and ii) translate the Euclidean space into Hamming, by using Super-Bit Locality Sensitive
Hash (SBLSH) [118] (see Sect. 3.2.3), that converts DL embeddings into bio-bit vectors (y
and xi, resp.).
Next, following Sect. 4.5.2, C and S generate their subsample sets (Y and Xi, resp.).
Recall that, S generates each projection mask, by randomly choosing Nsb ones, which
essentially turns all other bits into a constant zero.
Before each protocol execution, S regenerates the projection masks, AES encryption
key kS , and secret shares of each label li for each DB record (by using t-out-of-T Shamir’s
secret sharing scheme [200]), so that S ensures that C is not able to use any information
seen in a prior execution.
Finally, parties run STLPSI protocol in Fig. 4.3, where C inputs its subsamples, and
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Inputs: C inputs query q ∈ D; S inputs a database Db = {(d1, l1), ..., (dN , lN)} , where
each di ∈ D and label li∈LS.
1. [Encode] Parties agree on function Encode : D → {0, 1}L. C computes y =
Encode(q), and S computes xi = Encode(di) for each i ∈ [N ].
2. [Init] The server S samples an AES key kS $←{0, 1}128 and T projection masks
{mask1, . . . ,maskT}.
3. [Server’s local subsampling] The server generates subsample set Xi = {xi1, ..., xiT},
where xij ∈MS such that xij = AESkS (xi ∧maskj) for each i ∈ [N ] and j ∈ [T ].
4. [Secret sharing] S generates a secret share set SSi = {ssi1, . . . , ssiT} $← KS(0λ || li)
for each i ∈ [N ], where ssij ∈ SS, 0λ is an agreed token, and li is the ith label.
5. [Client’s 2PC oblivious subsampling] C and S run (CAES,SAES), where CAES inputs
y, SAES inputs kS and {mask1, . . . ,maskT}. Then, CAES learns the subsample set
Y = {y1, ..., yT}, where yj ∈MS s.t. yj = AESkS (y ∧maskj) for each j ∈ [T ], and
SAES learns ⊥.
6. [STLPSI execution] C and S run (CSTLPSI ,SSTLPSI), where CSTLPSI inputs Y , and
SSTLPSI inputsX = {X1, . . . ,XN}, and SS = {SS1, . . . , SSN}. At the end, S learns
⊥, and C learns a set R as per Definition 4.5.2. I.e., we have r′i = {(xij, ssij) : xij =
yj ∈ Y , ssij ∈ SSi}j∈[T ] for each i ∈ [N ], and ri = (r′i, li) iff |r′i| ≥ t, otherwise
ri = ∅. Then, R = {r1, ..., rN}.
Output: For each ri ∈ R, ri 6= ∅, C outputs li label recovered in Step 6. S outputs ⊥.
Figure 4.4: FLPSI protocol ΠFLPSI
S inputs subsamples and their associated secret shares for each DB record. At the end, S
learns nothing and C learns the label li (and matching items) of ith database record iff the
ith record has at least t matching subsamples with the C’s set.
Correctness. The protocol works correctly with small false matching (ε1) and non-
matching (ε2) error probabilities. Since we can only empirically estimate these errors, we
defer this analysis to Sect. 4.11.2. In summary, we target to get maximum error rates of
ε1 = 0.001 and ε2 = 0.01 for the smallest DB.
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4.7 Security Analysis of FLPSI Protocol
We start our analysis by formally defining security of FLPSI. We then state and prove
security in Sect. 4.7.2.
4.7.1 Security Definition of FLPSI
SECURITY DEFINITION DISCUSSION. Following the common approach to modeling se-
curity of 2PC, we use the ideal-real paradigm and consider static security against a semi-
honest adversary that can corrupt at most one participant.
We need to define an ideal functionality for FLPSI and what it means for a protocol to
securely realize it. An ideal functionality takes inputs from the parties, computes the de-
sired parties’ outputs, and returns them to the parties, along with the corresponding leakage
(if any). We require that the view of each party in real protocol’s execution is indistinguish-
able from the view produced by the ideal-world simulator.
This is a common general approach, which, unfortunately, does not fit FLPSI and many
natural biometric functionalities. The difficulty we are facing is that the ideal functionality
must precisely match what happens in the real world. In particular, the parties’ outputs
should have the same distribution in both worlds on all inputs. In our case this would
mean that the ideal functionality specifies the exact probability of any two close elements
correctly identifying as close by the protocol, as well as the probability of far elements
correctly identifying as far. This is unrealistic to achieve for real-world settings, such as
facial biometrics we focus on.
This complication is avoided in game-based definitions, where no ideal functionality
is defined, and hence there is no need to explicitly specify it. Indeed, security there can
be defined as an adversary unable to succeed (e.g., learn something forbidden) with prob-
ability above a certain threshold. However, they will not guarantee that absolutely nothing
additional is revealed, and such protocols are not freely composable – these are features of
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ideal-real style definitions.
Our approach. We reconcile the yin and yang and achieve the best of both by defining
the ideal FLPSI functionality via a reference to a real FLPSI protocol ΠFLPSI. Namely, we
will say that ideal functionality outputs whatever the real ΠFLPSI formally outputs. Recall,
in our case (cf Def. 4.4.2), it is the set R or pairs (q, li). While at the first glance this may
seem a tautology, this approach does provide a guarantee that nothing beyond the explicit
protocol output is revealed. Now we are in a good place, since we can easily control explicit
protocol output by specifying the correctness property. Indeed, Def. 4.4.2 requires (modulo
errors bounded by ε) that the C outputs close labels, and in particular does not output far
labels or any other information it may have learned from the view of execution.
In sum, the correctness requirement of Def. 4.4.2 guarantees that ΠFLPSI’s syntactic
output only contains allowed records; the simulation-based component guarantees that no
additional information (beyond the above output) is revealed. Put together, this makes a
composable and usable security definition. We are not aware of this definitional approach
being used in prior work, and believe it can be broadly useful, especially working with
biometrics.
We caution the reader that the correctness requirement – and hence our definition – are
not perfect. A “bad” protocol may exploit the allowed small manipulations of probabil-
ity of returning each particular record and leak unauthorized information to C. However,
in FLPSI (in contrast, e.g., to MPC of approximations [201]), correctness condition is re-
strictive and severely limits possible leakage: we return input DB records which cannot be
modified to leak. Moreover, our definition can be further tightened, e.g. by correctness re-
quiring that a record return probability does not change if some other DB record changes.
Formal exploration of this new definitional style for fuzzy MPC is an interesting future
research direction.
We parameterize the security definition with a leakage profile describing leakage of
information to the parties. This is common in the searchable encryption but is somewhat
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Functionality FL,ΠFLPSI
Given inputs q ∈ D of C, andDb = {(d1, l1) . . . , (dN , lN)} of S , where each di ∈ D, li ∈
LS,
• trusted party runs an honest execution of the protocol Π on the players’ inputs and
obtains the output result set R;
• return R and LC to the client;
• return LS to the server.
Figure 4.5: The Ideal Functionality FL,ΠFLPSI
novel for MPC-style definitions. Our construction will have very limited leakage to C: a
measure of closeness of C’s input with S’s entry it matched; no leakage in case of no match.
FORMAL FLPSI SECURITY DEFINITION. Let Π be an FLPSI protocol for a closeness
domain (D,Cl) and label space LS, defined according to Def. 4.4.2. Let L = {LC,LS} be
the leakage profile describing leakage to C and S. The ideal functionality FFLPSI is defined
in Fig. 4.5. Then, the security of FLPSI is formally defined as follows.
Definition 4.7.1. FLPSI Security. We say that a protocol ΠFLPSI = (C, S) defined w.r.t.
the closeness domain (D,Cl) is a secure FLPSI protocol (in the semi-honest model) with
leakage profile L = {LC,LS}, if ΠFLPSI securely realizes (cf. Def. 4.5.3) functionality
FL,ΠFLPSIFLPSI of Fig. 4.5.
4.7.2 Security Theorem and Proof of FLPSI
We now formally state the security theorem of FLPSI construction, instantiated with secure
2PC protocols (CAES,SAES) and (CSTLPSI ,SSTLPSI), and Shamir’s t-out-of-T secret shar-
ing scheme. We also state the leakage profile of ΠFLPSI, then prove the security theorem of
it in the semi-honest model.
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Theorem 4.7.1. Assume AES is a pseudorandom function (PRF). In the presence of
secure (in the semi-honest model) 2PC protocols (CAES,SAES) and (CSTLPSI ,SSTLPSI),
and a t-out-of-T secret sharing scheme, the ΠFLPSI protocol of Fig. 4.4 is a secure (in the
semi-honest model) Fuzzy LPSI protocol with leakage profile L = {LC,LS = ⊥}.
Leakage LS to S in ΠFLPSI. There is no leakage to S.
LeakageLC to C in ΠFLPSI. ΠFLPSI reveals to the client a measure of quality of the match
with the database entry (i.e., the number of (obliviously) encrypted matching subsamples).
In case of multiple matches, the client also learns which (obliviously) encrypted subsamples
matched (i.e. were common) across the different matched database entries.
Recall that our initial privacy goal is to achieve client privacy, which is satisfied by
revealing and leaking nothing to the server. Furthermore, we emphasize the leakage to the
client is strictly less (and in fact much less) than the client learning the matching database
entry(ies) (or its bit vector) of the server. It is easy to see that this leakage is inferred from
the matching entry(ies) held by the server. Inspecting the relevant portion of the proof, it is
easy to see that the SimC actions informed by leakage can be easily performed without LC ,
and with the knowledge of the matching database entries of the server.
In a typical scenario, where parties share all the information/data about matches (e.g.,
photos, name, age, etc. of a person of interest) with each other, this leakage does not have
any security impact on the desired system.
Now we formally prove the security of our main protocol ΠFLPSI w.r.t. Def. 4.7.1
Proof. In the following, we prove Theorem 4.7.1.
SIMULATING THE CLIENT. We first describe C’s view, and then construct its simulator.
Describing the client’s view. After describing VIEWC , we explain what the simu-
lator does to simulate the view and why this works. The simulator SimC’s inputs are a
query q ∈ D, the leakage LC , and the output of the real execution (label(s) of the matched
biometric(s), if any match occurred).
108
Let q be the client’s query biometric data, and y be the output bio-bit vector, computed
through DL, SBLSH and NR in the preprocessing. Only y is used in the rest of the protocol.
The preprocessing stage (Step 1) and Steps 2-4 are non-interactive and the client re-
ceives no messages. Hence, SimC does nothing to simulate these steps.
In Step 5, C and S run MPC, where C inputs y, and S inputs kS and
{mask1, . . . ,maskT}. Then, C gets subsample set Y = {y1, . . . , yT} s.t. yj = AESkS (y ∧
maskj). C receives MPC messages here, which (by the security of the underlying MPC
protocol) carry no information and are simulated by the simulator guaranteed by the MPC
protocol. However, the output of the MPC is something that C obtains in its view, and we
need to simulate it.
In Step 6, the client submits the encrypted subsamples Y = {y1, . . . , yT}, received from
Step 5, to the STLPSI protocol and gets the set of shares (and identities of the corresponding
matching encrypted subsamples) as output, if there is a match (which means there are
at least t matches). If there was no match, C receives the empty set from the STLPSI
protocol. Because SimC is given the output, it will know whether STLPSI returns empty.
However, in case a match is returned in the FLPSI protocol, we do not know how many
subsamples matched. We cannot simulate this (without leakage), as it depends, e.g., on
how close C’s and S’s matching bio-bit vectors are. Thus, this information (the number of
matched subsamples in case of a match) constitutes leakage LC , and SimC will use it for
the simulation. We again emphasize that this leakage is strictly less (and in fact much less)
than C learning the matching bio-bit vector (or the original biometric) of S.
Constructing the client’s simulator. We need to simulate the output and input of the
STLPSI call in Step 6. STLPSI inputs from the client is the set of elements (simulated
by random elements in the range of the AES function and which are further used in the
simulation of the AES step, described next). STLPSI output to the client is a set of labels
and allows to reconstruct the output of ΠFLPSI, together with the corresponding matched
set elements. The ΠFLPSI output (which is given to SimC as input) indicates if there was a
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match (or matches) and specifies the corresponding label(s).
If no match was achieved, SimC sets the simulated output of STLPSI to be empty.
If there was a single match over the database, SimC knows the label to be returned in
STLPSI. It also uses leakage LC to determine how many subsamples should be returned
in STLPSI. It then uses the received label li to generate the simulated secret shares input
into STLPSI and obtained in the matched subsamples. SimC then randomly chooses the set
elements (from the AES outputs it simulated) to be the ones resulting in matches.
The case of multiple matches is handled similarly. The only interesting difference is in
simulating how many subsamples should be returned for each label li. This is established
with the help of the leakage LC .
Having constructed the simulated input and output of ΠSTLPSI, SimC uses the client-side
simulator guaranteed by the security of ΠSTLPSI, to simulate the messages exchanged as part
of the Step 6. Note that the input of the protocol is distributed according to the requirements
of Theorem 4.5.1, and hence simulation goes through.
We need to simulate messages received in the MPC call of Step 5. The output of the
MPC call is the T random elements chosen by SimC as described above. The input to
the MPC call is the client’s input y, which is also given to SimC . Thus, the real-world
messages generated by the MPC subprotocols called in Step 5 are simulated by running the
client-side simulator provided by the MPC protocol.
This completes the description of the simulator SimC . As noted above, the discussion
included in the view description and the simulator construction is a direct argument of the
indistinguishability of the simulated and real views.
SIMULATING THE SERVER. Simulating S is significantly easier as it does not learn any-
thing or receive any leakage in the protocol execution. The only protocol messages received
by S are those of the calls to MPC and STLPSI in Steps 5 and 6. SimS simulates inputs
to both calls simply by following the protocol on its input, and there are no outputs to
S in these steps. Thus, the messages received by S in these steps are simulated by the
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corresponding server-side simulators of the MPC and STLPSI.
This completes the description of the simulator SimS . The argument of the indistin-
guishability of the simulated and real views is immediate.
This completes the proof.
4.8 Complexity Analysis of FLPSI
In this section, we present the computation and communication complexities wrt the
database and query sizes. C holds a set of T subsamples for a single query, and S holds
a database of N records with associated labels, each with T (subsample, share) pairs. Let
a,B,m be the number of partitions, size of each partition and size of SIMD batching vec-
tor, respectively.
4.8.1 Communication complexity.
FLPSI includes two interactive protocols: 2PC subsampling (CAES,SAES) and STLPSI
(CSTLPSI ,SSTLPSI). Let β be the data transmission cost for a single (CAES,SAES) call,
then the communication complexity for the former is O(Tβ), which does not depend on
the database size. Let ` be the length of an item in MS and SS, which is equal to domain
of FHE scheme FP, where ` = logP. Then, STLPSI has O(a` + T`) = O(T`( NmB +
1)) communication complexity. Since mB could be parameterized to be (almost) equal
to N (see Sect. 4.11.2), the total communication complexity is O(T (` + β)) (or O(T`)
considering the dominant term) in practice. This is sublinear relative to the database, but
linear relative to the number of subsamples.
4.8.2 Computation complexity.
In the offline phase, S needs to interpolate m × a polynomials, each in the degree of
B = NT
ma
. Given that the interpolation has a O(B2) complexity, then the offline com-
111
plexity is O( (NT )
2
ma
) [159]. In the online phase, S homomorphically evaluates a B-degree
interpolation polynomial for all partitions, which has a O(NT
2
m2
) complexity. Since T  m,
we have O(NT
m





combinations among plaintext re-







) share recovery cost through
plaintext data. Note that we fix t to a small value for all of the evaluated datasets, thus the
share recovery cost does not become a bottleneck in our pipeline (e.g., only 0.95% of the
query time, as reported in Fig. 4.9).
4.9 Environment and Implementation Details
We use an Azure F72s v2 instance, which has 72 virtual cores equivalent to that of 2.7
GHz Intel Xeon Platinum 8168 CPU and 144 GB of RAM each. We also have two sets of
experiments: for fast and slow network connections between C and S. While the former
has 500 MB/s connection with 0.5 ms latency, the latter is having 40 MB/s with 34 ms
latency. We use Ubuntu 18.04 in this instance. Note that, even though, our design does not
require a fast network connection or high number of threads, we use above environment for
creating an identical comparison setting with the state-of-the-art [99].
We implement our protocol on top of the homomorphic encryption library SEAL
v3.5 [100], through Brakerski/Fan-Vercauteren (BFV) scheme [202]. To extract embed-
ding vectors from facial images, we use the Python implementation of FaceNet5 (with the
Inception-Resnet-V1 architecture [203]) after aligning faces, as recommended in [204].
4.10 Optimizing FLPSI Implementation
In addition to applying optimization tricks to compress the database and reduce the homo-
morphic multiplication depth in STLPSI, as explained in Sect. 4.5.4, we further optimize
our protocol for better performance and accuracy as follows.
5https://github.com/davidsandberg/facenet
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4.10.1 Noise reduction (NR) in binary encoding.
Inspired by [80, 120, 19], the client can extract multiple face samples from a short surveil-
lance video in order to perform noise removal. This can be done very seamlessly at some
specific application scenarios. Since people cannot be completely in the same pose through-
out a video recording, C can treat each individual frame in a video as a different sample.
On the other hand, S can capture multiple samples per person more conveniently since it
may have a controlled environment unlike C.
In this optimization, both parties take bit vectors, generated in the binary encoding step
(from Sect. 4.5.1) through multiple biometric readings, and majority vote over each bit. If
a certain amount of them agree (e.g., at least 90 percent), they keep it. Otherwise, they
cancel (zero-out) it. After eliminating noisy bits, the residual bit vector is given to the
subsampling layer. We refer Sect. 3.2.4 for more details.
4.10.2 Subsample compression.
Since we use AES blockcipher with 128-bit key kS , we can compress its inputs to 128 bits
to avoid multiple rounds of block-ciphering. This will reduce the online communication
and computation costs of the 2PC subsampling protocol from Sect. 4.5.2. To do this, we can
effectively compress a subsample as it mostly contains zero bits, e.g., only 14-out-of-256
bits are ones in our setting, as follows. We split the bio-bit vector into 128-bit of chunks,
and evenly subsample each chunk (e.g., 7-out-of-128) without colliding subsampled bits
across the chunks. For instance, if 8th bit is subsampled in the first chunk, we do not
subsample 8th bit of the second chunk. Finally, we compute the bit-wise XOR of all chunks
as the compressed output.
4.10.3 Optimizing STLPSI (load balancing).
We introduce a new optimization to balance the loads across the buckets in S’s recon-
structed database (see Sect. 4.5.4). We decrease the number of partitions, as argued next.
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Note that a certain subsample(s) may be the same for too many DB entries, while the rest
are shared by less of them. Also notice, it is not mathematically possible to build a (La-
grange or Newton) interpolation polynomial over such (item, secret share) pairs, where any
two items are the same [205]. That is why S has to put each of the colliding subsamples
into distinct partitions, and thus there is an unavoidable lower bound on the number of
partitions, and accordingly, on the computation and communication costs. In STLPSI, be-
fore building the database, S truncates such (subsample, secret share) pairs after reaching
a certain collision threshold, which balances the load of the each bucket of its constructed
coefficient table. In Sect. 4.11.4, we empirically show the impact of this optimization on
the overall costs.
4.11 Evaluation
In this section, we extensively evaluate our protocol, and then systematically compare it to
the prior art. Note that we achieve our results by applying all optimizations.
4.11.1 Datasets
Evaluation datasets. We use a DL model that is pre-trained on the MSCeleb1M dataset, in-
cluding over 8 million unconstrained facial images of around 100 thousand identities [141].
Query set. We use the YouTube Faces (YTF) benchmark dataset, that contains noisy
collections of unconstrained facial videos from 1,595 public figures [142]. Since the pre-
processing may use multiple biometric scans per person to generate reliable bio-bit vectors,
we randomly pick (at most) ten frames each for C and S to test ε errors. We assume C al-
ways queries these 1,595 people over any size of DB in our experiments.
Database set. We generate photo-realistic synthetic faces to create large-scale databases
since there is no such big public datasets. We use StyleGAN [152] to create databases of
10 thousand (Face-10K), 100 thousand (Face-100K) and one million (Face-1M) identities
along with the YTF identities (with isolated samples from the query set).
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Par. Description Value
t matching threshold 2
T number of subsamples 64
L length of bio-bit-vectors 256
τrb consistency threshold ratio 0.9
Nsb number of subsampled bits 14
kS S’s key for a AES blockcipher {0, 1}128
P prime mod. of domain FP 8519681
λ security param. for token 0λ blogPc=23
N number of database entry [10K-10M]
Figure 4.6: List of parameters and their fixed values.
Comparison datasets. For our comparative analysis, we use AT&T [206] and
Deep1B [207] datasets, which are used in prior art. Note that we use these datasets in
the same way as they are used in the prior art. AT&T6 includes 400 facial images from
40 people, where 8 faces of each (320 in total) are kept as database items and 2 faces of
each are queried. Deep1B contains a billion image descriptors (each 96 dimension vec-
tor), which is generated by passing images through a deep neural network [207]. We use
the original query set, which includes 10 thousand data points, published by the authors7.
And, we conduct queries over two subsets of Deep1B that consist of randomly selected one
million and 10 million entries (labeled as Deep1B-1M and Deep1B-10M, respectively).
We treat Deep1B descriptors as embedding vectors in our pipeline since it is not a facial
dataset.
4.11.2 Parameters
In the following, we introduce the parameters and our parameter selection process. Note
that once we fix our parameters, we use them without changing across different experi-
ments.
ε-correctness errors. These refer to the errors in the ε-correctness of FLPSI. Recall




false rejection rate − FRR). Interpreting in our context, false matches denotes the number
of different identities obtained other than the queried one, while false non-matches standing
for the number of “not exist” results in response to querying existing people in the database.
In our experiments, we target to get at most 10 false matches and 1% false non-match
rate for any of the database sizes, which meets accuracy requirement of the commercial
systems [208, 79, 144].
Parameter choices for the targeted errors. In the following, we summarize our pa-
rameter searching method to find the ones achieving the targeted errors.
In Fig. 4.6, in addition to t and T , we enumerate and describe all parameters
(L, τrb,Nsb) required in DL, SBLSH and NR steps, which affect the errors. We first search
the parameters for the plaintext baseline to see if we can obtain the targeted errors without
enabling privacy-preserving blocks.
Tuning all parameters together has its own challenges because this is a big search space
to explore. Since t and T values (especially t) is also critical for the complexity of our
protocol, we set t = 2 and search for the minimum possible T value. To achieve this, we
first tune the length of bio-bit vectors. Then, we brute force the Nsb and T by targeting to
the minimum errors. We also consider the threshold τrb for the ratio of reliable bits along
with these parameters. Instead of brute forcing, we follow a more probabilistic approach to
find its optimal value. That is, we have to guarantee that enough bits are retained at the end
of the NR layer to pick T distinct subsampling functions (each has Nsb ones). Hence, 1) the
number of the remaining reliable bits (Nrb) should be more than the number of subsampled





≥ T inequality should to be
guaranteed. Finally, we fix our parameters to the values presented in Fig. 4.6.
Parameter choices for privacy-preserving blocks. The parameters of BFV scheme
are three integers (mp,mct,P), where mp is the polynomial modulus degree, mct is the
ciphertext modulus and P is the plaintext modulus [98]. We initialize mp = 213, mct = 218
bits and P = 8519681 to always achieve at least a 128-bit security level as recommended
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# of false FRR (%) for Plaintext / FLPSI
matches Face-10K Face-100K Face-1M
1 2.89/2.95 2.93/2.97 2.99/3.01
2 1.62/1.65 1.86/1.95 2.13/2.18
3 1.26/1.32 1.64/1.66 1.97/2.01
4 1.06/1.14 1.39/1.42 1.55/1.56
5 0.92/1.01 1.14/1.18 1.18/1.25
6 0.81/0.85 0.94/0.97 1.06/1.12
7 0.72/0.77 0.83/0.86 0.92/0.94
8 0.56/0.59 0.74/0.79 0.87/0.92
9 0.53/0.58 0.69/0.74 0.73/0.79
10 0.51/0.56 0.58/0.63 0.67/0.75
Figure 4.7: FRRs of underlying plaintext matching system and FLPSI protocol for at most
10 false matches per query errors.
in [98]. These parameters allow us to perform a standard noise flooding operation as part
of our STLPSI protocol (see Sect. 4.5.4). The LWE estimator8 by Albrecht et al. [209]
suggests 128 − 131 bits security level for this setting. We switch the ciphertext modulus
from 218 to 55 bits in the modulus-switching step to decrease the communication size from
S to C. For the parameters such as standard deviation error and secret key distribution we
use the default values of SEAL. We set the SIMD vector size to m = 8192, and the size of
the token 0λ to 23 bits (at most), which is the same length of the labels of database records.
Achieved errors for the fixed parameters. After fixing the parameters, we measure
the errors of end-to-end FLPSI protocol to see if it holds our ε-correctness requirement.
Fig. 4.7 shows the FRRs per query for the targeted false-matches (at most 10 per query
for any DB size). Note that these error rates have implications on the confidentiality of
DB, and nothing relevant to the query data, which is the first privacy goal of our protocol.
As mentioned before, revealing false matches (e.g., within industrial standards [208, 144,
79]) to the client is allowed since it is unavoidable in desired application. Having said that,
though FLPSI slightly increases the FRR errors compared to underlying plaintext system
(due to the reason explained in Sect. 4.10.3), it still holds the correctness for all settings.
8We use the commit fb7deba from https://bitbucket.org/malb/lwe-estimator/src/master/
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Database
Offline Online Online response time (milliseconds)
Storage Preprocess comm. Computation time with different number of threads Best query
(MB) time (s.) (MB) Th=1 8 16 32 64 72 Sp-up fast slow
Face-10K 5 0.94 12.1 523 93 68 46 57 56 11.4× 47 146
Face-100K 51 4.07 20.4 4457 635 376 257 241 186 24.0× 187 386
Face-1M 501 37.5 40.8 43956 5944 3058 1828 1647 1355 32.4× 1455 1655
Figure 4.8: FLPSI results (per query). The best computation times are in bold-face, and
the best computation speed-ups are measured against the single-threaded results. Total
response times are reported under the last two columns for fast/slow networks.
4.11.3 Costs of FLPSI
Fig. 4.8 shows experimental results of FLPSI protocol. For each database sizeN , it presents
the storage needs and preprocessing times for the offline phase, total online communication
overhead, and end-to-end online computation times for different number of threads (Th).
We report total response times for the fast and slow network configurations, introduced in
Sect. 4.9. For clarity, we discuss the results of a single query over Face-1M dataset in the
following. We average over 100 queries for the FLPSI results.
Offline Preprocessing Cost of FLPSI. We run a one-time initialization phase to com-
pile the DB from facial images. We do not include this cost in our summary tables. Our
protocols refresh t-out-of-T secret sharings and AES blockcipher key kS (both held by S)
per query. This is performed solely by S in expectation of the query. This cost is easily
amortized (run concurrently) with an actively executing query, and we report it as an offline
cost. In our experiments, S needs at most 501 MB of storage and 37.5 sec. to pre-compute
and buffer a copy of constructed database of 1M entries. We include buffer reading time in
the following online evaluations.
Online Communication Cost. We have a fixed (8.5 MB per query) communication
cost from obliviously extracting the subsamples of a single bio-bit-vector of the client
through the 2PC (CAES,SAES) protocol. Hence, this cost is independent from the database
size. FLPSI achieves at most 40.8 MB per query communication cost, which shows that
we are not relying on the fast network connection for efficiency. The last two columns of
Fig. 4.8 show that data communications increase from 100 to 300 ms (at most) even if we
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switch from the fast to slow network connection. This is our major advantage compared
to prior art (see Sect. 4.11.5). Hence, we can conclude that FLPSI is compatible with the
existing network infrastructures of potential clients in the desired surveillance scenario.
Step Party Run time percent
Building encrypted query C 3.66%
Homomorphic evaluation S 91.6%
Decrypting query results C 3.79%
Extracting matches C 0.95%
Figure 4.9: Run time percent. of steps in a query over Face-1M.
Online Computation Cost. Even in the single-threaded execution scenario, FLPSI
achieves promising performance (at most 44 seconds). Given that, since we spend most of
the time for homomorphically evaluating the polynomials on the server side, as presented
in Fig. 4.9, we can use multi-threading to speed up this computation. Note that setting
up a powerful server could be more applicable than providing fast network connections
(e.g., in gigabit scale) for every client. Using 72 threads achieves 32.4× faster computation
compared to using a single thread. Moreover, since S concurrently evaluates partitions,
which could be less than the number of threads for small databases, computation time does
not decrease linearly (or increases) as S uses more threads.
Best end-to-end timing. In Fig. 4.8, we show the best achievable response times for
each of the database sizes at the last two columns. Overall, by using multi-threading, FLPSI
can privately search a single person over a database of a million people in 1.46 sec. and 1.66
sec. with fast and slow network connections, respectively. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the fastest response time compared to prior art, with similar functionality, in a desired
application scenario.
4.11.4 Impact of Load Balancing Optimization
Now we explain how we decrease the overall communication and computation costs,
through the optimization from the Sect. 4.10.3. To do this, we repeat the experiments
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Database
Communication Response time (fast/slow)
(MB) Saving (seconds) Speed up
Face-10K 72 6× 2.12/2.33 4.1×/3.7×
Face-100K 528 26× 17.8/21.7 4.0×/4.7×
Face-1M 2124 52× 189/199 4.3×/4.5×
Figure 4.10: FLPSI per query results taken without load balancing the server’s buckets.
Data communications are reduced by saving factors, and response times are improved
by speed up factors with optimizations.
without applying this optimization, whose results are presented in Fig. 4.10. Then, we
compare them with those in Fig. 4.8. For clarity, we only report total communication over-
heads and single threaded response times. To show the impact of our optimization, we also
report the achieved saving factors in communication and speed ups in computation costs,
by comparing optimized and non-optimized results. Overall, we reduce the communication
overheads up to 52× and speed up the response times up to 4.3/4.5× on fast/slow networks.
4.11.5 End-to-end Comparison with Prior Art
In this section, we systematically compare FLPSI with previous private fuzzy matching
protocols. Considering their functionality and security guarantees for our application sce-
nario, we group prior art in two categories: i) threshold matching and ii) k-nearest neighbor
search. In (i), as in our work, S may return empty result (depending on the ε1 error) to C
if no close entry exists in the database. In (ii), S always guarantees to return k database
entries to C regardless of the query. While (ii) is a different functionality, we compare our
work with protocols in both categories, as the state-of-the-art (SANNS [99]) in (ii) is also
faster than protocols in (i), and is the fastest among protocols “close enough in spirit”.
As discussed earlier, we do not compare with exact matching protocols (e.g., (L)PSI
protocols from [156, 157, 158, 159]), as they do not support fuzzy matches. We solve a
much harder problem than exact matching.
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Comparison to Threshold Matching Approaches
As discussed in Sect. 4.2, prior art either a) applies thresholding to computed Euclidean
(or Hamming and cosine similarity) distance [164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170], or b)
runs t-out-of-T matching [160, 161, 162, 163] between query and database (feature) vec-
tors. Though they satisfy the functionality requirement and security guarantees for our
application scenario, none of them propose a practically applicable system for a real-time
surveillance task.
Protocol
Communication Resp. time (fast)
(MB) Saving (sec.) Speed up
FLPSI 0.39 - 0.014 -
Yasuda et al. [170]† 9.92 25.5× 1.70 121×
Huang et al. [169]† 17.9 46.0× 6.08 434×
Osadchy et al. [168]† 35.2 90.3× 99.2 7086×
Blanton et al. [167] 2.8 7.18× 9.37 669×
Barni et al. [166]† 9.11 23.4× 16.0 1110×
Sadeghi et al. [165] 2.8 7.18× 15.5 1286×
Erkin et al. [164] 7.3 18.7× 18.0 1143×
Figure 4.11: Comparing FLPSI with existing distance thresholding protocols. Commu-
nication costs and response times per query over AT&T database. †Costs are scaled for
AT&T database based on reported results in cited works.
Distance thresholding approaches. Fig. 4.11 compares concrete costs of FLPSI to
prior work [164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170]. Note that the cited works report commu-
nication and computation costs linear in the database size. They achieve between 1.7-99.2
sec. response times and 2.8-35.2 MB network overheads per query over AT&T database.
Further, majority of them do not satisfy our ε-correctness requirements. We achieve
121-7086× faster response time (14 ms. per query) and 7.18-90.3× less communication
for the same database, while meeting our ε-correctness requirements. Note that we consider
single threaded execution for all works, but could not execute them in the exact same en-
vironment. However, since all run on similar clock speeds, our achieved speed-ups would
slightly vary on the same environment.
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CEC [163] O(N|FP|`) O(N(|FP|+T)T′ε)
YSPW [162] O(NT2`) O(N(poly(T)+T2T′ε))





Figure 4.12: Comparing FLPSI with existing t-out-of-T protocols that are still considered
secure. Only the dominant terms are kept for all protocols. ` is the size of a ciphertext in
the chosen encryption scheme. T′ε is the time needed for all homomorphic operations in a
single cycle.
t-out-of-T matching approaches. Systems [161, 162, 163] (referred as CH19, YSPW,
CEC, resp.) are existing, secure, t-out-of-T protocols. Fig. 4.12 compares asymptotic com-
munication and computation complexity of [161, 162, 163] to our system. FLPSI behaves
better both in computation and communication than CH1, YSPW, and CEC protocols, as
both of their communication and computation complexities are linear in database size. Fur-
ther, computation and communication of CEC [163] are linear also with the domain size.
In concrete terms, CEC reports 3GB communication for a database of 100 T -dimension
vectors, where each vector item could be one of 4 distinct letters. Thus, CEC does not
scale for our case (FLPSI operates in a domain with over 223 integers). CH1 [161] and
YSPW [162] do not report concrete costs.
Protocol
Deep1B-1M Deep1B-10M
Communication Response time (fast/slow) Communication Response time (fast/slow)
Total Saving (seconds) Speed up Total Saving (seconds) Speed up
FLPSI 40.8 MB - 1.46/1.66 - 128 MB - 12.7/13.5 -
SANNS-linear 5.39 GB 132× 5.79/41.7 3.97/25.1× 57.7 GB 452× 73.1/446 5.76/33.0×
SANNS-approx 1.72 GB 42× 1.70/15.1 1.16/9.09× 6.07 GB 48× 5.27/41.8 0.41/3.10×
Figure 4.13: Comparing FLPSI to two protocols of SANNS [99]. Best achieved response
times are reported for fast/slow networks.
Comparison to kNNS Approaches
We emphasize that “k-nearest neighbor search” protocols solve a somewhat related, yet
different problem, and do not meet the security guarantees we consider. Nevertheless, we
9Ye et al. [162] break the security of the second protocol from [161].
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compare them to FLPSI because we wish to present a broader perspective and to illustrate
that our work is more efficient not only than protocols for our exact problem, but than any
prior work “close enough in spirit.”
kNNS is related to FLPSI. Before discussing performance, we briefly explain the
relevance of kNNS to our setting. Indeed, a protocol returning a nearest neighbor could be
used to construc a (leaky) FLPSI, e.g. as follows: C and S run 1NNS. C obtains the output
and checks if it meets the threshold of FLPSI before returning it (causing leakage to C if it
does not). To search and return multiple matches, C and S could either proceed iteratively,
increasing k by a small amount, or guess a larger k and risk higher leakage.
Performance comparison. We compare our design with Chen et al. [99]’s two pro-
tocols since, to our knowledge, they are the fastest protocols compared to all other kNNS
approaches [93, 210, 211, 212], which do not use a trusted third-party in their pipelines.
[99] show (at least) 8-31× faster response times compared to optimally implemented
prior art. They propose an optimized linear scan (SANNS-linear) and an approximate
search (SANNS-approx) protocols, which are built upon additive homomorphic encryp-
tion, garbled circuits and oblivious read only memory, to conduct secure kNNS over large
databases.
To conduct an almost identical comparison, we evaluate FLPSI on the same Azure
instances with the same fast/slow network connections, as introduced in Sect. 4.9, and over
the same image datasets: Deep1B-1M and Deep1B-10M.
Communication and computation costs. Fig. 4.13 compares total communication
overheads and the best achieved response times through the fast/slow networks for the both
database sizes. Due to our sublinear communication, FLPSI decreases required bandwidth
by 132-452× and 42-48× (depending on the database size) compared to SANNS’s linear
and approximate protocols, respectively. This implies significant improvement in wall-
clock time, especially on slower networks. In fact, SANNS outperforms FLPSI only on
Deep1B-10M dataset, with fast network connection, and via its approximate algorithm.
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For instance, the best response time of SANNS-approx protocol increases from 1.7 to 15.1
sec. as we switch the network from fast to slow connection. Similarly, SANNS-linear’s
performance decreases even more in the same situation, as it has more data overhead than
their approximate protocol. On the other hand, FLPSI preserves its performance regard-
less of the network connection, as it has 128 MB of communication overhead even for a
database of 10 million entries. Overall, we achieve up to 5.8/33× and 1.2/9.1× faster re-
sponse times compared to SANNS’s linear and approximate protocols, respectively, on the
fast/slow networks.
4.12 Conclusions
We define FLPSI, fuzzy labeled private set intersection, and propose an efficient construc-
tion. In FLPSI, client C holds a biometric query and server S holds a labeled biometric
database, where labels may be, e.g., persons’ identities. In FLPSI, C learns the label iff
the query is in the database, and S will learn nothing. Our definitional approach uniquely
combines the properties of game-based and simulation-based definitions, and can be useful
in other settings.
Designing an efficient protocol for FLPSI is challenging mainly due to the need to
manage the noisiness of biometric data. We realize FLPSI in the semi-honest model from
a blockcipher, garbled circuits, secret sharing, and fully homomorphic encryption.
FLPSI achieves sublinear communication cost relative to the database. Our experi-
ments show that our solution scales well to massive datasets including up to 10 million
entries. Additionally, our comparative results show that i) FLPSI achieves up to 48-452×
less communication cost and ii) up to 3.1/33× faster response times compared to protocols
from the state-of-the-art on a database of 10 million entries. Notably, FLPSI has a major
advantage over prior art by not relying on high speed network connection for efficiency.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this thesis, I introduced three different systems to tackle with the challenges in privacy-
preserving biometric authentication and recognition systems. First, I highlighted the vul-
nerability of existing cloud-based biometric verification/identification services even against
the most crudest attacks. To address this problem, I introduced our live biometric verifica-
tion system, rtCAPTCHA, to tell a real (and the actual) human and automated (large scale)
impostors apart during an authentication process. Instead of playing a cat-and-mouse game
with adversaries through pure ML-based approaches, rtCAPTCHA brings an unavoidable
computation burden to the attackers by forcing them to solve a challenge in a standard
cryptographic challenge-response protocol.
Then, I introduced our system, Justitia, a novel solution to privacy problem in the re-
mote biometric authentication scenario. In Justitia, the server can verify the client without
receiving his/her biometric data in the cleartext. In this context, I first show how to make
fuzzy biometric inputs compatible with the cryptographic primitives, such as fuzzy extrac-
tor, without facing a major accuracy and performance loss. Then, I showed a novel security
assessment technique, which assumes a powerful threat model and suggests a black-box
model to measure the entropy of future biometrics-based authentication systems.
Finally, I proposed our fuzzy labeled private set intersection (FLPSI) protocol, which
aims to protect the privacy of regular citizens in a biometric surveillance scenario. In this
novel “fuzzy biometric matching” protocol, the client can search a biometric data over a
sensitive database (e.g., a criminal database) without revealing the queried biometric data
to the server. To do this, I first show how to convert biometric data of a person into a t-
out-of-T exact-matching set elements. Then, I show how to build an LPSI protocol, that
accepts these set elements as inputs, upon existing cryptographic primitives with proven se-
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curity guarantees. I also introduced a novel security definition that provides a composable
simulation-based model and, at the same time, binds the adversary success instead of pre-
cisely specifying it. Then, I show a formal proof of FLPSI based on this new definitional
approach. We believe this new model creates a template for the future biometrics-based
cryptographic primitives.
5.1 Future Work
Though I highlighted and solved different fundamental problems in the security and pri-
vacy of biometrics-based authentication and identification systems, there are various open
problems and further challenges to address, as summarized in the following.
Dealing with noisy biometrics. Although the state-of-the-art deep learning techniques
achieve high accuracies for different modalities, they still may not be enough for a security
pipeline. Especially considering that the accuracy of these systems are usually measured
through standard benchmark datasets, which might be different than a desired security ap-
plication scenario. In our analysis and experiences, a real-world scenario usually requires
dealing with more noisy settings (e.g., angled camera position, blocked faces, voice sam-
ples with noisy ambient sounds etc.). Having said that all of the proposed techniques in this
dissertation are using off-the-shelf deep learning models as plug-in layers. That is, they can
upgrade a new deep learning model, that deals with noisy data, in the future.
Privacy-preserving liveness detection. In rtCAPTCHA, we proposed a liveness de-
tection system, where the server gets a client’s selfie video, while she is responding random
challenges. This pipeline obviously creates a privacy problem since the server receives the
audio/video in cleartext. Making a privacy-preserving rtCAPTCHA is a challenging task
since i) measuring the user’s response time and transcribing her response on the client-side
is not secure, and ii) doing these analyses on the server-side under encryption may not be
applicable or feasible. The current practice is putting a high trust assumption on either
(or both) client- or server-side, and thus solving the privacy issue in the liveness detection
126
systems is still an open and important problem.
Achieving malicious security in FLPSI. I presented a formal proof for the FLPSI in
the semi-honest security model, where the parties exactly follows the protocol, but try to
infer extra information through the transaction messages. This model satisfies the most of
the real-life scenarios where the parties do not try to corrupt any inputs or divert from the
protocol steps (e.g., two hospitals sharing data privately due to the regulations). On the
other hand, malicious security guarantees a stronger model. For instance, the client may
corrupt protocol inputs or leverage from the prior queries and create a sophisticated input
to the FLPSI protocol to learn additional records from the database. We left malicious
security to the future work.
Batching multiple people in the same FLPSI query. In the current FLPSI protocol,
the client can search one person through a single query instance. However, it could be
possible to query multiple people at the same time without causing additional performance
and communication costs. This could benefit to a scenario where the client captures high
volume of faces in a single frame from a surveillance video footage. I left studying batched-
query to the future work.
Building a real-time surveillance system in the wild. Even though FLPSI presents the
basic protocol and functionality, designing a full-fledged surveillance system is still a chal-
lenging task with many complications such as handling high volume of queries, combining
multiple camera sources, solving recognition fatigues, privacy-preserving face tracking,
answering multiple clients etc. On the other hand, FLPSI could be installed as a software
plug-in to existing surveillance systems without additional hardware requirements. Ac-
cording to my analysis, there is no privacy-preserving biometric surveillance system on the
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